

Enemy Images in War Propaganda

Edited by

MARJA VUORINEN

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INTRODUCTION: ENEMY IMAGES AS INVERSIONS OF THE SELF

MARJA VUORINEN

Inventing an enemy begins, paradoxically, with the invention of the self. The inclusion of some into a limited-membership community, e.g. a national, political or an ethnic group, necessarily presupposes the exclusion of certain others. An in-group identity and an out-group identity therefore become understandable only in relation to one another.¹ The logic of opposites being best defined by one another does not necessarily imply an inequality, let alone open disrespect or acts of violence between the parties, but it can be used to motivate just that. Indeed, the human tendency to define the self as good and the opposing other as less so only too often leads to exactly such practices.

The idea of otherness is based on the social psychological concept of projection coined by Sigmund Freud. Projection begins with splitting what is considered evil, destructive, weak or otherwise faulty apart from the more acceptable psychological and cultural features, and continues by removing the unwanted features from the self by placing them into an other (usually someone who actually is slightly different) in order to mentally protect the self.

A famous illustration of this phenomenon is the 19th century notion of the Orient. Edward Said demonstrates that the historical Orient was created by colonialist Europeans as a counter-image of everything Western, holding the features the westerners did not wish or dare to include into their cherished self-image.²

Creating others is typically done by establishing stereotypes, based on convenient exaggeration of select features. A multiform reality is recast into few simple patterns. The resulting banal categories determine how people belonging to a stereotyped group are perceived. A vicious circle forms when negative presuppositions gain evidence through seemingly spontaneous, neutral observation, making them seem natural and eternal.

¹ Wingfield, "Introduction".

² Said, *Orientalism*.

Every community has members whose behaviour is less than perfect; sometimes they even resemble the negative stereotype. This so-called kernel-of-truth argument provides ground for negative characterisation and makes the negative stereotypes appear partly true.

Enmity and otherness, two identity-creating, identity-reversing concepts of exclusion have a lot in common. Every enemy is an other, but all others are not enemies. The process of establishing an enemy-image through first creating an other can be illustrated by the following conceptual sequence.

In the beginning there is a perception of difference in comparison to the in-group self, producing a preliminary division into Us and Them. This is followed by a process of othering, i. e. projecting unwanted features away from the self and onto the out-group, preconceived as separate and different, which thus becomes a negation of the self. From then on they are everything that we don't wish, or dare, to be. A counter-image is formed when the self, in turn, gets to be defined more and more as the negation of the other – what is perceived or deemed typical for them cannot be included in the image of us anymore.

At this point the division into categories of Self and Other is complete. If the other it is perceived as threatening, at a certain historical moment, it can easily be formed to represent an Enemy. A long-established enemy-image may be developed into an Arch-enemy, a standing threat that seems to be always present.³

The starting point of any politics of hate necessarily is the definition of the self as good. As the idea about what's good varies but little, all in-groups tend to be imagined along fairly similar lines. Goodness, honesty, righteousness, purity, proper manners, hard work, right religion, high but not over-ripe culture and decency are the hallmarks of the Self, while the Other is accused of being evil, untruthful, crooked, impure, ill-mannered, lazy, superstitious, barbaric or decadent, and immoral. What is natural and normal, genuine and legitimate, are always 'our' qualities.⁴ Correspondingly, the imagined others and enemies also resemble one another, as the available assortment of vices projected upon them is also universal.

The self-explanatory notion of placing the defining Self into the centre of things is susceptible to alterations vis-à-vis the location of its definitional opposite. The defining in-group is not actually quite as neutral a zero point as it likes to suggest: it is constantly re-moulded and shifted

³ Agnew, "Czechs, Germans, Bohemians? Images of Self and Other in Bohemia to 1848", 68; Gellner, *Nations and nationalism*, 75; Harle, *The enemy with a thousand faces: the tradition of the other in western political thought and history*, 9-21; Wingfield, *ibid.*

⁴ Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 65; Harle, *ibid.*, 13.

about by the ideological opposites it creates for itself. In the end image and counter-image create one another: they make sense only in mutual relation. Enemy-images become inverse images of the Self.

The image of an enemy is essentially an image of threat. It represents an imminence of unwanted acts towards the Self, and motivates a subsequent need to remain vigilant, to plan defence or even to actively engage in a pre-emptive first attack. The main difference between Other and Enemy lies specifically in their respective activeness – an enemy is perceived, or imagined, to be actually menacing, while the other is deemed unthreatening.

When unwanted features are projected into an imagined faulty Other, the set of bad features is captivated into a separate form that is distant, passive and relatively stable, mentally located not only outside but also way below the Self. As a result the Other can be observed safely, and is rarely perceived as actively threatening.⁵ An Enemy, however, cannot be trusted to keep its distance, but is suspected of – or, eminently worse, perceived as – approaching: drawing nearer and eventually closing in, presumably in order to conquer, kill, enslave, destroy, damage, and/or steal.

To discover an enemy one thus has to define where it is supposed to be situated, whether or not it is moving closer, how close by it currently is, and whether it operates openly or under cover.

As the in-group Self typically places itself into the mental centre of things, the different enemies accordingly find their places within concentric zones around the defining centre. The outer circle is inhabited by the geographic, military enemies of the state or nation; they are the *enemies from outside*. The outer zone can be further divided into neighbouring states and more distant ones, situated beyond the immediate neighbours or even further away. In the next circle inwards are the *intimate enemies*: those who live within the same society but outside the defining Self, e.g. ‘the nation’, a particular class, or some other ideologically self-conscious in-group. This type is easily discerned and therefore relatively easy to deal with. The most sinister case is the *enemy within*: an invisible threat hiding inside the in-group community, so far unidentified and therefore very dangerous as a potential source of aggression right in the midst of Us.⁶

When the location of evil has been firmly established, it becomes possible to act upon this knowledge. As Gaetano Mosca once ironically

⁵ Said, *ibid.*

⁶ Harle *ibid.*, 35.

put it, 'with the general perception of evil comes confidence in the possibility of promptly alleviating it'.⁷

Destroying an enemy that has been defined as essentially evil will soon appear rational, legitimate, and even honourable.⁸ A situation when it is legitimate to attack, let alone systematically destroy other people must nevertheless be considered extreme, and thus exceptional. Ordinary peaceful societies function according to the opposite presupposition. The cultural programming of an average civilian is necessarily non-violent, to enable them to live in the society. To bypass this, the enemy must be redefined as inhuman. Immediately after a warlike period the threshold to resume killing is understandably lower than after a long peace.

When a passive enemy-image is activated and made into a motive for action, the situation is apt to escalate into conflict. Most elaborate enemy imagery is related to wars between nations, when propaganda is broadcast by both mass media and official state organs. Such imagery is often of international origin, circulated freely between allies.⁹ Sometimes similar imagery is utilised, with minor revisions, by both sides. Internal conflicts of a civil war type rely less on planned, official propaganda and more on spontaneous, create-as-you-go type of ideological messages.

A plausible explanation for emergence and escalation of political violence within a society is a process of scapegoating that eventually leads to a witch-hunt. The progression of events, from the first becoming aware of a set of problems to a full-blown internal warfare has been brilliantly described by David Frankfurter. It starts with a situation that looks ordinary enough. A community faces problems, which are at first dealt with locally, looking for local explanations – until along comes someone, typically from outside, who brings with him a knowledge of the local situation being a part of a much larger economic, religious, political or ethnic conflict, allegedly caused by a conspiracy of evil people who greatly profit from the present order of things. The community is thus introduced to a complex, ready-made scheme, that seems to make sense, but actually just offers an easy explanation by renaming the original problem and giving it a universal label. When doing so it points out who are the victims and – more to the point – who is the guilty party, and provides a detailed programme about how to proceed to solve the problem for good. The newcomers offer to help the locals to destroy the guilty

⁷ Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 280.

⁸ Frankfurter, *Evil Incarnate: Rumors of Demonic Conspiracy and Satanic Abuse in History*, 33-4, 46-7, 87, 159-60, 176, 208-24; Schmitt, *ibid.*, 6, 54, 79. Lippmann, *ibid.* 61.

⁹ E.g. Hayward, *Myths & legends of the First World War*, 76, 80 and *passim*.

ones, in the bargain becoming their champions, perhaps even permanent leaders. A witch-hunt ensues, organised by these self-appointed, self-styled heroes.¹⁰ Even non-violent political battles often resort to similar rhetoric, urging the followers to eradicate an opponent. Political uses of hate speech thus include the same hero factor as actual battles.

Political enemy images are particularly useful for upwardly mobile groups. Carl Schmitt went so far as to suggest that any political movement, to define itself, has to discover – perceive, define or imagine – an enemy, to know not only what they stand for but also, what they oppose. To know who we are, what we strive for, whom we protect and what we cherish, it is necessary also to know who doesn't belong, what will not be tolerated, who is to blame and who may have to be destroyed.¹¹

Enemy images are the paragon of negative stereotyping. Universally, stereotypes need not necessarily be either negative or unchangeable. As cognitive structures they enable a relevant comparison between categories and make individuals understandable as average members of a group.¹²

Even though all stereotypes definitely are not enemy images, all enemy images are stereotypes in the most negative sense of the word. Imagined enemies are necessarily simplified and purpose-oriented images, put up to cover only such aspects of those who they are supposed to portray that motivate the aggression of the defining party. In them a multifaceted, changing reality is reduced into a few features blown out of proportion and presented as innate and permanent. To be convincing an enemy-image must be easily recognisable, openly threatening, rationally or at least pseudo-rationally justifiable, and emotionally touching.¹³

Discourses of enmity are created, maintained, negotiated and modified within the community. Enemy images can appear spontaneously whenever there is a crisis involving separate groups. However, the most powerful, clear-cut images of enmity usually come into the world as conscious creations of propaganda machinery, and are aggressively spread through available media. If they are internalised by the community, they may become a permanent feature of popular thought, continuously renewing themselves within a culture. Images that reinforce and unite the community by acting as a safety valve, relieving pressure e.g. by allowing

¹⁰ Frankfurter, *ibid.*

¹¹ Schmitt, *ibid.*, 65.

¹² Oakes, Haslam and Turner, *Stereotyping and social reality*.

¹³ Frankfurter, *ibid.*, xii, 5, 31, 39, 76, 101, 208-24; Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, 31-54. Hobsbawm, "Mass-producing traditions: Europe, 1870-1914", 279, 291-2, 302.

the people to blame some obvious social evil on an uncontrollable outside force, tend to become the most popular.

The media plays a crucial role in the mobilisation of the masses. In the modern, democratic society where ideological power is wielded by way of persuasion, the media takes on a lion's share of both the creating and the broadcasting of propaganda. In the early days of the mass society this role was given to print media, newspapers and books of both fact and fiction, then to cinematic film and later on to radio and television. Latest innovation in the field of communications is the internet, differing from the previous in its disintegrated nature. It has recently shown its applicability for both political mobilisation and stirring up riots.¹⁴

New groups that rise into fame and power by surfing a revolutionary tidal waves typically end up defining themselves as those who overthrew an enemy of the people. For them the enemy, even when vanquished, still has its uses. By keeping up the memory of a former threat, allegedly still lurking in the shadows, they can by one stroke create a permanent mobilising myth, deny their own quest for power and at the same time legitimise it by referring to a greater evil that has to be kept constantly in check. And, as Anton Blok has pointed out, highlighting such differences is all the more vital when the actual differences between rival groups are small, even verging on nonexistent.¹⁵

The enemy categories discussed in this book are typically seen from outside, as instruments of negative identification: as others, who at a certain point of time have become somebody's enemies. What we are about to witness are thus essentially tendentious, distorted ways of thinking. In each case it remains with the reader to decide, whether the expressed threats were genuine or not. The in-groups are referred to as the holders of the defining centre, often representing a so-called ironic we: a self-identity that is imagined to be constant, but whose essence and position change as enmities change.

On the other hand, those who have successfully brought out and even put into action a violence-inducing hate speech are often themselves treated, by the posterity, as enemies of the public good. The in-group self can be pronounced rational and good, and the enemy respectively irrational and evil, but others may later reverse this judgement.

Yet the problem of evil concerns everybody. The issue simply cannot be boiled down to saying that evil people do evil deeds. Both good and bad things are done by ordinary people. Sometimes the worst evil is born

¹⁴ Most notably the so-called Arab Spring or the revolutionary wave of protests occurring in the Arab world from December 2010 onwards.

¹⁵ Blok, *Honour and Violence*, 115-35.

out of what might be called goodness-gone-bad. A self-righteous motivation allowing someone to deal out allegedly justified punishments, in the name of a chosen group of suffering victims, may well lead to attacking relatively innocent parties as surrogate enemies. It is easier to point out scapegoats, to have someone to blame, instead of slowly and painfully working out how to actually solve a problem for the good of all. For scapegoats, when unjustly blamed, also eventually end up as victims.

A researcher, more than anybody else, must steer clear of the allure of taking sides. While events unfold, all involved parties typically believe that they are in possession of a right cause and a legitimate interest. In a conflict, and its ensuing historiography, there are winners and losers. Neither party is in themselves a reliable witness, regardless of their position on the post-conflict stage.

In an optimal situation we have access to tales told by each side and can eventually judge for ourselves. Historians possibly do best if they just describe what happened, letting the past events and attitudes speak for themselves. Even a modicum of what has been called *methodological empathy*, a willingness to try and understand a group typically cast as evildoers as they at their time understood themselves,¹⁶ is recommendable for any student of enmity.

In a world where more and more people are concerned about the unchecked spread of hate speech, the old flippant definition of the ideological opponent as ‘those whom we love to hate’ may be about to be reversed. It is tempting to define those who think differently, e.g. those who criticize the current politics of multiculturalism, immigration or globalisation, as ‘those who only hate’, whereas the self-styled tolerant majority pronounces itself as ‘those who choose to love’ – the object of such an ideologically motivated love of course being those who, according to the defining party, truly deserve to be loved.¹⁷

The inclination to see one’s opponent as being full of hate, not just as a political adversary with differing – opposing! – opinions, typically goes with a tendency to see one’s own in-group as the epitome of love. This so-

¹⁶ The concept was coined by George Mosse. It has been applied particularly by the researchers of fascism, notably Roger Griffin. See Feldman, “Editorial introduction”, xiv, xxiv and Griffin, *A Fascist Century*, 21, 99.

¹⁷ This ‘we love, they hate’ definition of a national in-group was particularly striking in the Norwegian response to the mass murder committed by Anders Behring Breivik in July 2011. See e.g. <http://interuwcimag.wordpress.com/2011/08/03/answer-hate-with-love-response-to-the-terrorist-attack-in-norway/>

called sentimentalism is based on a moralistic notion that there is right and wrong kind of thinking and, respectively, good and bad people. It brings about an offhand division of social phenomena into acceptable and unacceptable, instead of seeing them as equally legitimate options, thus allowing people to be divided neatly into victims and oppressors. As such, it is liable to produce black-and-white thinking, particularly when it comes to tolerating – or, not tolerating – differences of political opinion. When the opponent is classified as evil from the outset, there is no need to negotiate, or even to listen to the other's point of view.¹⁸ Truly democratic discourse, on the other hand, is based on the exact opposite: expressed differences of opinion are acceptable, necessary, even indispensable. The best possible solution can only be reached after a genuine and detailed argument, taking into consideration as many different sides of the matter as possible.

Even though they at a first glance seem immensely distant from one another, hate speech and love speech constitute the opposite ends of one and the same continuum. Both can be used equally for separating Us from Them. A good example of such practice is evident in the long history of nationalist ideologies: whom the nation is urged to love directly indicates whom it must hate. Most bluntly this mindset has been called, by theorists on fascism, the 'Gardening state': an inclination to try and dictate which groups, or ideologies, are allowed to grow within a certain state or society, and which must be uprooted.¹⁹

Research on hate speech in general suffers from a phenomenon that might be called the backwards path. A retrospective glance always reveals a preceding process. Every outbreak of violence can be followed back to its source: to the hate speech that appeared and developed, decades in the making, slowly gained momentum, and eventually sprouted a deadly bloom.

Yet, not all stereotypes are negative and not all discourses of hate ever result in actual violence. Hate speech can at times be a fairly safe way of letting out hot air in a social conflict. Born out of an initial friction, in a newly formed contact situation, it can peter out speedily enough without causing considerable damage. Opinions can and do change and differences can be settled without bloodshed.

On the other hand, history knows far too many developments in which vicious representations of enemies, either outside or inside a society, have

¹⁸ For an inspired, if also indignant, analysis of sentimentalism, see Dalrymple, *Spoilt Rotten: The Toxic Cult of Sentimentality*.

¹⁹ The concept was originally introduced by Zygmunt Bauman; see Griffin, *A Fascist Century*, 43.

given momentum to escalation and led to acts of violence on either individual or mass scale. Too often a story has preceded a deed: a supposed knowledge of what some of Them have already done to some of Us has inspired and justified the first actual atrocities.

This volume documents actual instances of enemy imagery and historical cases of hate speech at their most destructive: as they appear in the context of war and preparation of war, paramilitary action and civil unrest. The cases discussed range from early 20th century revolutionary civil war setting to the ideologically explosive interwar period, and onwards, to the Second World War, the more recent Rwandan genocide and the ongoing conflict in the Middle-East. We even look into the near future: when enemies are about to become invisible, what is left of their images?

Tiina Lintunen tackles the moralist, judgemental treatment of Red female soldiers by the propagandists of the opposing side – the conservative, chauvinist, tradition-loving White male writers. The case in point is the Finnish Civil War of 1918 that broke out towards the end of the World War I, at least partly as a corollary of the Russian October Revolution.

The nationalist ideologues typically condemn ‘our women’ who have associated with the enemy socially or sexually, particularly in wartime conditions. The backlash follows closely after the end of hostilities, often in the form of public cutting of hair and other similar acts of personal shaming, thus making them run the gauntlet of indignant townspeople.

As Lintunen shows, in the cases of civil war the treatment of women enemy soldiers is considerably harder. The women in question have not only transgressed the boundaries, but gone completely over. They have co-opted the ideology of the opponent and consequently joined the ranks of the enemy. They are accordingly presented as monsters who by carrying arms and engaging in actual battle have violated not only the ideals of their nation but the very idea of ‘normal’ womanhood.

The article by Marja Vuorinen focuses on the enemy images presented in Adolf Hitler’s one-time best-seller, *Mein Kampf* (My struggle, 1925-6), in which he outlined an early version of his political programme. *Mein Kampf* is a highly controversial, notorious book. With its flagrant racist and otherwise hateful content it has well earned its reputation as an ‘evil’ book. One of its main features is an assortment of perceived enemies: imagined counter-forces threatening to curb the success of the German nation.

The enemies listed in *Mein Kampf* include the Bolsheviks, the Jews, the Austrian royal house, German parliamentarians, (Jewish) Viennese

journalists and intellectuals, and speculating international (Jewish) capitalists. Most of these negative images were not created by Hitler, but came from a much older European stock.

Actually, Hitler's most effective innovation may well have been to bring the Good Self back to the foreground. Imagining the superior Aryan German race as the eventual historical winner, and himself as its messiah, was the recipe for his temporary success. The enemy-images were, at least to some extent, introduced specifically as inversions, to accentuate the heroic self-image. This did not prevent them from being lethal.

Vesa Vares' groundbreaking article focuses on the deliberate use of humour to convey comic aspects of the enemy. In general, the war-time propaganda has a tendency towards the pathetic. Representations of threatening military adversaries and suffering civilian victims are usually deadly serious, as fits their grim context.

Consequently, humoristic enemy images rarely appear as a topic of research. Humour is, after all, a mediating genre. No matter how crude or inane the humorous expressions may be, they nevertheless presents a more human face of the opponent – particularly when compared to the more traditional images of cruel, pillaging, murdering enemies.

The target enemy that Vares discusses is the Russian (Soviet) army of the World War II, as portrayed in the Finnish wartime newspaper causeries and short comic films intended for audiences on both the home and the fighting front, designed to keep up the morale of the nation. Vares' typology of fictional enemy characters, both in their deadly serious and more comic aspects, clearly has a potential of being applied to other similar cases of enemy imagery.

The images of the Soviet soldiers as stupid, lazy, greedy, and not particularly brave, constantly at war with their equally stupid superiors, drew upon older images of a more peaceful past. Their main function was not so much to show the enemy as human, but rather to remind, by showing the opposite, the fighting Finnish nation of its own superior qualities, such as intellect, work ethic, selflessness, acceptance of hierarchy and a courageous spirit. Presenting the enemy in a comic guise added pleasant new flavour to the basic message. The average reader no doubt felt empowered by the flattering comparison.

Sarah Gendron's article deals with one of the most recent and most striking cases of an ethnic conflict slowly reaching a critical point during the course of decades, culminating in a mass murder with a death toll rising up to an estimate of 800 000 people.

The genocide that took place in 1994 in the small East African nation of Rwanda over the course of approximately 100 days was the outcome of

a longstanding ethnic tension between two peoples, who had slowly grown politically and culturally more and more apart: the minority Tutsi, who had controlled power for centuries, and the majority Hutu, who had seized power in the rebellion of 1959–62 by overthrowing the earlier Tutsi monarchy.

Coming, as it seemed, out of nowhere, with the aid of a powerful media machine, the propaganda effort deliberately built up a racist hatred. It was conveyed to large, often illiterate audiences mainly via popular music and radio shows. The Rwandan case of mass murder clearly shows the frightening, and frighteningly speedy, power of the media. Furthermore, it illustrates the ability of seemingly harmless, music-based popular radio programmes, which normally seek mainly to entertain audiences, to induce people into horrendous acts, when deliberately used for such ends by unscrupulous individuals.

During the Rwandan genocide, cell-phones and the internet had not yet been introduced. Some lessons about the power of the most modern means of communication can nevertheless be learned from it. Was the Rwandan genocide perhaps a dress rehearsal for certain excesses of the so-called Arab Spring of 2010–11?

Ron Schleifer provides a fresh view on the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict. The chapter deals with how Israelis and Arabs have been using propaganda since the Oslo Accords (1993) in order to further their political goals. Like Vares, Schleifer too uses ‘humoristic’ political cartoons and propaganda films as source materials, even though the humour they may contain is far more dismal in tone. The focus is on the imagery used by each side to project the blame away from the self by way of attaching it to the opponent.

What results is the basic technique of demonization, used by nations and armies systematically since World War I, in order to further their military and political goals. This is done either by way of crude humour, showing the opponents as grotesque or weak in cartoon caricatures, or by way of more straightforward propaganda films, evoking deep anguish by showing children as targets of terrorist marksmen’s bullets. The Israeli and Palestinian media displays a classic arsenal of the rhetoric of blame, e.g. poison and illness metaphors, and portraying the personality of the leader of the opposite side in an unfavourable light.

According to Schleifer, the Palestinians have come out on top in the media war: they use propaganda that is more graphic, shamelessly recycling both ancient myths and the propagandistic creations of yesteryear.

Aki-Mauri Huhtinen looks at modern warfare from the point of view of a modern standing army. His perspective is exceptionally wide, ranging

from the deepest millennia-old tradition to the tentative, slowly materialising possibilities of the present, pointing towards the immediate future. The article carries the reader from the days of Sun Tzu to those of Achilles, and onwards to the present age of Al Qaida and Muammar Gaddafi, of botnet, Facebook and cyberspace, and even beyond, to the future military operations happening so fast that they completely evade the human eye – perhaps even the eye of a cyborg. The focus is on the future of warfare and its relation to the changing philosophy of war.

Huhtinen's article sheds light on the way how an enemy turns from a visible to an invisible enemy. This change is a corollary of the globalising of the economy, supported by the fast-developing information industry. In the western world speed is seen as a virtue. Speeding something up, or speed itself, makes things invisible. The human eye cannot see a missile flying in the sky, a virus advancing inside the human body or the information streams of a computer. Winning the struggles is more and more based on the ability to move faster than the opponent or adversary. Being slow one becomes visible, and at the same time vulnerable: a possible target for the enemy to strike.

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FILTHY WHORES AND BRAVE MOTHERS: WOMEN IN WAR PROPAGANDA

TIINA LINTUNEN

The beginning of the 20th century was a time of change in traditional gender roles. Women began to disobey the traditional norms regulating the relationship of the sexes particularly visibly in the many left-wing revolutionary operations across Europe. In Russia armed women participated in the First World War, as well as in the Russian revolution and the ensuing Civil War. Furthermore, women participated actively in the attempted leftist coups in Germany and Hungary in 1919 and in the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s. Also in Finland women joined the service troops and the Red Guard during the Civil War in 1918.

By supporting the revolution Red women undermine the *status quo*. These women challenged the traditional women's role. Their conservative opponents perceived such action as threatening, confusing and reprehensible. Thus the women provided their opponents a useful way to distance all Red (i.e. leftist) women and represent them as 'the others' who are threatening 'us'. During the war, the Whites (i.e. right wing) spread rumours and strengthened propagandistic stereotypes about the Red women, which affected the public opinion on the White side. Mythical stereotypes were applied to the Red Women, describing them as aggressive, unfeminine, indecent and unfit for motherhood.

Through a textual analysis of newspaper articles and contemporary literature this study argues that morality and conservative ideal of motherhood were the main in-group virtues used in the propaganda against the Red women. These virtues were associated with respectable women at the beginning of the 20th century and the Reds were, accordingly, accused of lacking them.

The defaming of female political opponents has been widely used in connection with civil wars and revolts. The Finnish case serves as an example of how politically active leftist women were stereotyped in the opponents propaganda. It is compared to similar tendencies in certain other European countries, such as Spain and Hungary. The ideal role of a

woman at the beginning of the 20th century and how it was reflected in these threat images shall also be discussed.

1. The images of a woman in war propaganda

Effective psychological war has always been a decisive part of successful warfare. Persuasion and propaganda have been its tools. Propaganda itself is a complex term and scholars have defined it in various ways. I have adopted here the definition by Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell: 'Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.'¹ During the 20th century, propaganda became an even more crucial instrument of warfare since the electronic media enabled its fast distribution to the masses.²

Creating brutal images of the enemy has for centuries been used in propaganda. Its main purpose has been to unify one's own front, to strengthen the national identity and to legitimate aggressive behaviour towards the enemy. The essential content of these images is negativity. The enemy is often described as aggressive, threatening or ridiculous. Old fears and prejudices are re-introduced while accumulating new hatred. These images are based on strong emotions and therefore laborious to disprove by rational arguments.³ Enemy images are seldom restricted to soldiers, or even to men alone. It is typical to stigmatize a whole nation or group as an enemy, including its women. This applies also to civil wars. A major function of propaganda is to alienate the enemy and create boundaries between 'us' and 'them'. Stereotyping the enemy negatively is one of the most used methods of war propaganda. According to Stuart Hall, stereotypes are used to create boundaries between the acceptable and

¹ Jowett and O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 7.

² Finch "Psychological Propaganda: The War of Ideas on Ideas During the First Half of the Twentieth Century", 370-1.

³ Wunsch, "Lupa vihata – propaganda ja viholliskuvat mielipiteen muokkaajina konfliktitilanteissa" [License to hate – propaganda and enemy images moulding the opinion in a conflict], 264; Wunsch, *Punainen uhka. Neuvostoliiton kuva johtavassa suomalaisessa sanomalehdistössä maaliskuusta 1938 talvisodan päättymiseen maaliskuussa 1940*. [The Red Threat. Image of the Soviet Union in Finnish press from March 1938 til the End of the Winter war in March 1940], 18, 353; Luostarinen, *Perivihollinen* [Archenemy], 26; Knightley, *The first Casualty. The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker from the Crimea to Vietnam*, 82-4.

the unacceptable. This division strengthens a sense of solidarity between those who are 'normal' and further excludes the 'abnormal' from the society. According to Hall, stereotypes serve the strategy of splitting, because they clearly divide the members of a society into those who fulfil certain norms and those who do not. This grouping of people should, to a large extent, be seen as an act of exercising power. With the use of stereotypes the in-group also creates a clear impression of 'us'. By categorizing their environment, people create and maintain their own tangible world views.⁴

The aim of war propaganda is not merely to create a negative image of an enemy but also to strengthen one's own national identity. It is extremely important to create concordance among the ranks and evoke one's own superiority over the enemy. Women have an important part in the construction of a positive self-portrait. They often get to represent the purity of the nation. This sets great demands to the women's virtue. They are placed on a pedestal to be admired, but at the same time they are put under public control. As Nagel says, 'women are thought by traditionalists to embody family and national honour; women's shame is the family's shame, the nation's shame, the man's shame.'⁵ In the propaganda the nation's women's virtue is typically emphasised, whereas the women of the opposite side are actively defamed.

2. Case Finland

Finland was declared independent on December 6th, 1917, in the aftermath of the Russian revolution. During the preceding months the nation had divided into Reds (revolutionary leftists) and Whites (government-supporting rightists). The Reds started a revolution⁶ on January 27th, 1918, in the southern Finland. At the same time, the government-supporting Whites undertook actions in the northern Finland against the Red Guard and the Russian military troops still located in Finland. The bloody civil war only lasted for three and a half months, but approximately 36 000 Finns lay dead in its wake. Most of them were Reds, of the losing side.

On a propagandistic level, the Reds, as the citizens of one's own nation who had become enemies, were described by the winning White side as

⁴ Stuart Hall, "The Spectacle of the 'Other'", 258-9.

⁵ Nagel, "Ethnicity and Sexuality", 254.

⁶ The Reds called the uprising a Revolution, whereas the Whites afterwards labelled it a Rebellion. The historians are still arguing about the name of the event, but most prefer the neutral term of Civil War.

brutal creatures. The Whites were referring to them as monsters who had set their inner animal instincts free. This utterly stark image of the enemy included their women as well. The White propaganda utterly condemned the way how the Red women had participated in the war in civil and military tasks.

In civil wars the creation of enemy images is particularly difficult because the citizens, instead of attacking foreign enemies, rise against their own fellow citizens. Thus strong propaganda tools are needed to establish otherness, to create such a negative image of the opponents that warfare against them seems reasonable and acceptable. In the Finnish Civil War both sides aimed to represent the enemy as inhumanly cruel, devious and vile. Many old prejudices were re-established. During the war, newspapers published many articles in which anonymous 'eye-witnesses' told stories of the brutal actions of the enemy. The most negative terms were used to describe the torture that had happened before the actual killing. Nobody was answerable for the truth value of the articles. The responsibility was evaded by the use of passive forms: 'We have been informed by a reliable source'.⁷

Such published rumours facilitated the fine-tuning of the public opinion. The following two quotations from a well known and respected conservative newspaper, *Aamulehti*, published in April 1918 illustrate the common pattern:

This time we shall tell a story of one eye-witness based on his own experiences: 'Everybody'⁸ who is captured alive by these Red beasts is taken to a most awful theatre of torture that the imagination of a depraved diabolic mind can create. These creators of a hell on earth tear their victim's most sensitive body parts to pieces and rejoice at the prolongation of the agonies of the poor victims so that death would not put an end to this infernal performance too early'.⁹

First their shoes were taken off, then they had to stand in the snow until their feet had been frozen and all their clothes were taken off except underwear. Then they had been pricked with bayonets all over their bodies. Even that was not enough, in order to make the bestiality complete

⁷ See Paavolainen, *Poliittisen väkivaltaisuuDET Suomessa 1918 I*: 'Punainen terrori' [Political violence in Finland in 1918: 'Red terror'], 251-5; Turunen, *Veripello: Sisällissodan surmatyöt Pohjois-Kymenlaaksossa 1918* [Fields of Blood: Civil War Killings in Pohjois-Kymenlaakso in 1918], 271-2; Tikka, *Kenttäoikeudet: Välttömät rankaisutoimet Suomen sisällissodassa 1918* [Court-Martial without Law: Punitive Measures in the Finnish Civil War of 1918], 134.

⁸ Emphasis added by the writer.

⁹ Newspaper *Aamulehti* 9.4.1918.

had they all finally been – castrated. This disgusting ‘pleasure’ *is said to be quite usual*¹⁰ for the Reds.¹¹

These articles claim that the Reds tortured *all* of their prisoners and that the castration of the imprisoned male enemies was *quite usual* for them. In reality, most of these rumours of mutilations were based on no evidence. Some of the priests that were named as victims of this sort of violence continued their lives safe and sound.¹² Horror stories, similar to the ones quoted here, were used on both sides of the front, and people believed them at least to a certain extent.¹³ For example, many of those Red women who fled to the east in the end of the war specifically explained that they were scared of the approaching White troops, who *had been said* to be revengeful and violent.¹⁴

3. Red women in myth and stereotype

For the purposes of this article, ‘stereotypes’ are defined as sweeping generalizations based on rumours or anecdotes. By ‘myths’ I refer to stories that at some point have been believed to be true. A myth in itself is a concept with several meanings. In the first place, myths are living and changing stories that fulfil a certain social function. In war propaganda, their obvious function is to glorify one’s own troops and defame the opponents. Myths include connotations and, thus, as it were, reflect the contrast between the accepted and the excluded.¹⁵ Thereby myths can be utilized to produce Otherness.¹⁶

Roland Barthes has stated that what is required of a myth is an immediate effect. Once the myth has spread as the accepted truth disentangling it later is hard because a myth is supposed to be stronger than any rational facts that might be brought up afterwards. Particularly in

¹⁰ Emphasis added by the writer.

¹¹ Newspaper *Aamulehti* 17.4.1918.

¹² Paavolainen, *ibid.*, 251-2.

¹³ Recycled atrocity stories circulated e.g. during the World Wars. See Knightley *ibid.*, 83 and Kranjc “‘Long Live Our Honest Girls’: The Image of Women in Slovene Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1942-1945”, 61f.

¹⁴ Lintunen, *Punaisen naisen kuvat. Vuonna 1918 tuomitut Porin seudun punaiset naiset*. [Images of Red women. The women who were sentenced in 1918 in the district of Pori], 85.

¹⁵ Peltonen and Stenvall, “Johdanto. Myyttien ja symbolien tulkinnoista” [About Interpretations of Myths and Symbols], 11.

¹⁶ Lindholm, “Introduction: A conceptual discussion”, for *Ethnicity and Nationalism. Formation of Identity and Dynamics of Conflict in the 1990s*, 26.

war propaganda, a lot of exaggerated and even downright fabricated tales are told about the atrocities of the enemy. As Barthes has stated, it is too late to try to annul the effects of a story after it has been told, because the damage has already been done. When suspicion once has been thrown on somebody, it is hard to dispel it with new facts.¹⁷

In the war propaganda produced by the Finnish Whites, the Red enemies were described as animals and barbarians, who knew no higher values.¹⁸ The following quotation illuminates how the Red women were correspondingly targeted:

While a Red guardsman villain is called a human beast, this name is only too lenient for his feminine counterpart. Therefore any actions of elimination and punishment must with all intensity be applied also to women and especially to women, because otherwise we will never get this plague pulled out by its roots. So, let us kick the Red women soldiers, whores and Russian brides out of this society, away from the healthy people.

Absolutely away! ¹⁹

At the end of the war a purging of the nation of its disloyal members was demanded in the newspapers. The eliminating should also be applied to the women who were seen to have been depraved by the Red decay. In this stern metaphor, society is the living body in which the Reds are seen as an injurious abscess. In order to heal the society, this sick and evil part of the body should be cut off before the whole body will become contaminated. Accusations of enemies as destroyers of civilisation are typical of hate discourses and similar metaphors have also been used in several other contexts, e.g. in the World Wars.

In the White Finland, the images of the Red women were the result of efficient propaganda. On the basis of certain individuals, generalizations were made about all Red women. Women who served in the Red Guard were described as the unnatural deviations whose very existence threatened the White value system. 'The others' also included the wives and mothers of the Red guardians. They had not participated in the war, but were stigmatized due to their family ties.

Red women were labelled to fit four pejorative categories: women soldiers were called 'tigresses', mothers were seen as 'sources of evil', the nurses were 'sisters of love' and Russian soldiers' girlfriends were

¹⁷ Barthes *Mytologioita* [Mythologies], 183, 191.

¹⁸ Manninen, *Vapauttaistelu, kansalaissota ja kapina* [War of liberation, civil war and rebellion], 155, 167, 221.

¹⁹ Newspaper *Aamulehti* 24.4.1918.

defamed as 'Russian brides'.²⁰ With these stereotypes, the Whites stigmatized Red women as abnormal, vile creatures. The characterisations of these women and the stories about their actions gained ever more peculiar features while spreading during the course of the war.

These stereotypes uncover what the decent women of those days must *not* be like. At the same time, they tell about the ideal woman of the period.

3.1. Women's duties at the war

The women's attendance in the war was seen natural and acceptable when they worked in nursing and maintenance. However, all women were not satisfied with these traditional care tasks but wanted to go to the front to fight. In the Finnish Civil War women of both sides wanted to serve as armed. However, women's aim to fight next to men was strictly condemned by both the White and the Red administration, and military training for women was forbidden.²¹ Defying these prohibitions some young women began to establish detachments by themselves, and eventually there were approximately 2000 armed women in the Red Guard. First they were kept in reserve but as the defeat drew closer, women were allowed first to participate in the patrolling duties and finally accepted to the front in arms.

The negative attitude towards women soldiers was connected to the wider ideas of the period of the ideal gender roles. According to a conservative view the women's natural environment was home, which was the basic unit of the society. As bearers of the home, women were granted a significant role in the building of the nation. With industrialisation the concept of family changed. The idea of the nuclear family was created when young couples started a family after they had migrated to towns in search of work. This was a loosened version of the old wider family model of the several generations' house communities. The nuclear family was a fostering unit to which only the parents and the children belonged. In this model, the woman was responsible both for the home and for the moral education of the children. Wider circles and participation in social activities was reserved for men. It was the woman's social and patriotic duty to raise their children into citizens.²² A similar attitude was dominant

²⁰ Paavolainen, *Poliittisen väkivaltaisuuden Suomessa 1918 II: 'Valkoinen terrori'* [Political violence in Finland in 1918: 'White terror'], 204-6.

²¹ Lintunen, "Punaiset naiset aikansa naiskuvan haastajina" [Red women challenging the image of a woman], 116.

²² Ibid.

also in the Southern Europe. In Catholic Spain an ideal woman was supposed to be a *perfecta casada*, i.e. a perfect housewife who devoted herself to the home and family.²³

The myth of a woman as a being who gives birth and preserves life had been strong.²⁴ A woman was also supposed to maintain and support the *status quo*. Acting as a soldier and killing people was twice as bad when performed by a woman, because that was against the expectations set by her gender role.²⁵ For this reason women's participation in the masculine war was considered unacceptable, reprehensible and threatening. The Whites saw the arming of women in the Red Guard as a double fraud against the prevailing society: it was seen as an attack not only against the legal government but also against the whole gender system.

The women's exceptional military action was strictly condemned in the White propaganda. Three main themes were applied against women-in-arms: they were represented as threatening, ridiculous and immoral. The White propaganda created a brutal image in which women transformed into dreadful beasts when they emerged from their nursing roles and turned into warriors. The newspaper *Uusi Päivä* described how many women who had worked peacefully in the Red Guard in civil tasks at the beginning of the war, eventually fought like animals when the Reds started to withdraw. All members of the Red Guard, men and women, were considered traitors after the war, but women's participation in the rebellion was seen as the most shocking.²⁶

The animalization of the Red women was not the only means to separate them from the Whites. In their speeches and writings, the Whites also tried to ridicule women soldiers. A favourite target of irony was their manly clothing. Female soldiers wore unconventional manly clothes and cut their hair short.²⁷

In their trousers and in other men's wear, wearing, nevertheless, women's shoes and lots of make-up on their faces these guardsmen looked very ridiculous while they stood guard with a rifle on their shoulders. Otherwise they were like little devils.²⁸

²³ Nash, *Defying male civilization: women in the Spanish civil war*, 10-4.

²⁴ Lähteenmäki, "Miehet, naiset ja sota" [Men, women and war], 43-5.

²⁵ Lintunen, *ibid.*, 120f, 130.

²⁶ Newspaper *Uusi Päivä*, 16.4.1918.

²⁷ Hämäläinen, "Lahden työväen järjestyskaarti – punakaarti vv. 1917-1918 organisaationa ja sodankäyntivälineenä" [The Guard of the working class in Lahti – the Red Guard of 1917-1918 as an organization and a tool of warfare], 115.

²⁸ Newspaper *Ilkka* 12.4.1918.

The use of trousers indeed became the characteristic of the armed women, which attracted most attention and suspicion. In the early 1900s women wore only skirts and dresses in public; trousers on a woman were a clear signal of an exception. Deviation from tradition symbolised not only revolution and mutual female solidarity, but also the breaking of the limits previously confining their sex. With their mere clothes the women were able to declare to the surrounding world that they were on their way to search for a change in the system.²⁹

Some Whites saw the arming of the women as the last and most pathetic deed of the Reds. The famous author Juhani Aho described the first woman soldier he saw as follows:

This is now the last version of the Red guardsman, I think. It is melting away like last winter's snow. It really is the last version, it is not a boy, however, but a woman, a chubby little woman, fat and plump, a rifle on her shoulder, an ammunition belt on her waist, a yellow laced shoe on her feet, a woollen knitted skiing cap on her head – in short a woman in arms.³⁰

According to Aho, it was a farce to send women to fight against the German soldiers who were currently landing into Finland in order to help the White Army. Aho's mockery was aimed at these women and, through them, at the whole Red Guard, with its 'pathetic' recourse to recruiting even the help of women. Despite the scorn, women soldiers were taken most seriously. This is evident in the light of the fact that more than 400 of the Red women were executed after the war, without proper trials.³¹

3.2. The role of a mother

'[W]omen's role in nationalism is most often that of a mother, the symbol of the national hearth and home.'³² Mother's capacity as an educator was stressed in both good and bad terms. In the White propaganda the Red mothers were seen as sources of evil who had with their upbringing created Red beasts. The famous Finnish author Ilmari Kianto compared the Red women to she-wolves that produce one litter of

²⁹ Lintunen, *ibid.*, 125.

³⁰ Aho, *Hajamietteitä kapinaviikoilta III* [Reflections from the rebellious weeks III], 195.

³¹ Tukkinen, *Naiskapinallisten henkilötappiot 1918* [The Losses of Female Rebels in 1918], 38-64. Paavolainen 1967, 200. Piironen-Honkanen 1995, 37.

³² Nagel, "Masculinity and nationalism: gender and sexuality in the making of nations", 256.

wolf cubs after another and therefore should be killed above all else. This remark did not exclusively refer to armed women but to all Red women who could bear and rear Red children:

One should ask here why the war saves those women who are seen and known to represent the cruellest element in the Civil War: Should they be saved only because they are women? But is it not a prejudiced or even very short-sighted view not to punish those who with mere reproduction can strengthen the forces of the enemy.³³

The White mothers were admired for their patriarchal spirit.³⁴ White women who had sacrificed their sons and husbands for ‘the sacred war’ were described as heroic, respectable mothers and wives.³⁵ Red mothers, on the other hand, were described as deceitful and cruel. The newspaper *Uusi Päivä* was severe towards all Red women and wished for their punishment, allowing no mercy nor help for them:

You bourgeois people of Finland pity the helpless wives and families of Red guardsmen and at the same time those women bake guns into the breads they deliver to their captured husbands and at the same time those women in front of us threaten us with revenge by shaking their fists at us and insulting us. Are you seeking public mercy for those women who in the shape of hypocrisy and faked poverty, suddenly after throwing away their rifles, come back begging for food while carrying the mind of a snake? If this is the case, then why did the best of our boys die in the war, when you short-sighted support and tend the enemy. You feel sorry for these women but have you not seen that the cruelty of a woman is beyond that of a man. [...] People have to see the consequences of the crime, otherwise the crime does not vanish but we will be laughed at behind our backs, which is now the case.³⁶

The Red mothers, ‘the vixens with malicious tongues’ as they were called, were in the eyes of the Whites responsible for spreading socialism to the next generation. Some even blamed them for the whole war. A finger of reproach was especially pointed at the more mature, politically active women.³⁷ According to the conservatives, women’s duty was to raise their children to become decent citizens. The mothers of the Reds

³³ Newspaper *Keskisuomalainen*, 12.4.1918.

³⁴ Olsson, *Myytti ja kokemus* [Myth and experience], 65.

³⁵ Kivijärvi, “Sankarittaret” [Heroines], 49-52.

³⁶ Newspaper *Uusi Päivä* 26.4.1918.

³⁷ Paavola, *ibid.*, 204. Piironen-Honkanen, *Punakaartin aseelliset naiskomppaniat Suomen sisällissodassa 1918* [Red Guards armed troops of Women in the Finnish Civil War in 1918], 83.

had failed in this task as their offspring had started a rebellion. After the war hundreds of children were duly taken from their Red homes and sent to White foster homes to ensure them a 'decent' upbringing. In Central Europe women were also seen responsible of the transmission of moral values to the next generation. In Munich and Budapest women who supported the revolution were deprecated. Especially teachers were harshly criticized, as the following example from Hungary reveals: 'A new teacher walks among the children; a devilish Red shadow has mounted the teacher's desk.'³⁸

In the White society women had a stereotyped role and the ones supporting revolution did not fit in. They became outsiders.

3.3. Purity versus immorality

As women were seen as the symbolic mothers of the nation, their purity was expected to be impeccable.³⁹ The morality of the female opponents was also a target in war propaganda. In the Finnish context three groups of women were particularly subjected to an attack.

First, there were those women who had kept company with Russian soldiers. They were labeled as treacherous and immoral. The soldiers had not had time to leave the country after Finland became independent, and in the Civil War they supported the Reds. Among the working class, associating romantically with the soldiers was accepted, but the right-wing ideologues soon started to call these women 'Russian brides'. Scorn for them was obvious from the beginning, and after the Civil War these women became objects of derision. Acts of revenge were plotted against them all over the country; there was even talk about marking them with a branding iron. Such punishments were, however, only rarely carried out.⁴⁰ The newspaper *Kaleva* wrote about Russian brides as follows:

This elimination of scum also requires that the dirty and despicable flock of women that have assisted and whored with our persecutors should be

³⁸ Johnson, "The girl with the titus-head: Women in Revolution in Munich and Budapest, 1919", 546.

³⁹ Nagel, *ibid.*, 254.

⁴⁰ Karemaa, *Vihollisia, vainoojia, syöpäläisiä. Venäläisviha Suomessa 1917-1923* [Enemies, persecutors, vermins. Wrath against the Russians in 1917-1923], 102f, 196f. See also Kaarle "Ryssänlimppua, ripaskaa ja vallankumousta Turussa 1901-1917" [Russian bread, trepak and revolution in Turku 1901-1917], 87f.

gathered together, marked with an eternal shameful brand and sent there where their 'friends' are going to.⁴¹

The writer of the article demanded the deportation of these women in order to keep the Finnish race pure. According to him, these women presented a risk of polluting the nation with mix-raced babies. Thoughts of blood purity were approved among some educated circles in Finland and these ideas had strengthened through the German influence.

Local women who have romantic or sexual relations with the enemy during a war are typically condemned. E.g., women who had been with German soldiers in the occupied countries during World War II became targets of harsh criticism and even physical attacks after the war. In France women who had had sexual encounters with the Germans got their heads shaved and swastikas tattooed on their foreheads.⁴² In Norway and Finland women were despised for their affairs and marriages to German soldiers.⁴³ Similarly women who had had a relationship with Soviet soldiers during the occupation in Austria were often condemned by their community.⁴⁴

The second group whose morality was slandered were the women in maintenance troops. The nurses of the Red Guard were given the demeaning nicknamed of 'sisters of love'. A former Member of the Finnish Parliament described them as follows:

Many women left in February from the suburbs of Helsinki to the front pretending to go there as nurses. Soon they were, however, sent back home. Many of them were infected with syphilis.⁴⁵

In most cases, this calumny was not based on any proof. The women worked as nurses and cooks that the army was desperately in need of. Of course there were exceptions on the both sides of the front. Prostitutes found their way to both camps.⁴⁶ According to Cynthia Enloe the defaming of the women who follow the baggage train follows an earlier pattern. In the 17th century Europe groups of prostitutes used to

⁴¹ Newspaper *Kaleva*, 16.2.1918.

⁴² Nagel, "Ethnicity and Sexuality", 107-8. Karemaa, *ibid.*, 102-3.

⁴³ For more information, see Junila, "A Crying Shame? Having a Child with German father in Finland in the 1940s", 5-14.

⁴⁴ Stelzl-Marx, *Freier und Befreier – Zum Beziehungsgeflecht zwischen sowjetischen Besatzungssoldaten und österreichischen Frauen. In Die Rote Armee in Österreich. Sowjetische Besatzung 1945-55*, 442.

⁴⁵ Reima, *Mitä kylvetään, sitä niitetään. Sota-ajan vaikutuksia koteihin, lasten ja nuorten elämään*. [What you sow you will reap. The effects of the war on homes, children and youth], 34.

⁴⁶ Paavolainen, *ibid.*, 205-6.

follow the fighting armies. Their presence stained the reputation of all the women who were accompanying the army, thus bringing the soldiers' wives and daughters into disrepute. A woman of a baggage train was identified as a whore as a matter of course. The fact that they had chosen to live their lives among rough men alone was an adequate proof of their sexual immorality.⁴⁷

Thirdly, also the morals of the women soldiers were challenged. It was proclaimed that they were having indecent relationships with both Russian and Finnish Red soldiers. Similarly during the Spanish Civil War, the Republican women soldiers were a target of defaming. In propaganda they were likewise stigmatized as unnatural, ridiculous and immoral creatures. Moreover, they were accused of spreading venereal diseases and declining the moral standards on the front.⁴⁸

Eliza Ablovatski has shown that a dichotomy of the Pure White Women and Dangerous Red Women flourished, among the political Right-wing movements of the Central Europe during the interwar years. Women who had participated in the revolution and thus defied the prevailing society were condemned as unnatural. The societal wakening of women and their ensuing participation in the revolution was a sign of moral decay that carried a stigma of unrestrained sexuality.⁴⁹

For example, in Hungary in 1919 the women who had participated in the revolution were labelled politically and sexually dangerous and unwomanly. The conservatives saw that the revolution was shaking the very foundations of the traditional institutions and authorities. They named the revolutionary women as the 'representatives of the free love' and claimed that the communists would nationalize all Hungarian women. A strong rumour of the nationalization of women and the collapse of the family institution made many rightists fight fiercely against the revolution.⁵⁰

4. Conclusion

The propagandistic images of the imagined female opponents had an influence on the way how actual women were treated after the Finnish Civil war. While the war lasted, the captured women soldiers became victims for brutal terror. Many of them were raped and killed. Women

⁴⁷ Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives*.

⁴⁸ Nash *Defying male civilization: women in the Spanish civil war*, 110-3. Lannon, "Women and images of women in the Spanish Civil War", 215-7.

⁴⁹ Ablovatski, "Between Red Army and White Guard: Women in Budapest, 1918-1919", 75-7.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 78-80.

soldiers had worn men's uniforms and cut their hair short. Therefore their corpses were disgraced by tearing off their uniforms and uncovering their breasts and genitals. With this exposure the White men allegedly only made sure that they really were women, but the actual motive obviously was to dishonour the bodies.

After the war the surviving Red women soldiers were prosecuted for treason. The influence of propagandistic stereotypes was visible in the court documents. The local authorities were asked to give a statement about each defendant. In addition to a particularly woman's actions during the war they were asked to give an evaluation of their character and lifestyle as well. In these statements the influences of the propaganda is evident. The authorities often proposed a heavy penalty merely on the basis of presumed indecency, even though they were in fact completely ignorant about if the woman had joined the Red Guard or not. It was often admitted that the only thing they allegedly knew was that 'the defendant had been a Russian bride and should therefore be punished'.

The images of the enemy were strong, and the defaming was successful; after the war, many Reds had to meet the hatred of the Whites while trying to continue their lives. Finding work was not easy for ex-rebels. Some job advertisements even directly stated that the Reds were not wanted:

Two young girls will be taken to a little middle-class family on the country. Reds will not do.⁵¹

The women and children whose family members had been in the Red Guard often suffered the consequences without their own involvement, as the accusations were often brought against the whole family. The segregation of former Reds and Whites could also be perceived in the rudimentary welfare system of the period. The livelihood of the White widows and orphans was secured by pensions already in 1919. The Reds had to wait 23 years longer for equal benefits. Prior to that, the financial aid they received was organised through the more humiliating system for the assistance of poor people, which also involved a strict control over the receiving families.⁵² Reds were often mocked for their past and tended to keep silent about their experiences. Not until in the late 1960s, when the political atmosphere had changed, were the Reds finally entitled and ready to give their version of the war.

⁵¹ Newspaper *Keskisuomalainen* 28.5.1918.

⁵² Peltonen, *Muistin paikat: Vuoden 1918 sisällissodan muistamisesta ja unohtamisesta* [Remembering and Forgetting the Civil War in 1918], 156-63.

The question remains: what were the motives behind the creation of these stereotypes? Conspicuous women were a delicious target for the White propagandists. A major function of the propaganda was to separate the enemy from the in-group. Myths and stereotypes were used in order to portray the Reds as indecent and vile creatures. The stories about the unnatural deeds of the Red women were published by the Whites in order to *distort* the public image of the Red women. With these untrue stories the women were set apart from the average White people. The Whites aimed to prove that these rebellious women were no longer proper citizens, as they did not fulfil their proper womanly duties as homemakers and the moral educators of their children.

By breaking out from their traditional gender roles, the Red women had become a threat to the prevailing social order. They did not act the way women were expected to. Basically, they failed to fulfil *the White stereotype of a woman* – the one the conservatives were accustomed to and felt safe with. Due to their manly behaviour, Red women were not perceived as worthy of any chivalrous protection. With this labelling, the Whites also tried to justify, in retrospect, the rapes and the illegal executions they had committed during the war.

The defaming of political women opponents was not a unique Finnish phenomenon. On the contrary, it has been happened widely in connection with other wars. For example, the women who participated in the left wing risings in Germany and Hungary in 1919 were stigmatized as persons of loose sexual morals. After the revolts they were excluded from the nation as unnatural creatures. Eliza Johnson (2000, 543) stresses that it was ‘a *trope* of nationalist and conservative political discourse of the early twentieth century that women represent the moral life of the nation.’ Their roles were the ones of mothers and teachers.⁵³

The nation and its needs were central both in the Finnish, the German and the Hungarian White discourse of the interwar period. Red women were seen as a threat to the purity of the nation. They were criticized for acting against women’s natural role in society and for not fulfilling the criteria of an ideal woman. Moreover, women who had close contacts with the foreign element also failed to fulfil the demands of purity.⁵⁴

To conclude, the defaming stereotyping of Red women was a part of the White propaganda, which, as noticed, reflects universal patterns. The main function of the propaganda was to depict the Red women as

⁵³ Johnson, *ibid.*, 543.

⁵⁴ Lintunen, ”Punaiset naiset aikansa naiskuvan haastajina” [Red women challenging the image of a woman], 131f.

abnormal ‘others’. These images of the female enemy reveal a great deal of the values and the world views of their creators. Therefore, the examination of the propagandistic negative images of women uncovers the early 20th century right-wing views on the women's role in society and the official set of the generally accepted characteristics for women.

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HITLER'S ENEMY IMAGES AS INVERSIONS OF THE 'GOOD GERMAN'

MARJA VUORINEN

1. Introduction

Adolf Hitler's (1889-1945) best-selling ideological tome, *Mein Kampf* (My struggle),¹ established the National Socialist political program. Hitler began working on it while in the Landsberg prison, after his first, failed attempt to seize power, the Munich revolution in 1923. In prison he was visited by fellow Nazis, with whom he contemplated his ideas. He intended to make the book a financial success as well as an ideological one, hoping thus both to pay his personal debts and to gain capital for further political projects. After being released, in 1924, he moved to Obersalzberg, where he continued working on the book. The first volume was published in 1925, the second in 1926.

After Hitler's rise to power in 1933, his book became known as the 'Nazi Bible'. It was the official wedding gift, presented by the state to newlyweds. During the war it was given to every soldier leaving for the front. By the end of the war, about 10 million copies had been distributed in Germany alone. The book was available in several editions, ranging from the inexpensive paperback to the wedding edition. It was translated into many European languages, including Swedish, Italian and French in 1934, English and Dutch in 1939 and Finnish in 1941. After the World War II it has not been published in Germany,² but is sold internationally and available online via the internet. Lately it seems to have gained new popularity in the Arab world, for obvious reasons.

Mein Kampf is a highly controversial, notorious book. It is known by name to almost everyone, but has been read by few. With its flagrant racist and otherwise hateful content it has well earned its reputation as an 'evil' book. One of its main features is an assortment of perceived enemies:

¹ Hitler, *Mein Kampf*.

² The copyright is owned by the Bavarian state, and it has refused to allow the printing of new copies.

imagined counter-forces threatening to curb the success of the German nation.

Political movements create enemy images basically to define their own group identity. The 'enemies' listed in *Mein Kampf* include the Bolsheviks, the Jews as an ethnic, religious, political, economic and cultural entity, the Austrian royal house, Austrian and German parliamentarians, superficial intellectuals of all races, Jewish journalists, particularly of Vienna, and international (Jewish) capitalists, speculators and profiteers. Most of these negative images were not created by Hitler, but came from a much older European stock.

Actually, Hitler's most effective innovation may well have been to bring the positive image of the good German self back to the foreground. Imagining the 'superior' Aryan German nation as the eventual historical winner, and himself as its messiah, was the recipe for his temporary success. The enemy-images that later proved lethal were perhaps originally introduced as deliberate inversions, to accentuate a heroic self-image.

The aim of this article is to analyse the ideological contents of Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* in the light of the modern enemy image studies. The basic method is semiotic text analysis, complemented by the binary model of opposites, concerning the division between an in-group Self as opposed to the out-group Other-Enemy.

Mein Kampf is discussed as the most influential synopsis, in print, of Hitler's chosen ideology. Elaborating on the memorandum-sized Nazi Party Platform, co-written by Hitler and Anton Drexler in 1920,³ it helped to launch a political movement that became one of the most destructive in recent human history, and became its best-known propagandistic text. The scope of this article is limited accordingly. It does not tell anything about what was imagined, planned, said or written by Hitler and his co-ideologues after the publication of *Mein Kampf*, about how the ideology was subsequently developed, or what the party programme eventually gave justification to. The ensuing events are known well enough; those who are willing to refresh their memories I refer to the newest addition to the quality biographic research on Hitler, Ian Kershaw's two-tome *Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris* (1998) and *Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis* (2000).

Why then is Hitler's *Mein Kampf* worth re-reading, let alone a deep-reading semiotic and structural analysis? To begin with, because as the launching crystallisation of a powerful political message it reveals something about the moment, crucial in the development of any ideology, after which there seems to be no turning back. Also, because it, for a time,

³ e.g. Goldberg, *Liberal Fascism*, 69 and 410-3 (the Platform as an appendix).

was a hugely influential book, and as such invaluable when trying to understand what the Third Reich was all about. Known as the Nazi Bible, it was a best-seller of its era, with 10 million copies in circulation by the end of the World War II. Thirdly, because it is still widely known by reputation, even though read by few. And finally, because it is becoming alarmingly popular once again, not only among the new Western extreme right⁴ but also in India and in the Arab countries, particularly those bordering on Israel.

The main question this article seeks to shed light on, is why Hitler's message in its time was so palatable to so many. As *Mein Kampf* is both the topic and the main source of this analysis, the book is often referred to in its entirety. Such passages appear without a reference. Page numbers are given only when a particular section or individual pages of the book are discussed.

2. Enemies abroad, enemies at home, enemies amongst ourselves

The most significant and far-reaching aspect of *Mein Kampf* unquestionably is the 'hate speech' – as in 'hate crime' – about the Jew as the enemy. When the book is considered as a hate-inspiring text, apart from actual historical consequences, opinions about its overall nature may differ. How typical, or unusual, in its altogether unpleasant genre it really is?

If Hitler's text is the first example of hate speech that one encounters it will certainly seem stunning. On the other hand, someone who is familiar with several historical cases of hate speech will note that Hitler's version is not particularly unusual within the genre. Its predecessors include the favourite enemy-image of the 19th century bourgeois intelligentsia, the 'evil nobleman', often described in venomous and annihilation-seeking terms, the vicious rhetoric of the late 19th to early 20th century socialists concerning the propertied classes, or the Russophobe propaganda of the 1920s and '30s, representing the Russians as an inferior race and promoting violence towards them, often in graphic detail.⁵ Compared to

⁴ See e.g. Goodrick-Clarke, *Black Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric Nazism and the Politics of Identity*.

⁵ Taylor, *Lords of Misrule: Hostility to Aristocracy in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-century Britain*; Vuorinen, *Kuviteltu aatelismies: aatelius viholliskuvana ja itseymmäryksenä 1800-luvun Suomessa* [Imagined Nobleman: Nobility as an Enemy-image and an In-group Identity in the 19th Century Finland]; Ehrnrooth, *Sanan vallassa, vihan voimalla: sosialistiset vallankumousopit ja niiden vaikutus*

these examples, *Mein Kampf* seems a relatively typical product of its kind and era.

Propaganda in general and enemy images in particular make use of black-and-white descriptions, polarised notions and stereotyped views. Few items within Hitler's impressive selection of enemy images were of his own invention. Militarist nationalism, totalitarian policies, racism, anti-Semitism and eugenics had long traditions in the Western thought.⁶

Paradoxically, Hitler may even have acquired some aspects of his repertoire from the opposite side of the trenches of World War I. Being exposed to the Allied propaganda that presented the German soldier as the pillaging, murdering, ravaging Hun⁷ may well have given him valuable hints about how to imagine an enemy most effectively.

Hitler's gallery of enemy images is divided below into three separate categories, following a more general model based on the proximity and location of the perceived/imagined enemies. Each category is structured in a separate way, focussing on different characteristics and producing various sets of differentiating concepts. Some of them relate to concrete geographical locations, while others refer to more abstract sociological and political notions. Some sets of concepts are completely separate from one another, while others are strongly interrelated, forming interesting combinations.

When an enemy is imagined/perceived as approaching, it quickly becomes necessary to establish its relative location vis-à-vis the Self – that is: from which direction and what distance it threatens, in what way, and how soon. With this in mind, Vilho Harle divides the enemy category into three sub-categories, depending on their proximity to the defining in-group. *External enemies* are the traditional military enemies situated outside the state boundaries, or some other international agents interfering

Suomen työväenliikkeessä 1905-1914 [In the Power of the Word, Empowered by Hate: Socialist Revolutionary Doctrine and its Effect on the Finnish Workers' Movement, 1905-1914; Immonen, *Ryssästä saa puhua... Neuvostoliitto suomalaisessa julkisuudessa ja kirjat julkisuuden muotona 1918-1939* [About Ruskies, You May Speak... Soviet Union in the Finnish Publicity and Books as Medium]; Luostarinen, *Perivihollinen: Suomen oikeistolehdistön Neuvostoliittoa koskeva viholliskuva sodassa 1941-1944: tausta ja sisältö*, [The Archenemy: the Soviet Enemy as Seen by the Finnish Right-wing Press, During the War 1941-1944: Background and Content].

⁶ E.g. Bloxham and Gerwarth, *Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe*. Kershaw, *Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris*, 134-9, 144-5, 150-2, 162, 182, 244, 248-50; Llobera, *The making of totalitarian thought*; Goldberg, *ibid.*, 78-120.

⁷ E.g. Miller, "Introduction", in Edward Bernays: *Propaganda*, 15; Hayward, *Myths & legends of the First World War*, 72-97, 114-29.

with national level institutions. *Intimate enemies* exist within the same society but outside the defining in-group, while *internal enemies* are hiding within the group itself.⁸ The intimate enemies of Harle's definition include what Carl Schmitt calls a *constitutive enemy*, an opponent created by a political movement as the negation of everything they cherish and protect, to enable them to recognise their own identity.⁹

The enemies from outside are the traditional military enemies situated outside of the borders of a sovereign state, easiest defined apart from one another on map or by compass point. Enemies that threaten a society by war, from outside the state borders, are relatively easy to label non-human. They are ethnical and cultural strangers, about whom there is available little or no reliable first-hand information. If there is an ongoing military conflict, or an imminent threat of one, i.e. if the danger caused by the enemy is immediate and concrete, it is in the defending group's best interest to strengthen its will to fight even by defining the enemy as non-human.¹⁰

The second species of enemies are the so-called intimate enemies, residing within the same society but outside the defining group, are considered aliens or outsiders by the defining/observing in-group Self, but nevertheless live and act within the same society. In the broad sense of the word they can be defined as political enemies.¹¹ They can be further divided into sub-species. Societal enemies from 'above' and from 'below' date back for millennia, whereas the enemies from the 'right' and the 'left' – originating as terms from the times of the 1789 French revolution – belong mostly to the political maps of the 19th and 20th centuries. The above/below divide is present also in the division of society into lower, middle and upper classes; the latter division into three even includes the central or middle group, which in the former is only implied at.¹²

An *enemy from above* is a living paradox. It is represented as superior and quasi-invincible, but also, very pronouncedly, 'vincible', for behind its seeming grandness looms a qualitative inferiority. Its cultural weakness manifests as decadence and/or as a hyper-culture, e.g. an accentuation of formalities out of all proportion. An enemy from above has, in the past, usurped the power, property and resources that rightfully belong to 'us'. Through them it has built for itself a superior position that is completely

⁸ Harle, *The enemy with a thousand faces: the tradition of the other in western political thought and history*, 9-21, 35.

⁹ Schmitt, *The concept of the political*, 26-39, 46-7, 54, 64-8, 74, 79.

¹⁰ Harle, *ibid.*

¹¹ Harle, *ibid.*

¹² Vuorinen, "Locating the enemy".

unearned. It tends to oppress us; its behaviour is haughty, arrogant, proud, snobbish and hierarchy-oriented. As a reactionary force it slows down the progress and maliciously disrupts the development towards 'our' chosen future, thus symbolically standing in our way.¹³

Enemies from below stand literally lower than the spectator, and are by status non-cultural beings: unlearned or mentally slow, resembling a child, a savage or an animal. They disrespect 'our' hierarchies and norms, are listless, deceitful, defiant and demanding, and entertain big ideas about themselves. They covet 'our' status, power, property and education and try to wrench them from us, will not succumb to our guidance and dissociate themselves from our values. From the point of view of an elite, this category includes all the groups of low social origin who criticize the said elite group for bad morals or poor administration, e.g. popular religious revivals and grass-root-level democratic movements.¹⁴

Societal and political enemy categories interrelate in interesting ways. An enemy from above (right) tends to embody not only abstract societal power, as in the case of nobility, but also the more concrete economic power. The image of an all-powerful bourgeois exploiter was created by the revolutionary socialists, when urging the workers to wrest power away from their masters, who deprived them of the fruits of their labour, happiness, rest and education. An enemy from the left obviously relates to one from below. All revolutionaries belong to this category.¹⁵

Other combinations of political directions are more problematic. Enemies from above and left might be the youngsters of well-to-do Western families who in the 1960s and '70s rebelled against the older generation by parading picturesque leftist rhetoric. A 19th-century case in point are the progressive nationalist-democratic movements, proclaiming for a time to be 'of the people and for the people', but soon landing into positions well above the people – and seen, by their opponents, to be sentimental, overly ideological and generally incompetent. From below right obviously come the counter-revolutionary mass movements of the extreme right: Nazis, Fascists, Francoists. The type is embodied in the

¹³ The classic case of an enemy from above is the 19th-century nobleman, an icon of repressive mastership and political reaction – as portrayed by its rival and soon-to-be successors, the bourgeois professionals of the press. Another case in point is the made-to-order conglomerate enemy tailored for the emergent Soviet Union, consisting of the imperial court, nobility, clergy, bourgeoisie and the landowning kulaks. Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Hitlerian *Übermensch*, whose physical superiority combines discipline and subordination of the individual to the whole.¹⁶

The third and most perilous enemy species in Harle's sequence – and, as it happens, Hitler's favourite enemy type – are the internal enemies, lurking inside the defining group itself, weakening it, sponging on it, or threatening with sabotage, betrayal or desertion. The most unpredictable and therefore the most suspicious enemies are those, who by their looks and manners cannot be separated from 'us', who hide among us and whom we treat as one of us – but who may eventually betray us and thus, revealed themselves as unworthy of our trust.¹⁷

The risks caused by internal enemies are at their direst during war-time, when the contribution of every citizen is needed, to defend the nation. War-time freeloaders and troublemakers – those who fail to do their duty while others risk their lives – can be further divided into sub-categories, including complainers, shirkers, mutineers and deserters within the ranks of the army, defeatists who weaken the morale on the home front and profiteers who unscrupulously exploit the war economy. The cross-border, fifth-column forms of desertion include espionage and collaboration with the enemy, while domestic treason typically manifests as either revolt or sabotage.¹⁸ A special subtype of sexual treason is committed by 'our women' who jeopardize the moral of the nation by consorting with the enemy. A case in point is the so-called German brides in France during the World War II, many of whom were punished after the war by a public shaming.¹⁹

Internal enemies come also in peacetime varieties. Those incapable to carry full responsibility, known as weak links, put the survival of the nation into peril. Morally slack, mentally ill, disabled and alcohol abusers were often condemned as public enemies by the social reformists of the late 19th and early 20th century. Peacetime freeloaders are those who choose not to work; an industrious but dangerous embodiment of this type is the speculator who benefits from the work of others. The civilian shirkers come in two varieties: those who won't pay taxes but exploit the social benefits, and those who by their choices increase the commonwealth's health-care and welfare expenses – alcoholics, drug addicts, tobacco smokers and obese exercise-avoidants. Far more perilous are the peacetime traitors, who violate the bonds of law and loyalty: criminals and terrorists. During racist regimes, such as the Nazi regime, those who

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Harle, *ibid.*

¹⁸ Vuorinen, *ibid.*

¹⁹ Virgili, *Shorn Women: Gender and Punishment in Liberation France.*

consort with home-grown 'racial inferiors' could be condemned as traitors of their race.²⁰

The theological division into heaven and hell will not be discussed here, even though it is considered by some as the core of all rhetoric on good versus evil.²¹ Suffice it to note that religious identities have, for millennia, provided an ultimate criterion of division between 'us' and 'them', most notably in the case of the Nazis versus Jews – and, lately, Israelis vs. Palestinians.

In the modern secular discourse the division into heaven and hell is sometimes replaced by a sequence of past, present and future. By demonising the past the present circumstances can be represented as optimal, normal and natural, while any diversion from them can be interpreted as harmful and unnatural. Alternate ways to deal with this sequence are the optimistic model, that demonises not only the past but also and most particularly the present, and places the better prospects into a utopian future, and the pessimistic, reactionary notion of the past as a golden age, in turn demonizing the impending future.²²

3. Narcissism of minor differences

As many historians and social scientists have noted, the fiercest ideological struggles within a society often take place between individuals or groups that actually differ very little, producing a social psychological effect called narcissism of small, or minor, differences.²³ As Anton Blok describes the sequence, a sudden increase of social mobility typically leads to an erosion of former social barriers, which in turn leads to new rivalries. Most often the conflict focuses on a dispute over a common heritage as a symbolic patrimony. The resulting struggle resembles sibling rivalry and leads to an equivalent of the mythical fratricide, even though usually on a symbolical level. In case of political rivalry, movement often define themselves as the opposites of one another, creating an interlocked pair of what was called by Schmitt a constitutive enemy; the same occurs when an established movement later splits into rivalling fractions. As Blok points out, the defining apart is typically done by exaggerating any available, and often minor, differences in a convenient way, in order to create contradiction between groups that at the outset of the conflict seemed

²⁰ Vuorinen, *ibid.*

²¹ Harle, *ibid.*, 25-39.

²² Vuorinen, *ibid.*

²³ The phenomenon was originally described and named by Sigmund Freud, in *Civilisation and its Discontents*, 61.

embarrassingly similar.²⁴ The increasing hostility of the Nazis towards the German Jews took exactly this course.

For a key concept the political narcissism is curiously underdeveloped, with theorists concentrating on the interplay of personal and group narcissism within an individual, content to point out the collective self-admiration typical for many nationalist groups and the reactive aggression following a collective humiliation.²⁵ By going back to its roots within individual psychology, it is possible to come up with a tentative social psychology for any upwardly mobile group. The model in turn, can be applied back to an historical case, e.g. to the relationship between Hitler's imagined in-group self and the respective collection of imagined enemies.

According to Alexander Lowen and M. Scott Peck, the two classics on the field of studies on individual narcissism, the symptoms of psychological narcissism include, to begin with, grandiosity and self-importance, self-centeredness and a feeling of superiority. Such features are not only typical but necessary for any politically aspiring group. Without a firm belief in their goals and a motivation to concentrate resources on their advancement no movement has any chance to thrive.²⁶

The next narcissistic hallmark is even less flattering, if not less necessary for a politician: a constant need of attention and admiration, often also a keen interest in outward appearances. Adolf Hitler is by no means the only charismatic political leader to whom this applies. A related narcissistic symptom is a sense of entitlement, in this case a belief in one's ability, or even a right to rule. The ruthlessness with which the National Socialist party put forth its demand for political power and the exactitude with which it later implemented its decrees amply prove the accuracy of this characterisation.²⁷

The next cluster of narcissistic features, preoccupation with wealth, power, success and victory rings true about the Nazi leadership, as do arrogance and a will to control; yet they apply to many other political movements too. In the light of the grim events during the course of their reign, it is easy to accuse the Nazis even of the next two narcissistic symptoms, namely a selective absence of empathy and self-enhancement at the expense of others. But it is the last items on the list of symptoms,

²⁴ Blok, *Honour and Violence*, 115-35. Schmitt, *ibid*.

²⁵ E.g. Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson & Jayawickreme, "Collective Narcissism And Its Social Consequences".

²⁶ Lowen, *Narcissism: Denial Of The True Self*; Peck, *People Of The Lie: The Hope For Healing Human Evil*.

²⁷ *Ibid*.

scapegoating practices, maudlin emotionality and the shame/envy/contempt cluster, that are particularly interesting in the connection of enemy images.²⁸

4. Hitler's internal enemies

Compared to other similar discourses of enmity,²⁹ Hitler's list of internal enemies is actually pretty ordinary. The most prominent among them are war-time freeloaders and troublemakers. These include complainers, who refuse to accept what is their duty, disturb the daily practices of the army and generally weaken its discipline,³⁰ shirkers and deserters, who seek to evade the military service allotted to them,³¹ and defeatists, who weaken the morale of the army and even of the nation as a whole.³² The listing obviously covers all those who, in one way or another, failed to do their duty in the trenches of World War I or on the home front. They are disapprovingly contrasted with others, more nationally and patriotically aware Germans, who unquestioningly did their duty and bravely and without complaining risked their lives. Profiteers who exploited the war economy e.g. within the black market are condemned too.³³

Interestingly enough, such peace-time politicians, who were either unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the well-being of the nation, are also labelled shirkers, introducing to the civilian world a concept more at home in an army context, thus underlining the male German ideal type of a soldier.³⁴ Likewise, political treason is called 'desertion', referring particularly to those accused of the so-called stab-in-the-back, i.e. those Germans who, at least from the point of view of the future Nazis, weakened the national fighting spirit and enabled the revolution of 1918 by joining the strikes organised by the Left.³⁵

However, all the above terms are mostly used as isolated words of abuse; after all, at the moment of writing *Mein Kampf* they were already a thing of the past. They are not elaborated, whereas the opposite, the heroic German soldiers and other self-sacrificing, hard-working true German men, are praised, time after time, with torrents of positive attributes and

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ See above.

³⁰ Hitler, *ibid.*, 178-9, 182, 185.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 186, 207, 466, 487, 499, 538.

³² *Ibid.*, 187.

³³ *Ibid.*, 186, 190-1, 197, 209.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 246, 249, 253, 379.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 184, 188, 207, 304, 499, 538.

eloquent imagery.³⁶ This seems to point out that a definitive intent of the text was to empower the reader and to boost his self-esteem. Apropos: the reader for whom Hitler mostly intended his text was definitely a 'he'. This is evident in certain sentimental, metaphorical and/or objectifying passages concerning women that appear to be written solely for the eyes of a male reader.³⁷

Another typical case of perceived internal enemies are those Germans whose genetic makeup allegedly compromised the healthy future of the race. Married couples who were weakened by a hereditary disease were advised not to produce offspring of their own. They were encouraged instead to give a home to an orphaned (boy) child of a truly Aryan bloodline. On the other hand, abortion and contraceptives were pronounced strictly off-limits for all those who were considered able to increase the healthy populace. According to Hitler, the German nation was endangered also by prostitution which spread venereal diseases and corrupted young men's morals. Both celibacy and early marriage were mentioned as commendable alternatives. From the point of view of the nation, Hitler did not make much difference between hereditary condition, involuntary injury and deliberately acquired infirmity: cripples disabled by disease or accident as well as unfit weaklings who tended to skip physical exercise were pronounced as equal liabilities – all accused of putting the future strength of the German people into jeopardy.³⁸

Women as a procreation resource typically receive special attention from male nationalist writers. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler repeatedly discussed the education of German girls with the aim of making them physically and mentally fit mothers, at the same time implicitly criticising those women who fail this ideal.³⁹ He very decidedly condemned any Aryan-German women who gave themselves to Jewish men, instead of becoming mothers of purely German children.⁴⁰ However, the ban against 'bastardisation of our race' did not only apply to women, as Hitler also warned German men against taking as wife one of the 'Jewish daughters of the department-store proprietors'; in this aspect he seems to have supported sexual equality.⁴¹ In the course of the book, the pure-blood Aryans are repeatedly compared

³⁶ Ibid., 52, 73-7, 103, 129-37, 152-63, 180-90, 200, 207-8, 248, 393, 413 and passim.

³⁷ Ibid., 50, 149, 173, 178, 371-2, 374-6, 400.

³⁸ Ibid., 225-34, 366-71, 376.

³⁹ Ibid., 149, 190, 374-6, 400.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 190, 296, 374-6, 400.

⁴¹ Ibid., 226.

favourably to what Hitler called 'mixed-blood mongrels', obviously created by those who failed to keep the German racial stock unmixed.⁴²

Interestingly enough, homosexuals as such are not mentioned in the book, nor even referred to in any clear terms. There is a passage where 'effeminate men' are pronounced inferior to 'vigorously trained young men [...] tough as steel', and another one which condemns luxury clothing for men, favouring a crisp uniform, but these do not refer to homosexuals as such. In fact, Hitler saw luxury clothing as typical for wealthy Jewish men, and therefore unsuitable for true Germans.⁴³ On the other hand, one might be tempted to read into such quotations a ring of certain homoerotic or at least homo-social appreciation.

The most original of Hitler's ideological creations are two types of intimate political enemies, whom he described with an indignation quite obviously motivated by narcissism of minor differences. The first was a group of folklore-inspired romantic nationalists. He ridiculed them as silly dreamers who took an interest in Teutonic knights and other half-mythical heroes of distant ages, preoccupying themselves with axes, battle-spears, shields and helmets, and wallowing in fanciful historical imagery⁴⁴ – instead of concentrating on important present-day issues and serious, self-sacrificing contemporary heroism, like the Nazis themselves liked to do.

Later on, while discussing the period when the National Socialist ideology had already managed to secure a foothold, he expressed irritation over a habit of ideological sponging that he perceived in some of his colleagues. Accordingly, he condemned as 'political kleptomaniacs' all those who had chosen to wait backstage while their comrades struggled, proudly charging in only when the battle had been fought and won, ready to monopolise the programme which others had created and defended.⁴⁵

5. Hitler's intimate enemies

The closest political rivals of Hitler's movement were Leftist revolutionaries, socialists and trade unionists. Contrary to what one might expect, Hitler rarely resorts to picturing the socialists as downright enemies from below; they are mostly perceived to be on the level with the National Socialists, almost as worthy contestants. As both movements aimed at mobilising the broad social layers, the Nazis could not very well place their rivals from the Left below themselves; besides, the word

⁴² Ibid., 122, 198, 348, 354, 374.

⁴³ Ibid., 254, 374-5.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 326-30, 419.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 459-63.

Socialist was included even in their own party's name. In the early days the ideological competition frequently regressed to the level of fist-fighting on the streets, which only proves that the members of both parties were equally apt to engage in such low-life practices. Narcissism of minor differences, on the other hand, is evident in Hitler's detailed – and inspired – description about how the Nazi flag, with red as the ground colour, was purposefully designed to attract the attention of the socialists, reluctantly admired for their efficiency at mobilising the masses.⁴⁶

On a more verbal level, socialists were pronounced by Hitler to be a pestilence: poisoners of the people, 'condottieri of class warfare' preaching egoism and hatred.⁴⁷ The nationalist ideology, for its part, promoted unity in a healthy and communal classless society, openly opposing any class-oriented thinking.⁴⁸

Hitler's perceived racial others, originally in the context of the multinational Austrian Empire, were Slavs, at times mentioned as a single group,⁴⁹ and other non-Germanic peoples – including Czechs,⁵⁰ Poles,⁵¹ and Hungarians, Ruthenians, Serbs and Croats⁵² – who from the Pan-German point of view took far too much room both in the Empire as a geographic and governmental entity, and in its day-to-day parliamentary politics. As racial inferiors they were definitely pictured as enemies from below. According to Hitler they were constantly scheming within the Parliament and, in cooperation with the decadent Austrian court, aimed and planned to overthrow the true German core of the nation.

For Hitler, the racial enemy proper was always the Jew. The comparison between the good German and the bad/evil Jew is present throughout the book, heightening in the chapter titled *Race and people*, which discusses the Jew in the local aspect, as an ethnic-national and socio-cultural enemy of the German race. Ideologically the starting-point is the definition of Germans as a nation, producing dichotomies like national vs. international, self-sacrifice vs. egoism, and community spirit vs. anti-social individualism, the latter concept of each pair of course being represented by the Jew. Psychologically the demarcation line was

⁴⁶ Ibid., 436-55, 490-3.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 46-57

⁴⁸ Ibid., 56, 536.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 46, 94-6, 127, 142, 153-4.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 26, 110, 113, 122-3.

⁵¹ Ibid., 113, 122.

⁵² Ibid., 122.

drawn between the honest and the ethical (Germans) vs. the dishonest and the crooked (Jews).⁵³

The binary division into self and other represents the two groups as diametrically opposed. The standing racial dichotomies present the superior German as the opposite of the inferior Jew and the pure Aryan as the opposite of any mixed race. Comparison of physical characteristics presents Germans as strong and courageous, whereas Jews are presented as weaklings and cowards. Germans are said to have military prowess, while Jews are accused of what Hitler calls 'fantastic pacifism'. The essential health of the German race is contrasted by several illness metaphors, describing the Jews as spreading like epidemic, bacillus or pest.⁵⁴

Hitler's cultural dichotomies show the Germans as carriers of culture, while pronouncing the Jews as a decadent race. According to him, Germans promote the positive forces of civilisation by building and constructing, while Jews represent barbarism, exploitation and destruction. German culture is thriving and progressive, able to constantly regenerate itself, inspired as it is by fervent idealism, while its Jewish counterpart is long since petrified, settling for empty imitation and low materialist incentives. German science aspires after the truth, while Jews are content with dreaming and/or apt to tell downright lies.⁵⁵

Hitler presents the Germans as warriors and tillers of the soil. As opposed to them, the Jews are seen as un-producing merchants, money-lenders and middle-men, profiting mostly from the work of others. The socioeconomic division is made between hard-working, self-sufficient, inspired, skilful Germans on one hand, and exploitative, parasite-like, persistent, cunning Jews on the other. A German, according to Hitler, is devoted to promote equality and social justice, proud, upright, decent and always supportive to his fellow man, while a Jew is pictured as indolent, privilege-seeking, servile and calculating, well able to abuse his fellow man by posing as a quasi-benefactor, all the while hiding a selfish intent.⁵⁶

Elsewhere the Jews are accused either of speculating at the nation's expense, particularly in the after-war years, or of being generally dirty and disgusting, and even corrupting the German language.⁵⁷ A particularly compelling recurrent passage casts the Jew in the classic role of rapist and/or seducer:

⁵³ Ibid., 257-99.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 192-9, 355.

The black-haired Jewish youth lies in wait for hours on end, satanically glaring at and spying on the unsuspecting girl whom he plans to seduce, adulterating her blood and removing her from the bosom of her own people. The Jew uses every possible means to undermine the racial foundations of a subjugated people.⁵⁸

The Jews appear also in the role of big-city brothel owners, responsible for corrupting innocent German girls and luring them into prostitution.⁵⁹

Other racial inferiors include 'Negroes'⁶⁰ and 'Chinamen',⁶¹ both typically referred to as 'subhuman' categories. The former were seen corrupting both 'our innocent fair-haired girls' and the so-far fairly pure racial stock of the once so great French nation.⁶² The most sinister – if also most openly paranoid – passages describe Jews first themselves mixing with Aryan girls, and then bringing in the Negroes, in order 'to lower the racial quality of the people by permanently adulterating [their] blood'.⁶³

As a movement strongly dependent on a continuous flow of efficient propaganda, the National Socialists were bound to look on other public sources of ideology with a critical eye. The Viennese 'Jewish liberal' press of the pre-war period had been seen by the young Hitler as a manipulating machinery, which he accused of printing a

a meticulously-woven glitter of words, to dazzle and mislead the reader. [...] No means were too base, provided they could be exploited in the campaign of slander. These journalists were real virtuosos of twisting facts and presenting them in a deceptive form.⁶⁴

Nor was he happy with the lacking enthusiasm of the wartime German press⁶⁵ – or with the 'evil influence' of the post-war 'Jewish press' either.⁶⁶ The only true message was, of course, broadcast by the Party.

Hitler's perceived governmental enemies within the Austrian and Weimar states were obvious inversions of the positive characterisations of the good German self, again epitomised by the National Socialists.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 296 (quotation), 374.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 65.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 74, 177, 348, 353, 366, 390, 397, 502, 584.

⁶¹ Ibid., 353.

⁶² Ibid., 502, 557, 575.

⁶³ Ibid., 296, 502.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 49 (quotation), 59-69, 106-7, 286-7.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 176-8, 222-5.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 294, 298.

Parliamentarians – ‘the House of Puppets’ as he called them⁶⁷ – were scornfully described as useless chatterboxes, engaged in never-ending talks, voting over and over again about minor issues, yet unable to solve any real problems or bear responsibility for their own past decisions.⁶⁸ The image was used to argument for the anti-parliamentarian ‘Fuehrer principle’, which meant that leaders at any level were solely responsible for any decisions made, and answered only to their superiors.⁶⁹ This, in turn, heightened the Nazi self-image as ‘doers, not talkers’.⁷⁰ Democracy as a whole was despised for similar reasons.⁷¹

Opportunistic career politicians were also severely condemned by Hitler, pointing out that dedication to a (nationalist) cause was the only acceptable reason to enter politics.⁷² A particularly sinister set were the immediate post-war political leaders, labelled alternately as vampires, valets or criminals, liars or parrots.⁷³

‘The so-called intellectuals’ were described by Hitler with an irony that seems to hide a deep envy. They were repeatedly seen as dry bookworms and narrow-minded theorists, who in spite of all their academic certificates were completely out of touch with the ‘stern reality’, and thus unable to lead the people.⁷⁴ Their exact opposite was a practical, passionate, ruthless popular leader like Hitler himself, who was evidently most capable of rousing the masses.⁷⁵ ‘True intellectuals’ of course could be found among the National Socialists themselves.⁷⁶

Occasional insults were hurled also at ‘the cowardly upper classes’,⁷⁷ the decadent nobility and blasé gentry,⁷⁸ the Austrian court with its sycophantic courtier hangers-on,⁷⁹ the pacifists in general,⁸⁰ and a ‘timid bourgeoisie’⁸¹ – always represented as the exact opposite of the serious, upright and courageous, ordinary German men. The supreme German

⁶⁷ Ibid., 341.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 60, 79-87, 90-1, 207, 217-9, 245, 249, 253-4, 313, 343, 466, 543, 554.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 312-3.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 201.

⁷¹ Ibid., 81-2, 254, 287, 394, 512.

⁷² Ibid., 70-2, 93, 186.

⁷³ Ibid., 200, 210.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 43-4, 87, 98, 106-7, 198, 206, 254, 434-5.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 107, 194-9, 343-6.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 310.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 295.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 169, 174, 202.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 127-8, 154, 217-8, 250-1, 283.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 360.

⁸¹ Ibid., 339.

culture was also defended against a morbid modernism in art⁸² – interestingly evoking the soon-to-be Stalinist art programme of Socialist Realism.

6. Hitler's external enemies

In Hitler's mind, the Jews did not figure only as the local ethnic enemy of the Aryan race within the German state. For him the most terrible – truly all-encompassing – adversary was the racial-economic-political conglomerate enemy known as the International Jew. The concept of *Weltjudentum* incorporated into itself two seemingly widely separate aspects of economy and politics: the international Marxist and Bolshevik movements – at that point of time considered, by many, to be organised and led by Jews – and the international industrialists, capitalists and stock exchange speculators, again thought to be mostly Jewish by their ethnicity. Hitler's main aim was to free the Germans for good from the mistreatment they had allegedly suffered in the clutches of this 'world pest'.⁸³ In his mind the international Jewry was for ever bound to try and conquer other nations, in order to eventually become the lords of the entire earth.⁸⁴

Combining Bolsheviks and Marxists with industrialists, capitalists and speculators into a single form may seem strange. Yet for Hitler this combination was quite logical. The common denominator behind all these powers was money: Mammon, in itself quite naturally opposed to his ideal of the innate spirituality and lack of materialism of the German culture.⁸⁵ Moreover, within a nationalist context internationalism was considered a hostile force in its own right. It was the exact opposite of the nationalist ethos promoted by the Party, whose aim was to provide welfare to all hard-working Germans and to unite them into a classless folk-community.⁸⁶

Enemy states were discussed fairly dispassionately towards the end of the book. After all, the previous war was only just over and Germany needed time to recover, before engaging in revanchist military exploits.

Despite having been an adversary of Germany in the World War I, the British Empire figured in Hitler's speculations, at least at this point of time, mainly as a possible future ally.⁸⁷ The mortal enemy of the World

⁸² Ibid., 235-9, 252-3, 349, 354.

⁸³ Ibid., 300-35, 347-9, 355, 417.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 410.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 225, 227, 384, 395-6.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 253, 300-35, 393.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 138, 553-5.

War I, the architect of the Versailles treaty and the future arch-enemy was France.⁸⁸

Russia was presented as a case of its own. It was not an enemy by essence but a target by function, and defined accordingly. The Bolshevik government, and behind it a Jewish conspiracy secretly pulling the strings, were pronounced criminal. The German element that had existed in the country of old and might have led the populace to a better future was all but dissolved as a result of the revolution. The Russians, who allegedly possessed no state-building abilities, had depended on the Germans to provide them with government. According to Hitler, the vast Eastern land was waiting to be resettled by Germanic peoples in need of *Lebensraum*.⁸⁹

7. Conclusion: enemies as inversions of the narcissistic self

Most of the enemies listed by Hitler were cast in the role of scapegoats: as guilty parties, accused of whatever had gone wrong in the past, or of hampering the progress at present and preventing a splendid future from being realised. Some of them were high-level smooth operators such as parliamentarians, capitalists, Bolsheviks, speculators and exploiters – and, above all, wealthy and enormously influential Jews. Others were low-level private soldiers, cowards who deserted their posts and left their comrades to fight a losing battle, shirkers, weaklings and unfit mothers. Academics and courtiers were portrayed contemptuously to hide envy, born out of shame.

The Jew was an all-encompassing enemy category. It was a label attached to everything that was portrayed as evil – up to a point when one starts to wonder, whether the word had any actual religious-ethnic meaning at all, but was just a name to an enemy compiled of many different perceived and imagined evils, be they Bolsheviks, Communists, capitalists, war profiteers or dissenting journalists. In Hitler's collection of traditional enemy images only very few were not in any way associated with Jews.

Why then was Hitler's message so successful? Why was he, obviously, admired and loved, or at least easily accepted, by so many ordinary Germans? No doubt the circumstances, lost war, humiliating peace treaty, barely suppressed revolution, dysfunctional political sphere, difficult economic situation and general disorder were partly to blame.⁹⁰ Yet these were, in the end, only necessary, not sufficient conditions.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 553, 593-603.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 137, 140-2, 572-5.

⁹⁰ E.g. Kershaw, *ibid.*, 200-2.

The answer may well lie in the fact that Hitler's message was not only negative. It was, above all, both implicitly and explicitly positive: how strong, healthy, hard-working, powerful and entitled the German nation was, how it should and would in time reclaim the place in the world that justly belonged to it, and how it would procreate, spread out and eventually blossom.

Inflated enemy images served this purpose by giving a point of comparison, the negative opposite, and by providing motivation. Imagined enemies, the scheming, greedy and degenerate, were the black backcloth against which the Aryan German race brilliantly shone. Hitler's magic trick was the act of inversion: representing the self by representing its opposite. The result was a carefully crafted, made-to-order image of the Other-Enemy – an imagined reversal of the Good Self. In the end, Hitler's cavalcade of enemies reveals an essentially sentimental, even maudlin understanding of the idealised German nation.

His strategy is apparent in the structure of the text, throughout the book. Emotionally charged passages describing 'them' evenly alternate with those describing 'us', either within a single paragraph or at longer intervals, with a few paragraphs about one topic and then a couple about the other, the theme changing perhaps four or five times in one spread.

The enmities imagined and let loose by Adolf Hitler later materialised as causes for destruction of millions of human lives. Yet his book was only a link in a longer chain. Unfortunately, both complete enemy images and their separate components are perpetually recyclable. The imagery that was encapsulated in *Mein Kampf* is still in circulation, albeit sometimes in unexpected contexts and altered guises.

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CHILDLIKE MASSES AGAINST TRUE MEN OF VALOUR: THE COMICAL IMAGE OF THE RUSSIANS IN FINLAND DURING THE FINNISH-SOVIET WINTER WAR (1939-1940)

VESA VARES

1. The Winter War and the Finnish home front

The Finnish Winter War was, in a way, was a dream case for any propagandist assigned to keep up the fighting spirit of the home front. A task which otherwise could have been difficult – due to political and historical reasons, especially to the heritage of the 1918 Civil War and the high popular support of the left-wing – was made easy by the enemy and the general situation. After the home front realized that the fight was not hopeless, it was relatively easy to maintain the spirit.

There were many reasons for this. First of all, even though the casualties were hard to bear for those concerned, Finnish war propaganda managed, in general, to play them and other difficulties down. In addition, the duration of the war – three and a half months – was not so long as to make these casualties intolerable or cause war fatigue. The war ended before frustration or a general feeling of disaster settled in.

Also the general constellation helped to make the war appear as a heroic struggle of David against the evil Goliath. Even for a Finnish Communist it was hard to believe that the Finnish leaders would have been stupid enough to provoke a war in which 3,5 million Finns stood fighting alone against an enemy of 180 million, as the Soviet propaganda claimed. (Perhaps evil enough, but not stupid enough.) And to the vast majority, the non-Communist Finns, the war was, after all, not a major surprise: for them, the Soviet Union had always been the only possible enemy, if there would be a war in which Finland would be included. From these mental starting-points it was almost impossible to question the official line, that

Finland was the pure-hearted victim, fighting as the foremost bastion of the West against an unprovoked, sinister attack.

There were many who had considered a war unlikely as such. These included many figures of the political elite. For example, Risto Ryti, the man who was to be the Prime Minister during the Winter War, in the early 1930s still thought it self-evident that there would be no war, so it would be pointless to use major sums for armament. The Prime Minister of 1937-39, A. K. Cajander, had congratulated the country for not buying armament which would have become redundant as too old-fashioned. Only weeks before the Second World War broke out the leading Social Democrat, Minister of Finance Väinö Tanner (the Foreign Minister in the Winter War Cabinet) wrote to one of his political colleagues that he did not believe there would be another war, because the world simply could not become so crazy. However, even persons like these would have considered a Soviet attack against Finland as the only possible war. The right-wing politicians (in opposition in the autumn of 1939) had a field day, dealing out self-satisfied 'I told you so' comments, as they had always advocated a strong army. So at the end of the day the eruption of the war – in the form it took – was a total surprise only to very few. What ensued was an extremely intensive and short defence battle. The enemy image that was construed while it lasted was an almost ideal example of the topic.¹

Below I shall discuss a hitherto neglected aspect of the Finnish war propaganda: the use of humour as a weapon against the enemy. To boost the fighting spirit and to strengthen the belief to the national cause the enemy was made to look ridiculous and helpless. Humorous propaganda reflected the same mentality and same prejudices than the Russophobic propaganda in general, but here the enemy was represented in a different way and not as dehumanized as in ordinary war propaganda.

Moreover, because of the special context, even though the propaganda reflected general European stereotypes about Russia, it also had special 'Finnish' features. I will make some comparisons to other cases and case studies about using humour for propaganda purposes.

2. Humour as a tool for propaganda

The use of humour has not been as extensively studied as other sides of enemy propaganda. There are interesting studies on the nature of laughter, like Jan Rüger's article of 'Laughter and War in Berlin', which describes

¹ Wunsch, "Lupa vihata – propaganda ja viholliskuvat mielipiteen muokkaajina konfliktitilanteissa" [License to hate – propaganda and enemy images moulding the opinion in a conflict], 263.

the use of humour during the First World War in Germany. Rüger mainly deals with the traditional question whether laughter has been 'subversive' or 'supportive' in its relations, a question which has been considered also theoreticians like Henri Bergson, Sigmund Freud and Mary Douglas. According to them, laughter had a function as a safety-valve. They have seen laughter as a kind of 'supportive', stabilizing reaction towards times of war or repression, rather than subverting the status quo. However, cultural historians have later emphasized that is rather the changing culture and political attitudes towards laughter that should be studied, since there is no 'ontology of humour' and it is unlikely that there would be a universal definition for laughter. Rüger himself is more interested in 'how the different possible meanings of laughter were negotiated in times of war and repression'.²

In the case in hand now, it is clear that the function was supportive and stabilizing, since it was a part of the war effort and since it was a reaction of the nation which was very much the underdog, the one facing possible destruction and thus trying to use every means in its disposal to survive – not to rebel.

Also generally it is clear that using humour against the enemy cannot much differ from other war propaganda when the goals and motives are concerned. The attitudes behind the texts are the same and the aim is to boost the war effort. As Rüger quotes Jean-Yves Le Naour: 'The need for laughter in war involved the 'mobilization' of humour, a way of putting humour at the service of the war effort'.³ Therefore, also in humorous texts, one basically has to produce an image of an evil enemy that represents the 'Other' – whose values are alien to oneself and to what one considers as holy and essential for survival. It is the *method* used to transmit this message that is different. Therefore, the ideas of 'otherness' and 'enemy images' are central also to this study. They are the methodological foundation for analysing the texts in this case as well.

However, since the method of humour has to differ from the method of pathos, there are other aspects that need to be taken into account as well. These have mainly to do with the aspect of transmitting the message to the general public in a way that would be as easy to comprehend as possible. One has to make the point in simple forms, without long historical or intellectual introductions. At the same time, one has to appeal to other instincts than sheer hatred, especially since hate propaganda often has a tendency to backfire if it loses credibility. Humour, on the other hand, does not have the same problem – the nature of it practically requires that

² Rüger, "Laughter and War in Berlin", 25-7.

³ Ibid., 27.

it crosses the boundaries of credibility. Another difference is that whereas hate propaganda motivates the public by inducing fear of the enemy, humour propaganda aims to creating a feeling of superiority.

Basically, the Finnish case is similar to other examples of humorous World War II propaganda, e.g. when Walt Disney's *Mickey Mouse* and *Donald Duck* went to war or when Charles Chaplin created *The Great Dictator* (1940) or Ernst Lubitsch directed *To be or not to be* (1942), or when Hollywood produced the semi-human caricatures that described the Japanese.

The Finnish medium for this kind of propaganda was, however, far more traditional than Hollywood or any other means which massive nations like the Americans, Germans or British had in their disposal. During the Winter War, its main forum were the daily newspapers. They published lots of causeries, humorous essays. The Finnish causerie, 'pakina', originated in the 19th century, when newspapers were considered the main channel for the creation and spreading of Finnish nationalism.

These causeries were short stories that commented on politics, society and contemporary events in a popular way, some even in a local dialect. Causeries were meant for those readers who would consider leading articles and other editorial articles too difficult, too academic, or too specialized. The causeries could sometimes be seen as sort of verbal cartoons or caricatures. Indeed, in some newspapers they were published with a picture, a visual caricature dealing with the same matter. In a light manner, and in a popular language, they advised the reader how he or she should react to national and world events. They would also point out how rightly one's own party had behaved, and how disastrous the policies of other political orientations were. Every important newspaper had certain legendary authors who wrote these causeries for decades, becoming household names among their readers.

Because the duration of the Winter War was relatively short – it lasted, all in all, only 105 days – propaganda work was made mainly on an *ad hoc* basis; there was little either time or resources to plan ahead. During the Continuation War (1941-44) much more time and energy could be focused on planning. During the Winter War the main burden of the home front propaganda was carried by traditional actors: writers of causeries. In the conditions of war not much else was available. Another potential forum for humour propaganda, the cartoon periodical *Tuulispää*,⁴ was not

⁴ The name does not translate easily. It has multiple meanings, including a sharp sudden wind and a person going about in a hurry without knowing what they are actually doing.

published in the exceptional circumstances. It simply lacked resources during the wartime.

Below I shall concentrate on one of these authors of causeries. The pseudonym 'Olli' in a conservative daily newspaper *Uusi Suomi* (New Finland) was a *primus inter pares* among these journalists. He was actually not as political as many others – like 'Sasu Punanen' of *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, 'Eero' of *Helsingin Sanomat* (a liberal paper), 'Karhuvainion Esa' of *Ilkka* (agrarian) or 'Antti Suomenpoika' of *Ajan Suunta* (a right-wing radical paper) – in the sense that he would have taken part in the contemporary political debate on a daily basis. Even *Uusi Suomi* had another journalist, 'Timo' to write such causeries. But 'Olli' was an institution even in another sense: as the master of sarcasm, humour and word games. His main field was to make fun of human weaknesses. As a research object he is especially fruitful in the sense that politically, as a conservative and a nationalist, he represented a natural enemy of the Soviet Union.

Another source comes from the film industry. Here, of course, the dimensions are modest compared to Hollywoodesque propaganda. Because of the short duration of the Winter War, Finnish film industry could not catch up with the events to create epic stories or documentaries, except for official newsreels, and the resources as such were small. In the beginning, there was not time to film anything war-related fiction, and most male actors were busy fighting on the front anyway. However, the *Suomi-Filmi* company produced, in cooperation with the army, four filmographic sketches towards the end of the war, in which they produced an image of the enemy with the aid of humour.⁵

While Olli's political and mental background is well known, the background of the producers of the film sketches is not equally clear. Yet it can be safely said, that although it was probably less political than that of 'Olli', their general world view was based on similar mentality. They too had been accustomed to produce films to a wide public, but at the same time mainly according to traditional, patriotic middle class values.⁶

⁵ For some years it has been possible to purchase these films, together with official army newsreels of the Winter War and the Continuation War, in commercial stores in Finland. The general feeling towards Finland's role in the World War is presently a patriotic one. The war is considered a heroic effort, essential for maintaining the independence, despite the fact of Finland becoming, during the Continuation war, a co-belligerent and ally of Germany.

⁶ Interestingly, the cutter of the sketches, Valentin Vaala, had Russian family background. Vaala was one of the most important Finnish film directors of the era. Most of his films were romantic dramas without any political links.

3. Russophobia and ‘Others’ in general

Due to geographical proximity and to history, Russia / the Soviet Union has always been considered the principal security problem in Finland. During the centuries the relationship between the two countries has often been traumatic, even though there have also been more harmonious times, e.g. in the 19th century. After the October revolution and the Russian involvement to the Finnish Civil War in 1918, this relationship was even more problematic. Russia was considered the only threat against Finnish independence for both national and political reasons. Many Finns took it for granted that all Russian governments, no matter their political colour, aimed to re-annex Finland simply because Russia was a Great Power.

Because of all this, the image of the Russian was the self-evident enemy image even long before the Winter War. The image of Russians belongs to the relatively extensively studied themes in Finland – in addition to studies of anti-Semitism it is actually the only such prejudice researched in Finland. These studies – for example Matti Klinge, Kari Immonen and Outi Karemaa⁷ – deal with openly declared political Russophobia, represented mainly by intellectuals coming from the Far Right and taking very extreme forms. Also, they focus on peacetime propaganda of the 1920s and 1930s.⁸ Russophobia during the Continuation war (1941-44) has been studied by Heikki Luostarinen⁹. Sinikka Wunsch has studied the enemy image during the Winter War, concentrating on how the enemy image was produced and fabricated, and how the idea of the evil ‘Other’ was projected upon the enemy.¹⁰ Both she

⁷ Klinge, *’Vihan veljistä’ valtiososialismiin. Yhteiskunnallisia ja kansallisia näkemyksiä 1910- ja 1920-luvuilla* [From ‘Brotherhood of Hate’ to State Socialism: societal and national notions of the 1920s and ‘30s]; Immonen, *Ryssästä saa puhua... Neuvostoliitto suomalaisessa julkisuudessa ja kirjat julkisuuden muotona 1918-1939* [About Ruskies, you may speak... Soviet Union in the Finnish publicity and books as medium]; Karemaa, *Vihollisia, vainoojia, syöpäläisiä. Venäläisviha Suomessa 1918-1923* [Enemies, persecutors, vermins. Wrath against the Russians in 1917-1923].

⁸ See Vares: “Creating a State and National Identity: Finland and Europe 1918-1922”, 91-6.

⁹ Luostarinen, *Perivihollinen: Suomen oikeistolehdistön Neuvostoliittoa koskeva viholliskuva sodassa 1941-1944: tausta ja sisältö* [The archenemy: the Soviet enemy as seen by the Finnish right-wing press, during the war 1941-1944: background and content].

¹⁰ Wunsch, *ibid.*; Wunsch, *Punainen uhka. neuvostoliiton kuva johtavassa suomalaisessa sanomalehdistössä maaliskuusta 1938 talvisodan päättymiseen*

and Luostarinen refer to the models of the traditional authority on war propaganda, Harold Lasswell, and to Philip Knightley.¹¹

Put together, the results of the above-mentioned Finnish scholars describe how Russia was construed both as an 'Other' and as a threat towards the Finnish nation. The Russians were considered prone to – and submissive to – be driven towards dictatorship and oppression, and incapable to create democracy or live in liberty. The Russian state was deemed irremediably imperialistic, always trying to conquer new territories. This was supposedly due to their national character, which lacked capabilities to create a free state and free civic society, because the populace lacked the sense of freedom, responsibility and self-denial. Russia could only produce submissive, slave-like herds, not a community of free men, which could carry on the torch of progress by its inner sense of duty, responsibility, effectiveness and self-sacrifice. Culturally, the Russians were considered backward, often analphabetic, and even physically dirty – all these are classical ways to mark the difference of the 'Other' compared to 'Us'. When one adds Bolshevism and atheism, the picture of the evil one was complete. It was also the exact opposite to all what the Finnish Nationalist elite wanted the Finns to be: true to home, religion and fatherland, and ready to simultaneously stand up for one's rights and to submit oneself to the order of law and other higher values.¹²

The most extreme form of Russophobia was popular among the young, nationalist students, particularly the so-called Academic Carelia Society (Akateeminen Karjala-Seura, or AKS), which defined Russophobia as an integral part of Finnish Nationalism. Love for one's own country was not enough, one also needed someone to hate, and that obviously was the evil Russian. The common people probably did not think as theoretically, but even to them the Russian was peculiar: he was not Lutheran, in the past he had not been a free peasant, and under the Soviet rule he was not free to own land, he had no civic society or commercial enterprise like those in the West. And only the Finnish Communists appreciated the Bolshevik interpretation of Socialism, while the large majority of the Finnish labour movement, the Social Democrats, definitely did not.

maaliskuussa 1940 [The Red Threat. Image of the Soviet Union in Finnish press from March 1938 until the End of the Winter war in March 1940].

¹¹ Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*; Knightley, *The First Casualty. From Crimea to Vietnam: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth Maker*.

¹² E.g. Siltala, *Valkoisen äidin pojat: Siveellisyys ja sen varjot kansallisessa projektissa* [Sons of the White Mother: moral and its shadows within the nationalist project].

However, Luostarinen, Wunsch, Lasswell and Knightley focus on propaganda which is demonizing in character: how the enemy image was created by stigmatizing the Other as a threat, as evil. This was done by methods which represented open hostility, sometimes very pedagogically, sometimes appealing to the basest instincts, and almost always in very earnest fervour. E.g. according to Wunsch, the Russian was made to represent evilness and the threat against home, religion and fatherland, and this method of representation resembled religious rhetoric and manners even in cases when it was not religion that was actually referred to.¹³

The case corresponds to the processes described by Edward Said, Benedict Anderson and Stuart Hall, who have pointed out how all negative features were projected to the 'Other' and the positive features reserved to oneself, in order to create greater unity and fighting spirit in the own ranks and to legitimize one's own goals.¹⁴

However, Finnish humour propaganda tended to refer to quite other 'Russian' features than those that were deemed to be the most demonic ones. It is likely that these views were more popular and widespread than the actual hate aspect. In the 1930s, when Russians were featured in Finnish films, they were usually not represented as demons. It was typical that one or two of them were extremely repulsive and evil, and the rest were not positive figures either. But their faults were 'human': the Russian was lazy, stupid, dirty, irresponsible, and good-for-nothing, not interested in anything else than satisfying his physical needs, and more often than not he was drunk. He was also very amorous and tried to seduce the (often blond) Finnish woman who moralistically rejected him. All in all, he was a child-like figure: no responsibility, no self-control, no self-denial – and when his master beat him, he was submissive and did not defend himself. He was definitely the opposite of the self-image of the Finn, but portrayed rather as a miserable, even pitiful figure than a demon.¹⁵

In the Finnish case and especially in the case of the Winter War the goal and motivation of the propaganda could only be defensive. Nevertheless, the propaganda was built on a continuous idea, which in other circumstances could legitimize a policy of expansion (as it did, for many, in 1919-1920 and would do again in 1941-44).

¹³ Wunsch, "Lupa vihata – propaganda ja viholliskuvat mielipiteen muokkaajina konfliktitilanteissa" [License to hate – propaganda and enemy images moulding the opinion in a conflict], 271-3.

¹⁴ E.g. Hall: *Identiteetti* [Identity].

¹⁵ Vares: *Cavalcadesta torppaan: Poliittikka ja poliittiset arkkityypit suomalaisessa elokuvassa* [From Cavalcade to a hut: politics and political ideal types in the Finnish film industry].

How did the pseudonym Olli and the wartime sketches portray all these sides of Finnish mentality and on what sort of political ideology did they build on?

4. The pseudonym *Olli* and the right-wing mentality

During the Winter War, the pseudonym Olli continued along the same lines which had been his hallmark already for 20 years. The man behind the pseudonym was the journalist Väinö Nuorteva, who had been with *Uusi Suomi* since 1919.¹⁶

Olli's stories were typically very short, each taking up only a few pages in a book, as the causeries usually were – they were almost like prolonged jokes. Usually it is only this non-political side of Olli that is remembered. The Finnish National Biography and many scholars on literature refer to his texts as apolitical short stories which dealt with the problems of urban middle class civil servants, officials and white collar workers in a modernizing society.¹⁷ Olli seems to have been most popular among the middle class and intellectuals; the managing director of *Uusi Suomi* once complained in a letter to his friend, that Olli's way of writing suited well to the intellectuals, but was a bit too difficult for the common man.¹⁸ Olli's conservatism is generally recognized, but usually only as a mentality and an attitude, not as a political view. The Finnish National Biography claims, that in his causeries there was no politics, economics, army, religion or sex.¹⁹ This, however, is more than debatable. Olli was not only a conservative character, but also most definitely a political right-winger, who alongside his non-political mainstream topics wrote quite a lot of causeries that were openly political.

Olli came from a family line of high-ranking civil servants and middle class personalities. He was born in 1889 to a pharmacist's family and

¹⁶ Nuorteva's career was exceptionally long, extending all the way into the 1960s. During this time he wrote over 10 000 causeries, many of which were later published as collected works. The fact that so many generations were attracted by his humour is mainly due to its timeless caricatures of never-changing human weaknesses, vanity, arrogance, pompousness, envy and ignorance. Olli often highlighted these characteristics by the adventures of a single character, 'The Man with the Black Beard', an everyman figure among bureaucracy and overly rich upstarts.

¹⁷ Seppinen, *Nuorteva, Väinö 1889-1967* [a biography].

¹⁸ A letter from K.A. Paloheimo to O.W. Louhivuori 3.1.1940. Louhivuori's papers, Box 24, Finnish National Archives.

¹⁹ Seppinen, *ibid.*

made his career in newspapers that were openly right-wing. *Uusi Suomi* was the main organ of the Finnish National Coalition Party, which was the equivalent of a Conservative Party. In its political views, *Uusi Suomi* was sometimes closer to the radical than the moderate wing of the party. It was a fervent advocate of the party slogan 'home, religion and fatherland' and often criticized democracy for its supposed failures and inefficiencies. However, the Finnish conservatives were more Scandinavian than Eastern European in the sense that they, at the end of the day, did not challenge the existence of democracy.²⁰

Olli may even have had a personal reason to advance the conservative values, since there was, in his kin, a political 'black sheep' – or, in this case, rather a red sheep: Santeri Nuorteva, a Social Democrat who had fled to Soviet Russia after the Finnish Civil War, and later became the leader of Soviet Carelia.

In 1917, Olli wrote for *Uusi Päivä* (New Day), a paper that advocated Finnish independence. In the 1930s, he made excuses in the favour of the right-wing radicals who had resorted to violence during the years 1929-32 when Finnish democracy was challenged from the extreme right, by the so-called 'Lapua movement'. The movement harassed leftist and liberal politicians and even murdered three communists, before it was outlawed in 1932. Olli defended the motives and goals of the movement, maintaining that the violence was actually the fault of petty politicians of the left-wing and centre parties. It was them who had allowed the Communists to be represented and function in the political life. According to Olli, the Lapua movement was only a reaction by the sound Finnish people, and it was hypocritical to criticize it because of minor issues, when one had to remember its great, patriotic goals. Naturally it was regrettable that there had been violence, but this was the fault of those who had for too long tried the patience of the Finnish people.

During the elections of 1933 Olli forgot the humour side altogether, when he openly declared:

'There are now two fronts. A Red one and a White one. For Marxism or against it. There is no other alternative in between. [...] The time has indeed come to sweep Finland clean of the red filth! The Jewish red socialist dogmas which spread hatred have ripped the Finnish people too long!'²¹

²⁰ E.g. Vares, *Kokoomus ja demokratian kriisi 1929-1939* [*Kokoomus and the crisis of democracy in 1929-1939*].

²¹ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 1.7.1933 and 2.7.1933.

Olli did not show interest to condemn National Socialist Germany; in this he represented the thinking of many other Finnish right-wingers. He did not idolize the Third Reich nor made excuses for it, but he pointed his sarcasm towards those who were eager to condemn it. This sarcasm was directed against the kind of selective morals which – in his opinion – ignored the Stalin's purges but made noise about the events in Germany. For example, he commented, about the burning of books in 1933, that while he did not approve of such conduct himself, he also thought that most of the books in question had been of poor quality. According to Olli, the Nazis should have used another, far more trustworthy method if they wanted to destroy books – they should have borrowed them to relatives and friends, that way these books would certainly have vanished.²²

In one of his causeries Olli made mockery of imaginary American leftist intellectuals who had gathered together to express their disgust and moral indignity towards Germany. He told that a black man happened to pass by them, and suddenly those intellectuals became a lynch mob who accused the black man of all difficulties they had ever encountered. However, they could not catch him because he was such a good sprinter – all blacks had to be, because of American racism. Olli also ridiculed Albert Einstein's pacifism: Einstein had defended a Finnish conscientious objector, but denied his support to similar Belgians. Olli wrote that this was a new theory of relativity.²³

Olli cannot be described as a Fascist or National Socialist, or even as a right-wing radical. But it is no coincidence that a man of his verbal abilities almost totally neglected the chance of making fun of such godsend for mockery as the person of Hitler or National Socialism, yet at the same time repeatedly caricatured the Soviet Union and the Russian people.

In the 1930s Olli published numerous causeries, where the 'hero' – or rather anti-hero – was the peasant Ivan Petrovitsh, a regular Muzik and a total idiot, whom the Bolshevik Government and local Commissars mercilessly repressed and robbed of everything. Olli described the Soviet Union as a despotic society, where propaganda and lies were the order of the day, where almost nothing functioned and everything was backward.

These causeries alone created an amount of 'Otherness'. But they were not racist in the sense that every Russian would have been a dangerous demon, as was often maintained, especially in the student propaganda of the 1920s and the radical right-wing rhetoric in the 1930s. Olli's image of the Russians resembled the one of the Finnish historical films in the

²² Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 14.5.1933.

²³ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 13.9.1933.

1930s: there were a few demonic Russian leaders, and almost all Russian characters were repulsive, but the majority of them were described rather like big children.

5. Patriotic fervour and defence of Western middle-class values

Olli had advocated the patriotic values against the danger from the East already before the Soviet attack in late 1939 started. To strengthen the image of 'Us' which now was to be defended against the malice of the East, he did not use only the weapon of humour. Sometimes he resorted to very festive or serious expressions, some of which now sound very idealist, almost pathetic, but which were practically inevitable in the historical context of November 1939.

Thus, for example, Olli wrote very poetically about the uniting symbol of the nation – the Finnish flag:

We do not recognize other flags. Blue and white. [...] Its white and blue are such pure colours. And the Finnish people love everything pure. [...] The purity of the conscience, which unwavering stays put in justice and firmly believes to the victory of justice even if the whole world would be under injustice. The people have maintained this belief as their precious inheritance throughout the darkest times and hardships, and it has never gone out. [...] Even though the sense of justice in the world might have got shamefully numb during this astonishing time of the triumph of violence, so that the world, which once considered itself civilized, now sees brute force as the only measure stick of justice, let the people of Finland never, even alone, lose its faith to the force of justice. [...] the flag of the small nation of Finland has no stain of injustice in it. It is pure. And so shall it remain.²⁴

Olli carried on along the same lines even after the break-out of the Winter War. His ideals were fairly similar to the nationalist programme of the 19th century and resembled the bourgeois middle class values of the 20th: fulfilling one's duty by defending the homes and the traditional values, promoting the causes of justice and freedom which were bigger than the individual, believing in the God of one's fathers. According to Olli, the Finnish people were simultaneously defending the Western world as its utmost bastion – and the Finnish people stood united. He saw, that even during the war Finland actually had peace, the best peace in the

²⁴ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 29.11.1939, "Suomen lippu" [The Finnish flag].

world – the peace of conscience, the peace of one who knew that he was fulfilling his duty. In the end, light would defeat darkness.²⁵

Olli also made the obvious historical comparison to the Greek-Persian war. According to him, in addition to the fact that both were small nations and the utmost bastions of Western civilization under attack by the herds of the East, there was yet another similarity: Finland had been assigned to host the Olympic Games of 1940, so both were Olympic nations. Finland had thus received the torch of battle from Greece. Even the circumstances were the same: ‘Both Olympic nations had been forced to oppose, with little forces, the attack of the giant masses of the Eastern barbarians.’ The Greeks had won, due to their form which was as hard as steel and to their high civilization, and because of this they had never lost their faith and self-confidence. The Finns would do the same, by the force of light, truth, civilization and love for their fatherland. And this fight, too, would belong to the crucial, deciding events of world history.²⁶

6. Olli’s typology of Russians

6.1. Demons

There were times when even Olli inevitably would resort to tones and words that can hardly be described as anything but demonizing. The causerie ‘Me ja eräät muut’ (‘We and certain others’) gives this Self vs. Other aspect away already in its title.

In this case Olli did not only repeat his thesis about Finns as the champions of the West. He also stigmatized Russians and particularly Red Army officers as robbers and destroyers; the Russians would steal almost anything, and the rest they would break or tarnish. According to Olli, the oppression that had lasted since the days of Ivan the Terrible had made Russians used to it, and their basic nature would never change, no matter what [sort of] political system the country would have. Their basic instincts would always be those of a robber and a destroyer.²⁷ Even in his other causeries Olli time and again pointed out what beasts the Russians were, e.g. when their aeroplane had, according to the news, attacked a 12-

²⁵ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 3.12.1939, “Sittenkin on syytä iloon” [After all, there is cause for joy]; Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 24.12.1939, “Joulurauha” [Christmas peace].

²⁶ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 10.12.1939, “Olympialaiskansoja” [Olympic nations]. The Helsinki Olympic Games of 1940 were cancelled due to the World War. Finland eventually hosted the Olympic Games in 1952.

²⁷ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 28.12.1939, ”Me ja eräät muut” [Us and certain others].

year old girl with bombs and machine-guns.²⁸ However, these [kind of] stories remained the exception, not the rule, and basically Olli connected even this Russian demonism more to the political system than to the populace.

Olli does not seem to have been very interested in the Soviet leaders. He very seldom mentioned the persons of Stalin or Molotov. This might also be due to instructions from the censorship, but perhaps not solely; it had not been his habit even before to write about real persons. This is one of the major differences compared to Chaplin and Lubitsch, who made their best to express the person of Hitler as a figure of fun.

Only once did Olli ponder Stalin's and Molotov's policies and motives. The story was not humorous at all. It was actually a surprisingly cool analysis of the history and ideologies of the Soviet leaders, almost as if it had been written by a professional historian. Olli deduced that Stalin and Molotov had seldom been in touch with any Western country and thus had great difficulties to understand the Western way of thinking. They had been surprised by the Finnish unanimous resistance against the attack because they had been misled by Finnish émigré Communists. Olli even maintained that Stalin actually was not interested in advancing a world revolution, like Trotsky, but rather taking territories and neighbouring states bit by bit. Olli saw the Soviet policy more as a result of national communism of the new generation than as an international revolution.²⁹ This is not very far from the theories of many later historians.

Olli could not keep totally quiet about Molotov, whom the Finnish people hated most, even more than Stalin. He quoted the old gag about Molotov: 'Who else is lying here, asked Molotov, when he heard himself talking in his sleep.'³⁰ Also he wartime film sketches preferred to mock Molotov rather than Stalin. In one of them a disappointed Russian soldier sang a popular Finnish tune 'Njet Molotoff', making fun of Molotov who allegedly had promised the Soviet troops an easy victory, a swift conquest of Helsinki, plenty of alcohol to celebrate it and even Finnish women to boot. The most famous rhyme of the song 'Njet Molotoff, njet Molotoff, you lied more than even Bobrikoff', meant the culmination for the contemporary Finns.³¹ Nikolai Bobrikov, the Russian Governor General of the Russification Period of 1899-1904, had been a most hated figure and

²⁸ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 20.1.1940, "Ritäreita" [Knights].

²⁹ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 19.12.1939, "Kallis toveri" [Dear comrade].

³⁰ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 22.12.1939, "Sanoi" [He said].

³¹ *Leikki sijansa saakoon*. Suomi-Filmin sotilaspiila 1. Talvisodan katsaukset, Sodan uutisfilmit, DVD 1 [Let them play: Jokes of Suomi-Filmi 1. Winter War Broadcasts, Newsreels of the War, DVD 1].

assassinated by a Finnish Activist, who for a time was celebrated a national hero.

Surprisingly enough, one of the typical aspects by which the Russians were demonized was almost absent from Olli's causeries, even though he often referred to its opposite as a positive Finnish value: namely, religion. He hardly ever mentioned the godlessness of the atheist Soviet system in his Winter War causeries. Perhaps he found it hard to make any sort of humour about such an issue.

All in all, the idea that Russia and Russians, in any form, were a mortal danger to the Finnish nation and also morally repulsive was evident in Olli's thinking. It was one shade of his Russophobia. But it cannot be compared to, for example, the Russophobia of the extremist students, let alone to the National Socialist ideology of annihilation of the Jews. Even though it constituted a negative attitude towards everything Russian, it did not demonize the whole nation. It appealed rather to the sense of superiority of Us against the strange Other than to an instinct of destruction.

The sense of superiority could be strengthened by humour far better than by a sermon. Also Rüger points out how the German authorities first wanted to use only serious, patriotic propaganda to advance the fighting spirit and war effort in the First World War. Other kind of conduct – light humour and laughter – would not have been dignified and would have undermined war moral. However, sensing the mood of the ordinary people, the authorities soon changed their mind and it was exactly the humour of the man of the street, Berliner Schnauze, that came to symbolize the German fighting spirit, not serious-minded propaganda.³² In Olli's case, the same kind of development can be seen: from the serious tones before the eruption of the war, then a short time of uncertainty, then back to the spirit of ridiculing the enemy.

When the situation had seemed to stabilize, Olli began to use his most efficient weapon – humour – much more often than demonizing or using pathetic, serious tone. Also to the present reader this aspect may be the most interesting one. How did Olli develop the humorous 'Other' and what sort of Russophobia can we actually talk about when analyzing his writings?

6.2. A nation of liars

Instead of demonizing, Olli made use of his 1930s Russian themes, reviving them and exaggerating them even more. All the ingredients were

³² Rüger, *ibid.*, 29-37.

old, and not very uncommon in the general European Russophobe stereotypes. The Soviet system was seen as a totalitarian oppressor, whose ludicrous propaganda preposterously exaggerated all achievement. The common Russian was pictured as uneducated, dirty, stupid, submissive, primitive and extremely inefficient – but he sometimes had a cunning ability to make seemingly stupid, but shrewd questions to his superiors.

Olli emphasized the dishonesty of the whole Soviet system: lies were an essential part of it. Even though he did not say it quite openly, he seems to have thought that lying was an inborn Russian feature as well. But in general he linked it rather to the system than to the nationality. In mid-December 1939 Olli wrote a story about the Liars' Club of Puerto Carafino and their annual competition. First three competitors told quite impossible stories. When the fourth was about to appear, the doorman interrupted the meeting because he wanted to read a news bulletin from Moscow about the Russian-Finnish war. The board of referees instantly declared him the winner without even bothering to hear out the bulletin. According to them, it was not possible that any competitor could ever exceed it.³³

The same phenomenon was illustrated by a story of a Russian boy, who could not speak a single word of truth. The parents were desperate, but after diagnosing the boy's disability the doctor heartily congratulated them: the boy obviously had a bright future in the Communist party, maybe even in the Foreign Ministry.³⁴ In yet another story the Commissar had spoken the truth about the defeat in the battle of Suomussalmi, and now the other Russians were worried how he could continue at his job. He might accidentally speak something truthful also to the people.³⁵

Also the wartime film sketches made fun of the incredibility of the Soviet propaganda. Especially one actual person, the Finnish-speaking radio voice 'Teuvan Tiltu' in the Moscow radio propaganda broadcasts, became both famous and infamous. She was one of the most reliable sources of fun for the Finns, and soon even the Finnish authorities realised that the Finns found Tiltu's messages so hilarious, that it was no use trying to prevent the people from listening to her. Unwittingly, she made the best propaganda for the Finnish cause.

In the film sketches Tiltu's propagandistic manner and impossible claims were exaggerated still further: she was portrayed as a fanatical, uncivilized Communist, who read the ludicrous news, used Soviet-style complicated bureaucratic terms, stumbled with difficult words, and could

³³ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 15.12.1939, "Ylivoimainen" [Overwhelming].

³⁴ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 6.3.1940, "Toivehikas tapaus" [A hopeful case].

³⁵ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 13.1.1940, "Luuli sairaksi", [Thought he was sick].

not pronounce ‘d’ or ‘g’ properly. The contradiction between her words and reality was pointed out when she claimed that the new Communist Government of Finland had founded a 10-storey administrative palace and a university at the ‘town’ of Terijoki. At the same time it was shown that the ‘Palace’ was actually a miserable shack, and the ‘university’ was founded by nailing the text on the door of a wooden one-seated lavatory. And as all Finns knew, Terijoki was not even a town,, in the first place, but a rural commune.

It was also shown how the ‘thousands and thousands of liberated Finns’ in Tiltu’s broadcast actually consisted of exactly one Russian sentry, who spoke his lines once as these thousands of Finns, once as a Finnish prisoner-of-war, who expressed his joy of being liberated by the Red Army, etc. He performed this very stupidly, speaking totally broken Finnish and even shouting ‘uraa’ and repeatedly saying ‘da, da’. The end of the sketch showed how the shack collapsed when the sentry happened to lean on its wall. At the same time Tiltu was shouting a new broadcast: there had been three Finnish aeroplanes flying over Leningrad, and the heroic Soviet Army had shot down *nine* of them.³⁶

The similarity between Tiltu’s speeches and those of Adenoid Hynkel, the dictator in Chaplin’s *The Great Dictator*, described for example by Astrid Klocke,³⁷ springs to mind. However, Tiltu as described more verbally, and since she was both unintentionally comical and a woman, she was portrayed even more ridiculous. The presumption has often been that a politically fanatical woman is always even more fanatical and unrealistic than a politically fanatical man) – and thus also even more ludicrous, even ‘unnatural’.

The Finns have traditionally felt that they are an exceptionally honest, law-abiding and incorrupt nation – they stick to truth and law even to the point of stupidity, also in cases, in which honesty actually is not in their best interest. The fact that Finland was the only nation which had paid its war debt to the United States was often highlighted as an example of this honesty. Picturing the Russians as instinctive liars was one of the most basic methods of pointing out the difference between Us and Them.

It was the Politruks and other Communists who were portrayed as liars in Olli’s causeries – in the song ‘Njet Molotoff’ it was the Soviet Foreign Minister. The picture of the common Russian people was somewhat

³⁶ *Otto Ville ja Teuvan Tiltu*. Suomi-Filmin sotilaspilat 4. Talvisodan katsaukset, sodan uutisfilmit, DVD 1 [Otto Ville and Tiltu of Teuva. Jokes of Suomi-Filmi, 4. Winter War Broadcasts, Newsreels of the War, DVD 1].

³⁷ Klocke, “Subverting satire: Edgar Hilsenrath’s novel *Der Nazi und der Friseur* and Charlie Chaplin’s film *The Great Dictator*”.

different. It was not positive, but it differed from the picture of cruel demons and professional liars.

6.3. The helpless Russian

According to the causeries of Olli, the most crucial shortcoming of the Russian people was not its bestiality or its biological origin. Their most fateful sin was the utter helplessness and submission with which they faced the Bolshevik Terror.

A constant theme in Olli's causeries was how the commissars and the men of the NKVD mercilessly oppressed and robbed the Russian people. The commissars did not care one bit about the people, nor even about the people's chances to survive. Olli actually never wrote about a fervent, sincere communist; what the commissars robbed, they robbed for themselves. There was recurrent imaginary precinct, Novovodka – an obvious reference to the drunken Russians – that served as a milieu for the stories, and a commissar, whose name was not by chance Torakoff (almost the same as the Finnish word for cockroach). This habit to invent ridiculous names resembles the way in which Astrid Klocke analyzes the names used in Chaplin's *The Great Dictator* and the symbolism of the names³⁸. A couple of times Olli even described how the politruks and commissars shot their own soldiers, when these were trying to retreat from the front.

The constellation between the evil Communists and the phlegmatic Russian people was most evident in the story 'Tylsä elefantti' ('The dull-minded elephant'). It tells about a stupid and cowardly elephant who submitted to obey a small bee, because it was afraid of being stung. The elephant did not understand that it could smash the bee by the smallest sling of its trunk. Olli did not leave the point of this allegory to the reader, but wrote how 'the vast human mass of Russia --- as a dull herd of slaves allows the small group of Bolsheviks to rule them'. He thought that the Russian people had lost even the animal instinct of self-preservation.³⁹

From this Olli logically deduced, that the 180 million Russians could never defeat the 3-4 million Finns. If the Russian people could not rid itself of even one million communists, it would be quite hopeless for them to defeat the Finns, who were much better shots and generally better fighters than the Russian communists ever were, and who, besides, were fighting for their lives – for higher causes, for civilization, for humanity,

³⁸ Ibid., 499-500.

³⁹ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 23.12.1939, "Tylsä elefantti" [The dull-minded elephant].

for freedom for their homes and fatherland.⁴⁰ The title of the causerie was 'Pari sanaa ryssille', 'A couple of words to the Ruskies', but naturally this logic was meant to encourage the Finnish home front readers.

Olli also liked to describe how the Russians, who had heard only lies about their enemies, were astonished after they had been captured by the Finns. Contrary to the Soviet propaganda they were well treated and received much more food than in Russia. In one of the causeries he described a Russian POW who made the Finnish guards suspicious by smiling constantly. Finally they found out that the prisoner thought he was having a pleasant dream. He began to laugh when the Finns told him he was in a prison camp – a warm room, good clothes, food, how could that be a prison? He begged not to be woken up.⁴¹

Also the film sketches repeated the stereotype of childlike Russians, who were naive and only interested in satisfying their immediate needs. As already mentioned, they were portrayed as having gone to war expecting to get plenty of food, alcohol and Finnish women. The sketch showed the harsh reality: captured Russians who were frightened and whining about their disappointment towards their leaders. The Russian was most often portrayed as a ridiculous, stupid Muzik – not as a demon. Even the usual bad guys, the politruks and commissars, were absent from this sketch. And even when the Russian was dreaming about Finnish women, he was seen rather as an immature peasant who cannot control his dreams and needs, and as a sort of self-made potential Don Juan, than as an Asian rapist who is coming to murder Finnish women and children (basically 'un-masculine' foreign men trying to charm 'our women' being one of the most common stereotypes in the world). The Russian was a threat, but he could be defeated – he was so childlike, that he actually had no chance to win.⁴²

Helplessness was not the only theme; another was the lack of civilization. Olli entertained the stereotype of illiterate, dirty Russians. 'The Kolkhoz seems to have brought the cattle along, said the Finnish agronomist, when he saw the lice in the rags of the imprisoned Russian.'⁴³ 'This is not a home, this is a Kolkhoz', declared one of the film sketches,

⁴⁰ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 25.2.1940, "Pari sanaa ryssille" [A couple of words to the Ruskies].

⁴¹ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 11.1.1940, "Ruokaa" [Food]; Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 18.2.1940, "Vankeja" [Prisoners].

⁴² *Leikki sijansa saakoon*. Suomi-Filmin sotilaspila 1. Talvisodan katsaukset, Sodan uutisfilmit, DVD 1 [We must let them play. Jokes of Suomi-Filmi, 1. Winter War Broadcasts, Newsreels of the War, DVD 1].

⁴³ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 22.12.1939, "Sanoi" [Said].

showing a Finnish townsman who tried hopelessly to keep the kitchen clean and to wash the dishes, when the women were evacuated to the countryside.⁴⁴ In the Finland of those days it was perfectly legitimate for a man to be out of his depth in the kitchen – but it was also typical to use the word ‘Kolkhoz’ as the symbol for domestic dirt and disorder.

Once Olli wrote, how the illiterate Ivan asked Pjotr, what was in the newspaper, to which Pjotr snapped that Ivan should have learnt to read. Ivan explained that this had been impossible, because he had heard a government manifesto according to which illiteracy had already been totally removed from the Soviet Union. It would have been suspicious to try to learn to read after that.⁴⁵

All attempts by Russians to learn anything failed, because nothing that they had manufactured worked. One Soviet scientist had created a refrigerator in order to train soldiers for cold conditions. However, the box was too cold and the soldier who was put in it died. The scientist pointed out that despite of this, the box was useful, because it would save money: you did not need to send the soldiers to the front, you could kill them straight away in the box and save travel expenses.⁴⁶ Skiing as the yardstick of the heroic, hardened Finnish fighter was of course also quite impossible for the Russians to learn.⁴⁷

Here again a similar approach comes in mind: Astrid Klocke describes in one of her articles, how dictator Adenoid Hynkel and his Göring-like henchman Herring tried to invent new weapons and other gadgets and failed miserably in *The Great Dictator*. The result was always that the human guinea-pig died, but nobody cared.⁴⁸

To a certain degree Olli also ridiculed Finns, particularly when he wrote about the county of Hölmölä (roughly translates as Idiot County). The comments of the inhabitants reflect a sort of *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* – or the *Forrest Gump* idea of noble simple-mindedness, unspoilt and incorrupt, seeing the faults of the system more clearly than the more sophisticated mind. For example, the people of the county deeply disapproved of the idea of comparing the Soviet system to a convict prison, because this was an insult to the convict prisons.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ *Laulava taloryhmä*. Suomi-Filmin sotilaspilat 2. Talvisodan katsaukset, sodan uutisfilmit, DVD 1. (The siinging group of the house. Jokes of Suomi-Filmi, 2. Winter War Broadcasts, Newsreels of the War.)

⁴⁵ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 3.2.1940, “Pelkkää tarua” [Just a fairy tale].

⁴⁶ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 19.1.1940, ”Totutuskaappi” [A cupboard for adaptation].

⁴⁷ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 18.1.1940.

⁴⁸ Klocke, *ibid.*, 503-4.

⁴⁹ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 6.2.1940, ”Kunnianloukkaus” [Libel].

The last short causerie before the peace treaty in March 1940 was about a Russian who had ceased to speak so that no one could report him for having wrong opinions. Because of this, he did nothing else but yelled 'uraa' in the official parades. Unfortunately he had started to fear that he might see counterrevolutionary dreams, so he did not dare to sleep any more, but stayed awake all night walking about and shouting 'uraa' in order not to fall asleep. He was convicted and sentenced to forced hard labour anyway, for an intention to see forbidden dreams that were dangerous to the Soviet state.⁵⁰

Olli's propaganda was not the only one that differed from the standard, more serious propaganda. Even in the films made during the Continuation War the spirit was very much the same. Perhaps the clearest example of this was the adventure film *Jees ja just* (1943), in which two Finnish soldiers, called Ryhmy and Romppainen, two very undisciplined and slow-reacting but still very efficient Finnish soldiers, lured hundreds of Russians and saved many Finnish soldiers from captivity. The Russians were portrayed as stupid, inefficient, cowardly and dirty creatures, who were, again, interested only in food, alcohol, sleep and dance and whose unmanliness was underlined by the fact that they were bullied and beaten by a *female* commissar. The best hiding-place for Ryhmy and Romppainen was said to be a sauna, because no Russian would ever wash himself, and even the bad-smelling onion liquor the Finns had would not lead the Russians to find them, because the Russians themselves smelled even worse. The only Russian that could be taken seriously was the female commissar, a regular *Ninotchka* – but then, she eventually (and without success) fell in love in one of the Finnish soldiers.

Interestingly enough, Ryhmy and Romppainen did not kill even one Russian during their adventure – they only knocked several of them unconscious and sent the rest to a wild goose chase.

6.4. The cunning Russian

According to the Finnish humour propaganda, the common Russian was helpless and submissive. But he could also have the cunning ability of the peasant to survive and occasionally to ask seemingly simple questions, which put the lying politruks into awkward position – e.g. why hadn't the war ended already, even though Finland was a small country and the Soviet propaganda claimed that the heroic Red Army had been advancing all the time?

⁵⁰ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 10.3.1940, "Sittenkin" [Even so].

This cunning feature had, however, more to do with the stereotype that the Russian was always trying ways to find alcohol and food. Accordingly, the common Russian, even though he was a man of the ‘herd’ and submitted to his master’s terror, actually had no illusions about his masters, and was ready to abandon them if someone else arranged an opportunity to do so. In fact, he was only waiting for the time, when the Bolsheviks would be thrown out.

This type of Russian was portrayed in the longest film sketch (the Russian sentry), and it resembled far more the general stereotype of an ordinary Russian, rather than the stereotypical Bolshevik. Even when the sentry was doing everything that he was ordered to do (although very inefficiently), he expected the Bolsheviks to fall, was very lazy, dreamed of food and alcohol, knew how badly he was treated and dreamt of the past, when he had been an independent peasant. A rough translation of his song shows this:

Before we had the emperors and the Czar,
and Ivan had no *svoboda* [freedom],
then came *svoboda* and the People’s Commissar,
now we have no freedom nor *liepushka* [bread].
Before I used to be a *Kulak* and a *Muzik*,
I had my own soup and my own spoon,
I was carrying happily on my back
a tea pot, some bread and cabbage.

Also now he got plenty – he got bullied, got whipped, got kicked, got hungry. But he had no freedom, and no vodka of his own; even the vodka he had to steal. The sentry would have stolen the alcohol even from the thermometer, had he not been called by his superiors.

In the end of the sketch the sentry sang again, dreamily:

There will come a time when the Bolsheviks go away
And we shoot the Commissar Government.
Then the *Politruk* is going to be whipped and kicked,
And Ivan will hit him with the baton himself.
Then I’m again a *Kulak* and a *Muzik*,
I shall have my own soup and my own spoon,
I shall happily carry on my back
A tea pot, some bread and cabbage.⁵¹

⁵¹ *Otto Ville ja Teuvan Tiltu*. Suomi-Filmin sotilaspiilat 4. Talvisodan katsaukset, sodan uutisfilmit, DVD 1 [Otto Ville and Tiltu of Teuva. Jokes of Suomi-Filmi, 4. Winter War Broadcasts, Newsreels of the War, DVD 1].

In the Finnish stereotype, this – and vodka – was all that a common Russian needed for his personal paradise, and this was what the Bolsheviks had deprived him of. The Russian was thus portrayed much more as the ‘traditional’ Russian than as a representative of a new Soviet society. Tiltu and Olli’s commissars act like Greta Garbo as Ninotchka, but they are more an exception than a rule when one thinks how the Russian nation and the Russian person as such are portrayed.

In fact, the war sketches and Olli’s causeries rather resemble Ernst Lubitsch’s tendency to describe the enemy according to old images rather than as a modern phenomenon. In *To be or not to be*, the Germans are usually caricatured as the old stereotypes of ‘Prussians’ suggest – formal, humourless, clumsy, obnoxious, militarist, machine-like, unquestioning and lacking independence, inside in essence uncertain personalities, who can always be fooled by clever, courageous, independent minds.

6.5. The pathetic traitor

Olli wrote surprisingly little about the puppet communist ‘government’ which Stalin had founded at the outbreak of the war, in the rural commune of Terijoki. The Soviets had expected that this would cause a Red uprising in Finland and lead to a civil war like the one fought in 1918, which would ensure an easy and fast victory for the Red Army.

What happened was quite the opposite. The existence of a rival government did not divide the Finns but in fact united them better than anything else could have done. The so-called Terijoki government did not become a signal for beginning a revolution, but functioned as what might be called a ‘traitor factor’: it convinced practically all the Finns, that the war was not only about moving a borderline, but a question of the independence and freedom of the nation. The feeble name list of the Terijoki government could not convince even the local Communists, the vast majority of who went to war against the Soviet Union just like other Finns. Only the ‘Prime Minister’ of the puppet government, Otto Wille Kuusinen, one of the two surviving members of the Red Finnish Government of 1918, was a known figure in Finland.⁵²

Olli mentioned the Terijoki government and its Prime Minister very seldom. However, the longest of the film sketches paraded this issue.

⁵² About the ‘Terijoki Government’, see Jussila, *Terijoen hallitus 1939-40* [The Terijoki government 1939-40]. The other survivor had fled to the United States, not to Soviet Russia. It was known that none of the Ministers had died in 1918, but had managed to make it to Soviet Russia, so it was obvious they had perished there.

In the sketch Tiltu describes Kuusinen as a great statesman and warlord, dressed to an early 18th century military uniform.⁵³ The contradiction is obvious, for in the film Kuusinen is shown as a clumsy, frustrated man, who is probably also drunk – for he already knew that everything was going the wrong way. The other ‘ministers’ were portrayed as even more pathetic, and the whole ‘army’ the government was supposed to command consisted of the Minister of War. The Ministers were all aware that they were only hypocrites and] that their situation was hopeless. At the beginning of a meeting the most cynical of them uttered, that the masquerade was starting again. When Kuusinen wanted the ministers to discuss the protection of the civilian population of the conquered areas, the same minister snapped: ‘Unnecessary – we do not have any population.’ Equally useless was the law for provisions, since they had no provisions either. It was also not necessary to order windows darkened, because they had run out of oil as well, and the windows were broken anyway. Finally the Minister of Finance announced that the entire state funds consisted of 14 dollars. They could not get more, ‘because nobody believes in us’. At the end of the meeting all the greedy ministers tried to grab these 14 dollars and started to fight over them, and in the very end – as already noted before – the whole building collapsed, when the Russian sentry happened to lean on it.⁵⁴

The moral issues concerning betrayal and comparisons to the traditional historical traitor, *Efialtes of Sparta*, were absent in the sketch – it was clearly considered better to describe the traitors as pathetic and doomed rather than dangerous.

7. Olli and the rest of the world

In order to boost the morale in Finland, it was essential to emphasize that the rest of the world sympathized with Finland and knew that she was fighting for a just cause.

In mid-December 1939, Olli described how the Soviet bombings against Finland had opened the eyes of the world, even the eyes of many Communists, and how the end result would be the disintegration of the

⁵³ For some reason, possibly a translation error, it was widely thought in Finland that the puppet government had decided to use the old ”karolinska” (Carolinian) uniforms from the times of the Great Nordic War (1700-1721) during the Swedish King Carl XII. Jussila, *ibid.*, 53.

⁵⁴ *Otto Ville ja Teuvan Tiltu*. Suomi-Filmin sotilaspilati 4. Talvisodan katsaukset, sodan uutisfilmit, DVD 1. [Otto Ville and Tiltu of Teuva. Jokes of Suomi-Filmi, 4. Winter War Broadcasts, Newsreels of the War, DVD 1].

international Communist movement and the eventual withering of the world revolution.⁵⁵ In the same month he thanked the world for its moral support, especially the League of Nations for cancelling the membership of the Soviet Union. Truth and justice had not perished, after all.⁵⁶ It was essential to convince the Finnish people, that they would not be compelled to bear the brunt of the war alone; the civilized Western world, which Finland was defending, would come to help.

For a while, there were high hopes about getting some concrete help. However, when time went on, such assurances gave way to sarcastic hints about how inactive and hypocritical the rest of the world was, leaving Finland to fight alone. The rest of the world did not become quite the Other, but seemed rather like the Prodigal Son, who had abandoned the one that it should have helped.

At this point Olli began to direct his sarcasm also towards the West. He wrote e.g. of a man who went to the barber, but instead of cutting his hair and beard the barber only expressed his sympathy, admiration and condolences. Even when thanking the League of Nations, Olli hinted that it would cause even greater joy, if others would join the battle against the robber.⁵⁷ The tone became more and more impatient as winter 1940 turned into spring and the situation at the front became more acute – and there still seemed to be nothing more than sympathy in store for Finland.

The point was taken home also by a film sketch in which a man attacked another with a sword and enforced ‘assurances of neutrality and security’ against the victim’s will. The victim called for help, a man came to the stage and expressed his admiration and sympathy to the victim, and his deep dissatisfaction and moral outrage to the culprit. Then he said: ‘I have done my duty, I have not lost my neutrality’ – and left without actually doing anything to help. In the end of the sketch the victim kicked the attacker from the stage by himself.⁵⁸

Criticizing the passiveness of others did not, of course, bring any help. The disappointment expressed in Finnish causeries and sketches hardly reached, still less bothered the Western world. But to point out this

⁵⁵ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 12.12.1939, “Pommittavat itseään” [They bomb themselves].

⁵⁶ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 13.12.1939, “Ystäviä”, [Friends]; Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 21.12.1939, “Ripeästi” [Swiftly].

⁵⁷ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 20.12.1939, ”Paremmen puutteessa” [In the want of something better]; Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 21.12.1939, ”Ripeästi” [Swiftly].

⁵⁸ *Kaksi kaverusta Kille ja Kalle*. Suomi-Filmin sotilaspiilat 3. Talvisodan katsaukset, sodan uutisfilmit, DVD 1. [Two friends, Kille and Kalle. Jokes of Suomi-Filmi, 3. Winter War Broadcasts, Newsreels of the War, DVD 1].

passiveness was essential to the moral of the Finnish people: in their eyes, the own battle became even more heroic and more moral when compared to the passive cynicism of others, and made it even easier to embrace the role of a martyr.

Olli's frustration and sarcasm were extremely evident when he wrote a story in which he allegedly told about 'the ancient brutal times, when mankind was not yet so civilized, unselfish and just as now' and when 'the international justice ... had not yet reached the highly developed stage, to which the modern culture has elevated it'. In the story, a robber prince Häikäle (translates to English roughly as the Unscrupulous rogue) conquered his neighbours one by one. Each time when the one who had been attacked asked for help, he got sympathy but no one came to rescue, because the others thought that maybe Häikäle would be content to his present conquest and leave others alone. The end result was, of course, that Häikäle destroyed all his neighbours one by one.

Olli concluded his story: 'This was the result of the state wisdom and carefulness, which abandoned the certain reality and preferred wobbly speculations. In our clever, far-sighted time such put-your-head-to-the-bush-like-a-rabbit -state wisdom would be out of the question! Wouldn't it?'⁵⁹

About a week before the peace treaty was signed Olli wrote a causerie, which was extremely pessimistic, almost defeatist – and revealed deep frustration towards human nature. One of his characters, the black-bearded man, concluded that there had been a basic error in the speculations about the 'missing link' between the ape and the man. Man himself was the missing link – between an ape and an ape. Mankind had advanced quite far in civilization, but now the process was going backwards again. 'Brutal violence is again conquering the honorary place. The soulless masses of brutes may trample humanity and development to their feet. Men will have to abandon their ruining buildings and move to forests and caves – just like in their original status. If the civilized people have no means to stop this, man will in the end become a mere ape again.'⁶⁰

This tone was more pessimistic than defiant. So was the causerie of the next day, which accused the world for considering that the amount of a population and the size of the state were the only foundations of justice. The capabilities, living strength and cultural achievements meant nothing any more, if the nation was too small. Only the herds counted.⁶¹ The

⁵⁹ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 3.3.1940, "Ehkä", [Maybe].

⁶⁰ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 8.3.1940, "Puuttuva rengas" [The Missing Link].

⁶¹ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 9.3.1940, "Uudet maaottelusäännöt" [New rules for sports contests between nations].

Finnish Foreign Minister Väinö Tanner spoke to the people in the same spirit after the peace treaty in mid-March, 1940: the main fault of the Finnish nation had been that it was small. Yet again, you could make a comparison to The Great Dictator: the hero's girl, a Jewess named Hannah, stating: 'Life could be wonderful if people could be left alone.'⁶²

A few days after the causerie about the missing link, the harsh conditions of the peace treaty – the loss of the province of Karelia, including Finland's second-biggest town, Viipuri – took most Finns by surprise. The propaganda had boosted the fighting spirit almost too well.

After the war the stories about the Russians naturally stopped, and Olli continued in a generally patriotic tone, honouring those who had so heroically sacrificed their lives. But he did not concede anything, where the values and ideals were concerned, and he even sensed a sort of national rebirth that had come out of the unity during the war. The notion of Finland being the bastion of the West and the necessity of self-sacrifice had only strengthened: the fire had removed everything that was bad, and the clear and hard metal of the Finnish people was now there for all to see. And everything that had been destroyed had to be reconstructed.⁶³

Finland had ceded certain territories – about 10 % of the state area – but as the main part of the country had not been occupied, it was still possible to express the old spirit. It was still Us and Them, although naturally one could now emphasize only Us and be silent about Them.

8. Conclusion

The propaganda work of the pseudonym Olli and the film sketches reflected extremely nationalist and conservative Finnish values, and the goals behind it did not essentially differ from those of the general war propaganda or the Russophobe tendencies of the time. Both aimed at portraying the adversary as incompetent, in order to boost the defensive fighting spirit so that Finland would survive.

What differed was the method. It was consistent with Olli's writings of the 1930s, and with the expressions that had been seen on other popular forums such as the cinema, cartoons etc. The Russian was presented as a pathetically helpless, uncivilized creature whom one might pity because he could not live up to any higher principles of morality or self-discipline – which the in-group Finns obviously could master.

⁶² Klocke, *ibid.*, 503.

⁶³ Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 15.3.1940, "Poijat" [Boys]; Newspaper *Uusi Suomi* 16.3.1940, "Rakennettavaa." [To build].

The demon image that connects with the hatred-aspect appeared occasionally in Olli's texts, and sometimes his conclusions were the same as those that might have been uttered by Russophobic racists. But at most times this demonizing aspect remained in the background. It was reserved to those who were labelled political demons: commissars, *politruks*, the NKVD. The most repulsive figures were portrayed as such mainly because of their politics and allegedly dishonest morals; they were repulsive also as persons, not merely as Russians.

The ordinary Russian was not sympathetic, but he definitely was not a demon either. He was pathetically helpless, uncivilized, timid, and inefficient, [rather] a victim himself rather than a threat. He became a threat only as a part of a herd, and even the herd was no match against the civilized, organized, self-disciplined Finnish nation, allegedly fighting for the only true moral values and ready to sacrifice itself for these. This was what the Russians were deemed incapable of; their main fault was their lack of civilization and education, and their inability to submit themselves to higher causes as free men. They were obviously constructed as the counterpart of the positive stereotype of the 'strong silent men', which the Finns entertained about themselves. This strong, silent man performed and achieved – the Russian only whined.

It was not only due to the war situation that Olli and the sketches described Russians as helpless. Of course it was the war that made this necessary: one cannot fight, let alone defeat an enemy that is efficient. But this image of Russians was familiar already from the peacetime of the 1920s and 1930s, both in causeries and in films. This lamer and more common aspect of Russophobia is often forgotten, since it is the most extreme expressions which usually get most attention. They offer more drama and demand moral analysis.

Even though the purpose of war propaganda usually is to deny the humanity of the enemy,⁶⁴ the causeries and the sketches actually offered an image that made the enemy human. They definitely did not make a positive image of the enemy; quite the contrary, his human nature consisted of all possible human weaknesses, with no strengths at all, but still – the picture is human. Description was truly dehumanizing only when the *politruks* and commissars were concerned. It is also surprising how little the 'godless', atheist side of Bolshevism was used in this humour propaganda.

Even so, Olli was creating an Other, and this was not only a product of the war either: he had written about the Russians and the Soviet system in quite the same way already in the 1930s, and he was selective in his

⁶⁴ Wunsch, *ibid.*, 263.

criticism against dictatorships. Also in the domestic policy he tended to be a rather strict conservative, although one who did not have any special political aspirations for himself. It might be said that he represented one variant of the middle class reaction against a phenomenon which, to him, appeared as the Other in every possible way – national, political, cultural, religious, and social. These kinds of reactions also made the middle class logic apt to ignore the faults of those who despised the same ‘Other’ as they did – although for different reasons. The same can be said of the film sketches: both they and the causeries expressed similar stereotypes, Russophobia and xenophobia in general.

It must of course be borne in mind that exaggeration was the very essence of Olli’s style and of the genre of causeries in general. It does not necessarily mean that the actual thinking behind the texts was as radical. Olli criticized also quite many non-political issues, like bureaucracy, red tape, vanity, greed etc., with exactly the same method of ridiculing by exaggeration. But this style suited also the needs of political propaganda in the hour of need. It made its reappearance in 1941, when there was a need to legitimate a revanche rather than strengthen a defence.

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EXPLOITING THE HUTU/TUTSI DIVIDE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTREMIST PROPAGANDA AND GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

SARAH GENDRON

1. Introduction

Prior to colonization, Rwanda was a country comprised of one people. While there were financial and social distinctions which differentiated one group from the next, Rwandans shared much of what divided others around the world; geographical borders, god (Imana), and language (Kinyarwanda).

For centuries, the distinctions ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ were understood as functional labels. Hutus were agriculturalists, Tutsis pastoralists, and Twas (approximately 1% of the population) the hunter-gatherers. The division of land amongst chiefs of various groups ensured that Hutus and Tutsis governed with relative equality. This possibility of parity was further buttressed by the potential for mobility from one group to the next. Hutus could experience *Kwihutura* (the loss of ‘hutuness’) with the acquisition of cattle. Likewise, a Tutsi could undergo *Gucupira* (the loss of ‘tutsiness’) with the loss of livestock.

In an effort to divide so as to better conquer, Belgian colonizers sought to racialize this once mobile and social distinction. It was the naturalization of this division and the resultant imbalance of power that eventually led to the one hundred day genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The largely non-military participants would likely not have mobilized so quickly nor acted with such brutality against their own neighbors and co-workers without incitement to do so. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, the primary agents of coercion were the industries most often associated with pleasure: art and popular culture.

2. Reflections on propaganda and art

Of course, the employment of art and entertainment in the service of thought manipulation is not new to our times. From the politically charged paintings of artists such as Delacroix and Picasso to the critiques of governments or ideologies in the written work of Molière and Diderot, artistic representation has long been employed as a means of both commentary and persuasion. As the previous examples illustrate and as Richard Alan Nelson's definition describes, it is not necessary for a work of art to have nefarious political aspirations for it to be considered 'propagandistic':

Propaganda is neutrally defined as a systematic form of purposeful persuasion that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions and actions of specified target audiences for ideological, political or commercial purposes through the controlled transmission of one-sided messages (which may or may not be factual) [...].¹

His parenthetical reference to the possibility of the use of non-factual information and suggestion of 'systematic' 'one-sided' messages notwithstanding, Nelson describes propaganda as something which could be used for the promotion of – for lack of more sophisticated words – good or evil.

The word propaganda first appeared in 1622 as part of the name for a group of Cardinals whose job it was to oversee foreign religious endeavors; the *Congregatio de Propaganda fide*, or the 'Congregation for Propagating the Faith'. Thus while Nelson's definition differs slightly from the original in that it is no longer associated exclusively with the dissemination of 'good' messages ('good' according to the church missionaries), the neutrality that he places at the heart of the word is nonetheless consistent with the Latin origins of the term, where *propagare* signifies the fundamentally impartial act of 'propagation.'

This desire to cultivate a specific response or reaction in the viewer, also recalls notions of engagement in post-Kantian aesthetic theory, from Schiller's – and later Hegel's – conceptualization of the role of the formal impulse in aesthetic judgment, to Sartre's notion of 'committed' art. These connections have led scholars like Alain de Botton to generalize the definition of propagandistic art to such a degree that all art seems to fit under this umbrella term:

¹ Nelson, *A Chronology and Glossary of Propaganda in the United States*.

A work of art becomes a piece of propaganda whenever it uses its resources to direct us towards something, insofar as it attempts to enhance our sensitivity and our readiness to respond favourably to any end or idea. Under this definition, few works of art could fail to be counted as propaganda [...].²

In a very basic sense, what de Botton suggests is true. With the notable exception of abstract art which refrains from the use of figuration and thus resists facile ‘readability’ or communication, it could be argued that all figural art ‘uses its resources’ to ‘[direct] us towards’ some specific, intended response.

What the above examples and definitions do not take into account is the way in which the term has evolved since World War I. No longer simply associated with a desire to influence its audience, propagandistic representation has now become associated with the promotion of war and the dissemination of hate messages. This evolution enables us to distinguish between ‘committed’ and ‘propaganda’ representation, for while the former seeks to engage the viewer/reader on both a sensory and intellectual level, the latter aims squarely at the viewer’s fears. As was the case in Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Maoist China, propagandistic appeals to the emotional barometer of the audience in Rwanda contributed greatly to the cultivation of hate that eventually lead to genocide in 1994.

3. The Hutu/Tutsi divide in history and culture

Inspired by the growing popularity of ‘race science’, ethnologists split the Rwandan population according to phenotypic attributes – skull size, height, skin color – to which they associated moral characteristics. In the *Groupov* production of the play *Rwanda 94*, the character of the Historian – played by a white, francophone man – underscores the absurdity of these designations by reading descriptions of each group to the audience:

The Tutsi is tall, a kind of giant, thin, high forehead, thin nose [...], intelligent, but also cunning, hypocritical [...]. The Hutu is the ‘common negro’, [...] flat nose, enormous lips, childish in nature [...]. The Twa is a monkey-like creature, born for base activities.³

In an effort to legitimize the privileging of one group over the other, the colonizers established a history of Rwanda based on John Hanning

² de Botton, *The Architecture of Happiness*.

³ Collard, *Rwanda 94: une tentative de réparation symbolique envers les morts, à l'usage des vivants*. Translation by the author.

Speke's 'Hamitic hypothesis'. In this racial theory, paler-skinned beings from the North (North Africa, and by geographic proximity, Europe) are imagined to have conquered – by dint of their superior will and intelligence – their darker-skinned counterparts from the South:

According to these accounts, the Twa hunters and gatherers were the first and indigenous residents of the area. The somewhat more advanced Hutu cultivators then arrived to clear the forest and displace the Twa. Next, the capable, if ruthless, Tutsi descended from the north and used their superior political and military abilities to conquer the far more numerous but less intelligent Hutu.⁴

This 'apartheid-like structure' was then institutionalized by bestowing various privileges on the Tutsis that were denied to the Hutus and then by requiring both to carry identity cards which stated ethnic belonging.⁵

As history has shown, this strict and unequal division ultimately resulted in the events of 1994. For long after the Belgians conferred independence upon Rwanda, the colonizing gesture of cleaving the population according to ethnic divisions remained. So too did the memory of the related oppression. With the Hutu 'social revolution' in 1959 came just the beginning of the repercussions. Subjected to sporadic purges, many Tutsis fled to neighboring Uganda. In 1987, these refugees came together to form the Tutsi-led *RPF* (Rwandan Patriotic Front) which retaliated against the extremists. All of this – the colonial divisions and racialization of the population, the history of privilege, and the violence that ensued long after the Belgians had left – would later become fodder for extremist propaganda which, applying the seventeenth-century logic of 'pleasing while teaching' (*plaire pour instruire*), sought to employ entertainment as a means of clearing the way for Rwanda's own 'final solution'.

Although racially charged hate speech was common in Rwandan government circles well before the 1990s, it was the utilization of propagandistic messages in popular culture that enabled extremists to inspire the masses with the desire for genocide. It is no coincidence that the two primary sources of pop culture propaganda – *Kangura* magazine and *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTL)* – were initiated by members of the president's inner circle. Given their mutual lineage, it is also not surprising that *Kangura* and *RTL* (known to many as 'Radio

⁴ Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story; Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch".

⁵ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda*.

Machete') disseminated the same basic messages. In an attempt to unify the Hutu population against the Tutsis, representatives of both the magazine and the radio station exploited the identities formulated by the former colonial regime in the hope of exacerbating the already polarized populace.

In a series of lectures at Marquette University in 2009, the Rwandan playwright, activist, and actor Diogène Ntarindwa explained that the principal strategy for achieving this end was not to change the accepted stereotypes of each group, but rather to reverse the values that each had formerly been assigned. Attributes that were once considered to have positive worth under colonial rule took on decidedly negative connotations in extremist post-colonial propaganda. The image of the Tutsi as a superior 'warrior' originating from North Africa that was once used to justify his right to rule was made over into a foreign aggressor who wished to victimize the Hutu people. Once thought of as intelligent and resourceful by the colonizers, the Tutsi was now conceived of as devious and opportunistic. At one time admired for their elegance and beauty (according to white, European standards, of course), Tutsi men would now be depicted as morally weak and effeminate, and the women as overtly sexual, predatory creatures.

3.1 *Kangura* Magazine

Founded in 1990, *Kangura* was the brain-child of First Lady Agathe Habyarimana and her husband's secret corps of advisors, the *Akazu*. Initially created to oppose the largely anti-government *Kanguka*, it was not long before *Kangura* became the voice of Hutu extremism.⁶

Although there were some seemingly benign articles published in this journal – some referencing history, others outlining change that was taking place in Uganda, and so on – the far more frequent essays threatening the Tutsi population and the grossly caricaturist images that accompanied them left little room for ambiguity. *Kangura*'s editor Hassan Ngeze did not hesitate to regularly display the magazine's allegiance to Hutu ethnic unity over national identity, telling the Hutu readers, for example, 'You are an important ethnic group of the Bantu...The nation is artificial but the ethnic group is natural'.⁷ The paper also sought to instill in its readers a commitment to Hutu unity by keeping the wounds of pre-revolutionary Rwanda fresh in their minds. Recalling the messages of the 1957 'Bahutu

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Young et al., *Race and the Foundations of Knowledge: Cultural Amnesia in the Academy*.

Manifesto', *Kangura* frequently suggested that the past political, economic, and social supremacy of the Tutsi was once again the case the 1990's:

The Batutsi comprise 50 per cent of government officials, 70 per cent of private business employees, 90 per cent of staff in embassies and international organizations, and they hold prominent positions everywhere. However, this ethnic group constitutes 10 per cent of the population.⁸

Another article further implied that this strategically planned domination on the part of the Tutsi minority would result, once again, in bloodshed:

Since the revolution of 1959, the Batutsi have not for one moment relinquished the notion of reconquering power in Rwanda, of exterminating intellectuals and of dominating Bahutu farmers.⁹

In the December 1990 issue, *Kangura* reprinted actual excerpts of the 1957 Hutu Manifesto. Co-opting religion for the purposes of inciting racist sentiment, the so-called 'Ten Commandments of the Hutu' proclaimed the need for the 'majority' to retain control of Rwandan education and military. It also accused all Hutu who would engage in business or emotional transactions with the 'common enemy' as traitors. One month later, in the January 1991 issue, religious symbolism was again employed as a means of legitimizing racial division. This time, it is in a drawing of the Virgin Mary, Jesus and Joseph. The text accompanying the image indicates that while Mary asks Jesus to protect the Hutu in Burundi, and he responds – as one would expect – by saying that he will ask them to love each other, Joseph reprimands him, and says 'No, instead tell the Hutu of the world to unite'.¹⁰ While these examples constitute a desire for ethnic separatism, they are innocuous in comparison with Ngeze's promises of 'extermination' and the obvious message presented on the November, 1991 cover which featured a machete, Rwanda's first President Grégoire Kayibanda, and the question 'What weapons shall we use to conquer the *Inyenzi* once and for all?'.¹¹ Ngeze further suggests that such inflammatory language and images were necessary due to the Tutsi threat of 'carefully and consciously orchestrat[ing]' plans to commit 'genocide'.¹² In the March, 1993 essay 'A Cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly,' he

⁸ Anon. 1991a: 3, in Kabanda, "Kangura: the triumph of propaganda refined,"

⁹ Anon. 1990: 6-7, in Kabanda, *ibid.*

¹⁰ Chrétien, Dupaquier and Kabanda, *Rwanda: les médias du génocide*, 256, 371-4.

¹¹ Benesch, "Inciting genocide, pleading free speech".

¹² James, "Media, genocide and international response: another look at Rwanda".

accuses the Tutsi population of committing the ‘unspeakable crimes’ – the ‘killing, pillaging, raping’ – of their ancestors:

The history of Rwanda shows us clearly that a Tutsi stays always exactly the same, that he has never changed. The malice, the evil are just as we knew them in the history of our country. We are not wrong in saying that a cockroach gives birth to another cockroach. Who could tell the difference between the Inyenzi who attacked in October 1990 and those of the 1960’s? They are all linked...their evilness is the same.¹³

A 1994 cartoon shows a photographic image of Ngeze himself surrounded by a comparatively paler-skinned, crudely sketched, group of RPF soldiers. When the soldiers threaten to ‘deal with’ the ‘Hutu extremists’, Ngeze responds with a warning: ‘Kill me, but know that if the people who are in the majority hear about my death, Rwanda will be razed’. When, just a few days prior to the genocide, Ngeze proclaims ‘Let whatever is smoldering erupt’, it is unlikely that anyone misunderstood what he was advocating.¹⁴

Tutsi women were often the subjects of the virulent attacks in *Kangura*. No less than four of the ‘Ten Commandments...’ warn that they use their charms to further the ‘Tutsi ethnic cause’. *Kangura*’s illustrations featuring Tutsi women are equally offensive. One particularly reprehensible example is a caricature starring UN Peacekeeper Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire caught in an intimate embrace with two scantily-clad, buxom Tutsi women. Here, the women are portrayed as opportunistic RPF tools who are willing to trade sexual favours for political purposes (February, 1994). The potential physical danger posed by Tutsi women is made palpable when a July 1991 essay accuses Tutsi men of ‘transform[ing] their sisters, wives and mothers into pistols’.¹⁵ There is little doubt that such targeting of Tutsi women contributed to the rationalization of brutal sex crimes during the genocidal rampage. Among these acts were gang rapes of girls and women, excisions of breasts and buttocks, and forced insertions of objects – including bottles and, in one particularly horrific instance, an axe – into vaginal canals.

3.2 Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines

While *Kangura* contributed to cultivating an atmosphere where racial hatred became tolerable and even entertaining as early as four years before

¹³ Midlarsky, *The killing trap: genocide in the twentieth century*.

¹⁴ Meredith, *The state of Africa: a history of fifty years of independence*.

¹⁵ Chrétien et al., *ibid*.

the one hundred day massacre, it was the comparatively younger but more influential *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* that became the voice of genocide. Like *Kangura*, *RTLM* was initiated by Agathe Habyarimana's *Akazu*. However, unlike *Kangura*, the radio station was privately owned and thus initially appeared to have no governmental allegiance, despite the fact that, as Dina Temple-Raston notes, they were given a license to operate where other stations with competing formats were denied. Another important difference between the two was that, although *Kangura* also attempted to appeal to a large audience by illustrating essays with cartoons and doctored photographs (like that of Silas Majyambere as both a Nazi and a devil), *RTLM*'s reach was far greater. At the time of its inception in 1993, Rwanda had a 66% rate of literacy, which meant that much of the population could not read the *Kangura* tracts. Moreover, due to the country's mountainous topography, radio waves were a far more effective way of reaching the entire population than those of television. For these reasons, a larger percentage of the population relied more often on the radio than on other forms of media for their news and entertainment. *RTLM*'s mix of traditional music, pop, and hip hop, with commentary and talk-back segments in both Kinyarwanda and French enabled it to bridge generational, class, and linguistic divisions.

The singer whose music is most identified with *RTLM* is Simon Bikindi. Also director of the Irindiro Ballet (a traditional dance and music company), Bikindi was one of the country's foremost musicians from the late 1980's until the mid 1990's. Although he sang on a variety of subjects, he is best known today for three songs that preach Hutu solidarity and domination. The earliest of these, *Twasezereye* ('We said goodbye to the Feudal Regime') was released in 1987. It exhorted its listeners to 'remember the whip and the chore, [and] the days [...] spent serving the master without remuneration' and to 'rejoice the Independence'. With growing frustration about the Arusha Accords in the early 1990's, this song made a dramatic return. *Bene Sebahinzi* ('The sons of the Father of the Cultivators') likewise recounted the Tutsi's exploitation of the Hutus ('... the servitude, the whip, and the forced work')¹⁶ and 'encouraged Hutu solidarity against a common foe, the Tutsi'.¹⁷ *Nanga Abahutu* ('I hate the Hutu'), for its part, took its cues from the *Ten Commandments...*, chastising Hutus who 'disowned their identity' and demanding that all 'remember' the slain Hutu heroes of the past.

Besides their usage of contemporary popular music like that of Bikindi, *RTLM*'s particular success can be attributed to the relaxed style of

¹⁶ Pavlakis, "The role of 'hate media' in Rwanda's genocide".

¹⁷ "The Prosecution vs. Simon Bikindi".

the discussions between the station's disc jockeys and their guests and listeners. The former supervisor of *Radio Rwanda* describes it in the following way:

The broadcasts were like a conversation among Rwandans who knew each other well and were relaxing over some banana beer. The exchanges covered everything: rumors circulating on the hills, news from the national radio, conflicts among local political bosses... It was all in fun.¹⁸

Differing slightly from the tone of Higirow's description, transcripts of the transmissions dating from July 1993 to July 1994 indicate that the primary goal of the station was to make the ethnic divide palatable to the masses. To this end, a number of strategies used by *Kangura* were applied by *RTLM*. The announcers frequently cultivated in their listeners both a heightened sense of nationalism and an affective distance from the Tutsis by suggesting that they were not Rwandans but instead foreign invaders.

For example, as per the transcripts from April 22, 1994, Kantano Habimana warned that the Tutsis should 'think twice before [...] scorn[ing] someone in his own house.' *RTLM*'s motley crew of shock-jocks also regularly accused the Tutsis of a history of racially motivated violence. In the April 15 broadcast in 1994, Gaspard Gahigi charged the Tutsis with the responsibility of having solidified and institutionalized the distinction between Tutsis and Hutus. On April 22, 1994, Georges Ruggiu reminded his audience about the 'feudal legend' whereby only Tutsis historically received an education since only they were meant to govern. According to Ruggiu, the 'superiority complex' this privileging gave them is still with them and is what motivates their desire to further 'oppress the Hutus and cast democracy out the window'. From April 6th until the end of the 100 days, *RTLM* announcers leaped deftly from historical oppression to present-day violence, as they began accusing the Tutsis of provoking the genocide through 'bad propaganda' (Karamira), killing the President, resuming hostilities on the following day (Bemeriki, Gahigi), and seeking to 'decimate' the Hutu population (unidentified voice).

In an effort to amplify fear and validate increasingly frequent calls to violence, announcers readily conflated RPF soldiers with ordinary Tutsi citizens. In broadcasts from April 15th and 22nd, one speaker stated that the RPF were Tutsi 'before anything else'. In transcripts from April 14 and 22, speakers (among them, Hamimana, Cantano, Kambanda, and unidentified voices) also referred to both Tutsi citizens and RPF soldiers as 'inkotanyi' ('warrior' or 'infiltrator'), 'inyenzi' ('cockroach') or the

¹⁸ Higirow, "Distortions and omissions".

combined 'Inyenzi-inkotanyi'. Included in the list of 'inkotanyi' were ordinary men with their 'honey-coated tongues', beautiful women sporting 'malicious smiles', and street children. One speaker added that all of them would be easy to identify by sight: 'Look at the person's height and his physical appearance [...] Just look at his small nose and then break it'.¹⁹ In July of 1994, *RTLM* dispensed altogether with the innuendos when one speaker declared that the population should 'rise up to exterminate this race of bad people'.²⁰

RTLM is best known for such direct appeals to violence. As BBC journalist Ally Mugenzi has stated, the station 'acted as if it was giving instructions to the killers'.²¹ While it is true that the announcers regularly identified the names, addresses and license plates of Tutsis and moderate Hutus, instructions, it turns out, is a rather light way of describing their actions. The transcripts show that they sought to position themselves as key players in the 'war' by *commanding* action on the part of Hutu citizens. Using the imperative verb form and words such as 'must' and 'have to' (as in 'we must finish with them, exterminate them' (May 13), and 'you have to work harder...the graves are only half-full [...]') (April 7 and 8), announcers jockeyed for control of the newly forming citizen militia. Listeners were exhorted to 'inform' and 'rise up' against the enemy. The announcers demanded that they 'seek out undesirables', 'go after them and ferret them out' (April 22), and 'hunt [the] Inkotanyi who [were] meant to die prematurely' (May 5). To this end, the speakers ordered their audience to 'take a gun and shoot [them]' or if lacking a gun, to 'fight with the weapons [at their] disposal.' Some five weeks after the beginning of the genocidal rampage, announcers at *RTLM* continued to command their listeners to action in no uncertain terms:

All those who are listening to us, arise so that we can all fight for our Rwanda...Fight with the weapons you have at your disposal, those of you who have arrows, with arrows, those of you who have spears with spears...Take your traditional tools...We must finish with them, exterminate them, sweep them from the whole country' (May 13).

All the while, *RTLM* played music intended to intensify the violence. Some of the songs left unidentified in the transcripts glorified the Rwandan army and encouraged the soldiers in their 'work'. Bikindi's music lauding Hutu superiority was played almost incessantly during the genocide. By some estimates, his songs were repeated up to fifteen times a

¹⁹ Temple-Raston, "Radio Hate".

²⁰ Braeckman, in Gutman and Rieff, *Crimes of war: What the public should know*.

²¹ Smith, "The impact of hate media in Rwanda".

day.²² Given this frequency and the messages conveyed in his music, it is no wonder that many of the killers were heard singing Bikindi's songs as they 'hacked or beat to death hundreds of thousands of Tutsi with government-issued and nail-studded clubs'.²³ It was if his music choreographed the killings.

4. The legal ramifications of propaganda in popular culture

Following the genocide, UN prosecutors working on behalf of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda indicted media executives Hassan Ngeze, Ferdinand Nahimana, and Jean Bosco Barayagwiza for the role played by *Kangura* and *RTLM* in the 100 day killing spree. Simon Bikindi was later also arrested. His charges included incitement to genocide and direct participation in genocidal acts. These so-called 'Hate Media Trials' garnered attention from the international community in ways that the actual genocide never did. The United States ostensibly wished to avoid another Somalia and thus sidestepped labeling what was taking place in Rwanda as 'genocide'.²⁴

Sadly, the most cynical reason for the lack of international support may be the most accurate. While the fate of Rwandan citizens seemed to have little consequence for the West (in particular because of the country's comparative lack of natural resources), the notion of freedom of expression weighed heavily on the hearts and minds of the international community. Although the United States has always stubbornly defended this 'right', many other democratic nations have a more measured approach. As Temple-Raston notes, Denmark, Britain, and Switzerland all have laws prohibiting racial affronts. But for many, convicting these men based on what was articulated in a cultural format represented the opening of Pandora's box.²⁵ Such a conviction could pave the way for tolerating repressive governments who might wish to stifle artistic expression for political purposes. Perhaps this is why there are so few precedents. With respect to Ngeze, Nahimana and Barayagwiza, this was the first time since the Nuremberg trials of Julius Streicher that journalists had been indicted for incitement to genocide in an international court.²⁶ In the case of

²² Drewett and Cloonan, *Popular music censorship in Africa*.

²³ Jacoby, "Words that can kill".

²⁴ Barker, *Frontline: ghosts of Rwanda*.

²⁵ Temple-Raston, *ibid*.

²⁶ Simmons, "Trial centers on role of press".

Bikindi, it was the first time ever that an artist would be charged with using his art for a similar end.

Besides this concern for protecting free speech, these trials were difficult for additional reasons, not the least of which was linguistic ambiguity. Since much of the language employed in *Kangura* and in the *RTLM* broadcasts was coded, proving incitement would be complicated. The use of words like *Interahamwe* referring to the citizen militia (meaning ‘those who stand together’), *Inyenzi* (cockroach) and *Inkotanyi* (warrior) indiscriminately representing RPF soldiers, Tutsis, and moderate Hutus, along with euphemistic exhortations to ‘get the work done’, use ‘tools’ and so on, allowed the accused to avoid some responsibility for what was articulated and thus for what followed articulation. One *RTLM* announcer used this very approach to eschew blame, stating ‘we did incite people to be critical about the Rwandan Patriotic Front and some interpreted that as a call to kill Tutsis [...]. But I defy anyone to find a tape of me saying ‘You must kill’’ (IRIN 1998). This was also the case with Bikindi’s music, for while the ‘patriotic’ lyrics underscore a desire for racial unity on one hand, and racial discrimination on the other, his music never asks anyone to kill for either.

The notion of intent, which is implicit in the 1948 definition of genocide, can be equally tricky to prove. However, with regards to the Rwandan government, ascertaining proof of intent to commit genocide was not particularly challenging. Besides the evident conclusions which could be drawn from the fact that a copy of *Mein Kampf* was found in the presidential palace and members of the *Interahamwe* were expected to read the book, there were other ways in which governmental activities in Rwanda paralleled those of Nazi Germany.²⁷ In both cases, propaganda was used as a tool with which to cultivate racial hatred. For each, a scapegoat was created to shoulder the burden of historic and contemporary ills. The supposed scientifically determined characteristics of this ‘foreign’ sacrificial being were then exaggerated in images and text. Both the Nazis and the Hutu extremists created laws – the Nuremberg Laws and the Hutu Ten Commandments – for the purposes of discrimination and prevention of racial ‘contamination’. The distribution of radios to the masses for the aim of disseminating government sanctioned information was also common to both Germany in the 1940’s and Rwanda in the 1990’s.²⁸ So too was the implementation of the press – Hassan Ngeze’s *Kangura* and Julius Streicher’s *Der Stürmer* – in the service of instilling in its readers racial fear and a thirst for extermination. That these practices were

²⁷ Mirzoeff, “Invisible again: Rwanda and representation after genocide”.

²⁸ Chalk, “Radio propaganda and genocide”.

implemented as part of a strategy to produce genocide is evidenced by the recovery of a short text entitled *Note Relative à la propagande d'expansion et de recrutement* found in the prefecture of Butare just after the genocide. In this work, the author claims to draw inspiration from fellow genocidal propagandists Lenin and Goebbels. In addition to the tactics previously mentioned, the author advocates what he refers to as 'Accusation in a mirror' where 'the party which is using terror will accuse the enemy of using terror.' Also employed in Nazi Germany, this ploy is meant to convince even those initially not inclined to fear the 'enemy' that they too are in grave danger and must kill or be killed. Unthinkable atrocities can then be cloaked as a form of 'legitimate [self] defense'.²⁹

Clearly, the aim is not to assert that one genocide is the same as another, but rather to suggest that the influence that Nazi strategies had on government insiders in Rwanda constitutes, at least provisionally, intention on the part of these perpetrators.³⁰ However, it is more difficult to establish this type of intent with regards to popular culture, since its primary function is supposedly less to inform than to entertain. Given their government backing, Bikindi – who had worked at the Ministry of Youth – *Kangura* magazine, and *RTL* forfeited the immunity afforded by this definition. At its inception, the founders of *Kangura* attempted to conceal this relationship by fashioning the title on that of another magazine run by both Tutsis and Hutus (*Kanguka*) and by pirating one of its correspondents, Ngeze, to be the editor. In contrast, Bikindi gained legitimization through his governmental contacts and appearances at political rallies. The same

²⁹ Des Forges, *ibid.*

³⁰ Besides the evident differences separating these two genocides in particular – the identity of the victims, geographical locations of the genocides, the presence of concentration camps in one case and the lack thereof in the other – there are several other, perhaps more subtle differences that distinguish what took place in and around Nazi Germany from what took place in Rwanda. Where the Nuremberg Laws were written in the format of legal injunctions, the structure and title of the Hutu Ten Commandments were clearly meant to evoke religious symbolism. While both persecutors employed coded language, the Nazis made it a practice to conceal all aspects of their plans and thus left little in the way of direct documentation of their real intentions. Thus although the killing was largely hidden in one case, it was intentionally visible and audible in the other. Witness accounts detail how *interahamwe* would often come after their victims screaming or singing and would not hesitate to slash their victims and leave them to bleed out in the streets for all to see. One final but significant difference that I will note – which is not to say that there are no more – was the relative duration of the two genocides, one to be counted in years, the other in days. This last dissimilarity might account for many of the other differences.

was true of *RTL*M. Gaspard Gahigi, editor-in-chief of *RTL*M, was an active participant in the MRND (the Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement).³¹ This might explain, in part, why the station was able to procure a license where others failed. Moreover, *RTL*M shared the same frequency as the government station. When it broadcast on the same channel from 8:00 am to 11:00 am, listeners could not help but associate the two programs with each other. When *RTL*M's building was finally hit by the RPF, representatives of the station made one last show of their connections by escaping in an armoured vehicle.

In the end, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted all four men. The major players in the direction of *Kangura* and *RTL*M were given life sentences. As for Bikindi, he too received a guilty verdict. As expected, it was for hate speech. However, he was not convicted based on his music. The Chamber did find that all three songs in question 'manipulated the history of Rwanda' with the 'specific intention to disseminate pro-Hutu ideology and anti-Tutsi propaganda'. But since it was not Bikindi who chose to play this music repeatedly throughout the 100 days, he could not be held responsible for a connection between the songs and the violence. On the other hand, the courts did find him guilty on a different count. He was condemned for having incited violence by using a public address system to encourage the killing of Tutsis while driving with an *Interahamwe* convoy. For this – the only count upon which he was convicted – Bikindi received a fifteen year sentence.

5. Peace and reconciliation through popular culture

Given that the prosecution had hoped to convict Bikindi not only on the charge of incitement but also on allegations related to his music – and perhaps more importantly – to his direct participation in the killings, many might feel that the final verdict was unjust. While the prosecution failed to prove that Bikindi took part in the bloodshed, they did manage to establish that his music influenced those who admitted to having committed genocidal acts. This might seem to be enough of a connection to establish some personal responsibility. However, for some, like Ole Reitov of Copenhagen's *Freemuse*, this was a brilliantly engineered compromise:

It clarifies on one level that such hate speeches are not legal according to international and national legislation, and on the other side, it says that we

³¹ Higi, *ibid.*.

cannot prove the link which means that it leaves scope for freedom of expression [...].³²

Bikindi was guilty of using words to kill – this was clear – but art and popular culture would not be held responsible.

In the years following 1994, efforts have been made to achieve peace and reconciliation by whatever means possible. In some instances, confrontation has been used for healing purposes, whether in the form of *Gacaca* trials (traditional avenues of justice) or the establishment of communities in which former *génocidaires* and victims live together. In other cases, healing is sought by way of brandishing the memory from articulation altogether. For example, the words ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Hutu’ have been officially banned as identity markers and until relatively recently there has been little talk of lifting the prohibition of teaching about the 1994 genocide. As one might imagine, popular culture and other types of creative expression have also been employed in the service of bringing peace to the community. According to the February, 1998 IRIN Report, a variety of agencies have taken a cue from *RTL*M’s nefarious success and established various forms of ‘peace radio’ in the Great Lakes Region. As examples, the report names the Swiss originated *Radio Agatashya* and the Burundi-based *Radio Umwizero* for their commitment to disseminate objective information and ethnically-impartial entertainment. The report also gives a nod to the *BBC* and *Voice of America* for airing programs meant to reunite families and friends separated in 1994. Although the presence of these stations has not prevented *RTL*M offspring like *Voix du Patriote* from continuing to occupy the airwaves, they represent initiatives on the part of the Great Lakes and international community to exploit this avenue in the name of peace. In addition to these enterprises, musicians and dance troupes promoting ethnic harmony are becoming more numerous. In 2000, the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Center for Communication Programs partnered with the Rwandan Ministry of Justice, the Center for Conflict Management, ORINFOR, IBUKA, *Collectif des Liges et Associations des Droits de l’Homme* (CLADHO), and the Muslim Association of Rwanda to create a four-part campaign intended to bring about peace and justice.

One of the efforts of the collective was to hold a song writing contest in which participants from all over Rwanda would compete regionally and then nationally for the top awards. The principal point of departure was that the songs had to be about the *Gacaca* trials. Umubano Mwiza’s ‘Positive Coexistence’, Ubutabaera Bwunga’s ‘Justice that Reconciles’,

³² Werman, “Simon Bikindi”.

and Trubogore Umuco's 'Let's Mend our Culture' all demonstrate – in title alone – the desire to employ music as a tool for promoting healing and social change. Other artistic communities, such as the Inganzo Ballet and the organization Drumming for Peace, local musicians like Massamba Intore, and international songwriters like Corneille, also celebrate the coming together of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. Admittedly, some of the most well-known Rwandan artists – like Loti Bizimana and the poet/composer Cyprien Rugamba – were killed in the first days of the genocide. Despite this, indeed perhaps because of this, the national and international collectives and individuals named above continue to incorporate the lessons of ethnic hatred in their work so as to remind the world how easily we can all be conditioned to kill.

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THE ENEMY'S IMAGE: PROPAGANDA IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

RON SCHLEIFER

1. Introduction

Propaganda has been used for military and political purposes since ancient times.¹ The systematic use of propaganda as part of a military doctrine, known today as 'psychological warfare', has its beginnings in the World War I. The British used it successfully for two different purposes. First for their own internal needs, to encourage enlistment in a war that had stagnated and metamorphosed into exhausting trench warfare that demanded increasing numbers of soldiers, and secondly as a form of psychological warfare, to maintain the political will to continue the war. Their chosen tool was the demonization of the German people.

In *Mein Kampf*, Adolf Hitler expressed great regard for the British propaganda campaign and credited it with causing Germany's surrender. Dr. Joseph Goebbels improved the system with regard to Jews, Bolsheviks, and other so-called vermin that had to be destroyed, the results of which are generally known.

To portray the Germans as monsters, the British had to overcome many psychological barriers such as their deep respect for German culture since the Enlightenment, and the close familial relationship between the British royal family and the Germans.

This was done only when the initial enthusiasm about the war declined and the casualty count increased. The government embarked on a two-stage campaign. On the one hand, it increased the level of patriotism – 'for the King and Country' – and the willingness to suffer losses. On the other, it developed into a hate-campaign, inflaming the hatred against the Germans.²

¹ Lasswell, *Propaganda and Communication in World History*.

² Taylor, *British Propaganda During the First World War, 1914-18*.

Accordingly, the Germans were pictured as 'Huns' and the Kaiser as a lunatic. Fanciful rumours were disseminated in England, via the press, whose barons thus joined the war effort. The British were told, for instance, that a Belgian baby had had his hands and legs amputated by German bayonets, and that churches had been plundered by the Kaiser's soldiers.³

The French soon joined the campaign, for much of the fighting took place on their soil. Certain particularly ingenious propaganda operations stand out besides the standard poster campaigns and the more ordinary stories and rumours spread by the popular press. E.g. a museum was set up to show the Germans' monster-like qualities, from a pseudo-scientific point of view.

The Americans, upon joining the war in 1917, likewise presented the German 'Huns' as monsters in a series of posters that called for investment in war loans. One of the long-term effects of this was that when, twenty years later, the Germans indeed engaged in horrendous acts, Goebbels could belittle the reports as being merely recycled stories from the previous war.

The six million Jews killed in the World War II were only a fraction of the overall number of lives lost in that war. The demonization campaign against the Jews, launched in the 1920s, originally helped to gain support for the National Socialist Party. It facilitated the banishment of Jews from the German economy and, finally, their deportation to death camps.

Another long-standing demonization campaign was aimed at the Russians, with the exception of the period between the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement and the invasion of Russia in 1941.

By the end of that year, following the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the Americans had developed their own particular racial hatred against the Japanese, whom they called 'the Yellow Peril'. In this case the pattern from World War I was repeated. The flames of patriotism were fanned in order to continue the war in the Pacific until the conquest of Japan. This military campaign would have involved over one million casualties, if not for the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In the Korean War (1950-3) the North, which had inferior military capabilities, used atrocity propaganda against the U.S. and UN forces. It accused the U.S. of intentionally bombing civilians, and of using biological weapons. Here is a new development in atrocity propaganda vis-à-vis world politics. The target is not the home audience, but the public opinion in the West, moulded to induce the people to pressure the decision makers in their respective countries to stop the fighting.

³ Roetter, *The Art of Psychological Warfare*.

During the Vietnam War this technique was used increasingly, this time to provide the U.S. antiwar activists with ammunition. Describing the real and imagined atrocities in Vietnam was intended to invoke guilt in the Americans and their supporters in the West. The North Vietnamese underlined the deaths of civilians in Hanoi, at the same time suppressing the information that the workers' camps had been placed intentionally close to the armament factories.

In the First Gulf War (1991) the Americans demonized the Iraqis in order to secure popular support for fighting in faraway Kuwait. For this purpose, they used both real atrocities, such as the gas-bombing of the Kurds in Halabja, and fantasies, such as the alleged stealing of incubators from the hospital in Kuwait and leaving the prematurely born babies to their fate. *Hamas* was to make similar use of this technique in its struggle against Israel some twenty years later.

2. Propaganda in the Israeli-Arab Conflict

The Israeli-Arab conflict began gaining momentum at the end of the World War I. The first major attack on the Jews took place in 1929, during the British Mandate of Palestine, as a result of rumours that the Jews had defiled the Temple Mount.

Among the battles that occurred immediately before the British left in 1948, one stands out: the battle of Der Yassin, a village at the entrance of Jerusalem. The events of the battle itself are debated to this day. However, there is no doubt that the rumours regarding the number of deaths of Arab fighters and peasants (49 or 240, depending on the source), spread among the inhabitants of the surrounding villages and fed by a planned campaign by the *Hagana*⁴, caused hundreds of thousands to flee their native villages.

Three decades later, during the First Lebanon War of 1982, the Palestinians already understood the political power inherent in a demonization campaign. Two days after the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) entered Southern Lebanon, the Palestinian Red Crescent Organization headed by Dr. Fathi Arafat issued a press release stating that in Southern Lebanon had been six hundred thousand casualties as a result of the fighting. The choice of number was, of course, no coincidence. Only a few days later it became known that the population of Southern Lebanon consisted of only two hundred and fifty thousand people.

As in the North Vietnamese case, which the Palestinians had studied in depth, the media were quick to cover the (actual) atrocities in the bombed

⁴ *Hagana* is a paramilitary defence force protecting the Jewish settlement.

hospitals – from where the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was shooting rockets at the IDF.

The first instance of an organized demonization campaign occurred a year later, in the West Bank. A sewage leak near a girls' school caused nausea, headaches, and hysteria among the students. A rumour soon spread that 'the Jews are poisoning our daughters'. Scores of girls were hospitalized in a Jenin hospital. The World Health Organization was called in and a laboratory for poison investigation flown in from the U.S. In the meantime, the Israeli Ministry of Health began its own investigations. There were mass demonstrations, and a political tension built up as a result of the incident.

The party ended when the GSS discovered that the PLO had taken over the hospital, and that its activists in white coats were using force to hospitalize the students. Medically speaking, this was a case of mass hysteria. The sewer was repaired and the situation calmed down.

The massive press coverage of the incident further demonstrated to the Palestinians the power of demonization as a political tool. They made a widespread use of it in April 2002. When Israel attacked the headquarters of suicide bombers in Jenin, the Palestinians made it look like an organized massacre, claiming that five thousand people were butchered. The UN organized a committee to investigate these charges. One year later it produced a report showing that, all in all, fifty-two people had perished, half of them civilians and half of them armed militants.⁵

The Palestinian media disseminated the political line dictated to them by Jasser Arafat's office. The leading theme during the early years following the Oslo Accords (from 1993 onwards) was that of initial hope and sudden disappointment. When the Palestinian Authority (PA) clandestinely joined *Hamas* in the suicide bombing campaign, the attitude towards Israel began to change. While the Palestinians had to join forces and make sacrifices by glorifying the *Shaheeds* (martyrs), the Palestinian illustrators and caricaturists depicting the Israelis resorted to the traditional anti-Semitic motifs from Nazi Germany.

Cartoons share certain qualities, no matter which culture is involved. Syndicated American cartoons caricaturing different political directions and actors influence the Western world via internationally distributed newspapers and magazines such as *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Herald Tribune*, *Time* and *Newsweek*. European cartoon caricatures as well as Arab ones often evoke their features. The Arab and Palestinian caricatures have definite, classic anti-Semitic motifs.

⁵ United Nations: Official Documents System of the United Nations.

The connection between the Palestinians and the Nazis is old news. Its origin is the intensive Nazi and Fascist propaganda campaigning, started in the 1930s and continued until the end of the World War II. Haj Amin Al-Husseini, head of the Arab High Commission, connected the Palestinian issue to Nazism. He was the head of the Arab delegation of the German radio and print communications throughout World War II, under the German propaganda machine.

The Germans wished to recruit the Arab nation in their war against the British by arousing hatred against the Jews. In the process they had to overcome a small ideological obstacle presented by the overall German anti-Semitism – for the Arabs are also Semites. The problem was solved by making an *ad hoc* distinction between ‘ordinary’ Semites and Jewish Semites.⁶ In the future, when Palestinian speakers would be accused of anti-Semitism, they would respond that Arabs cannot be anti-Semites, as they are Semites themselves.

3. Timeline

The period covered by this article, from 1993 to 2010, is characterized by a series of ups and downs. The year 1993 contained great hopes for both the Palestinians and the Israeli Left. As Arafat began stretching the boundaries of the agreement to gain more benefits for the Palestinians, the Israelis, not used to such negotiating techniques, usually gave in, in order ‘not to torpedo the historical agreements because of small detail’.

The euphoria phase gradually came to an end, and Arafat replaced it with a violent terror campaign of suicide bombings (1995-8). The Wye agreement of 1999, between Arafat and Netanyahu, caused a temporary steep drop in violence, but his eventual disappointment with the Camp David Agreement made Arafat give orders for a violent *Intifada*. It was launched on the pretext of Ariel Sharon, the then head of the opposition, touring the Temple Mount.

The following four and a half years consisted of one suicide attack after another. They were targeted air attacks from the *Hamas* leadership hideouts and its bomb workshops. Israel responded with a ground operation in Jenin, which the Palestinians successfully portrayed as a massacre. The case has already been discussed above.

Towards the end of 2005 Israel withdrew entirely from the Gaza Strip in a one-sided act. During that period there was a hiatus in terror and propaganda, until the withdrawal was complete. Once completed, the

⁶ Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World*.

Palestinians began bombing southern cities of Israel from the areas Israel had just vacated.

Activities on the propaganda front were renewed as well.

4. Organization

4.1. The Palestinians

In the Arab world the government's official role in the management information is a given. Within each Arab regime a government ministry coordinates the information distributed by the authorities and – at least until the internet era – applies strict censorship. In Israel, on the other hand, there is a deep aversion towards anything overtly resembling propaganda. This approach has deep historical roots. It goes back to Dr. Goebbels' well-known activities, and closely resembles the aversion of the Western countries towards overt propaganda since the days of Communism and Fascism. An Information Ministry was established in Israel in 1974, only to be disbanded six months later. It was re-established thirty-five years later, but with barely any budget or jurisdiction.

Since the Oslo Accords, PA Chairman Arafat organized the media along traditional Arab lines. The Palestinian Authority (PA) as a *de facto* state, founded newspapers, television and radio stations and official internet websites.

The Palestinian government included, of course, an Information Ministry. Its current head is Dr. Saib Arikat, an experienced and eloquent speaker, who has been active in this field since the First Intifada in 1987.

It is very reasonable for the Palestinians to use propaganda. Particularly after the Six Day War it has been obvious that there is a significant difference between the military abilities of the Palestinians and those of Israel. They have therefore resorted to guerrilla warfare, with an emphasis on propaganda.

4.2. The Israelis

Since Israel in 1948 became an independent state, it has focused on developing its military might. Consequently, in every few years, its failing investment in its international image receives poor marks from the State Comptroller.⁷

⁷ Neaman Institute, "Public Diplomacy in Israel" (Hebrew).

The combination of a democratic system, limitation of the official censorship to state secrets, freedom of travel, a free press, and an easy access to satellite technology for reporters, along with the above-mentioned inclination to flinch from anything that smacks of propaganda has wreaked havoc on Israel's public image. In comparison, since the 1970s the Palestinians have invested much in establishing contacts with reporters, supplying dramatic news material, and applying controversial manipulation techniques (see the Muhammed Al-Dura incident). This has given them a tremendous advantage in winning over the hearts and minds of the Western world, not to mention the worldwide public opinion in general.⁸

There are several government bodies in Israel that deal with supplying information, but for various political and administrative reasons their activities are not coordinated in any way. The Foreign Ministry is in charge of Israel's foreign relations, but its power and budget are constantly being curtailed in favour of the Prime Minister's Office. Public diplomacy – the latest euphemism for propaganda – is very low on the Foreign Ministry's list of priorities, even though since the First Intifada (1987-91) there has been a slight improvement in that area.

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit is a small unit in charge of the public relations for the IDF, especially for its chiefs of staff, most of who have gone into politics after finishing their tour of duty. When the IDF found itself in the eye of the storm, the unit designated to deal with public relations was unprepared, in terms of the number of personnel, their training and the authority required to receive the influx of foreign journalists demanding immediate information about the events in the West Bank and Gaza. Unlike other Western armies, the IDF still lacks the institutionalized tenure track of a professionally trained public affairs officer. Unit officers typically receive an on-the-job training, completed with a few short courses.

The IDF does have a small psychological warfare unit, which has undergone many changes since its establishment at the end of the 1970s. It was disbanded at the beginning of the Second Intifada (2000), only to be hastily reassembled in 2005, shortly before the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War in 2006. At that point of time it was forced to improvise when putting up content, personnel, and channels of communication.

In Operation Cast Lead (2009) the unit was fully activated, inundating Gaza with millions of flyers and hijacking *Hamas'* television station and communication network. The only success was the relocation of Palestinian

⁸ Lederman, *Battle Lines: The American Media and the Intifada*; Chafetz, *Double Vision: How the Press Distorts America's View of the Middle East*.

civilians from the fighting areas, and the provision of humanitarian aid during the daily ceasefires. The Gazan people were not markedly moved by the footage of *Hamas* appropriating civilian aid trucks for the benefit of its own supporters.

5. Sources

It is difficult to discuss the Israeli side of the propaganda conflict since there is almost no government visual media, aside from the government television station, which has a very low rating. Therefore the sources for the material in this chapter are cartoon caricatures published in privately owned Israeli newspapers. Even though they express the caricaturist's personal opinion, they also reflect more common attitudes, since the caricature's role is to deliver a popular social or political message in a witty and even entertaining way.

Political caricatures in general are very influential. They are given a central place in newspapers, and are often syndicated to numerous publications and websites. Caricaturists in top American newspapers enjoy a high social and professional status. In the Arab world the daily caricature is equal to an op-ed column.⁹ While caricaturists present an opinion supposedly espoused by the readers of a particular journal, in the case of the Palestinians they also coordinate with political leadership. A famous Palestinian caricaturist, Naj El Ali, was murdered in London in July 1987 because he had dared to criticize the PLO.¹⁰

For this study, the Israeli side is represented by hundreds of caricatures from *Haaretz* newspaper, with a liberal-Leftist stance, and from *Yediot Aharonot* which represents a more central approach. The Palestinian side is examined by using the official newspapers of the Palestinian Authority as well as those of the centralized organizations, such as *Hamas*. Clips from the television programmes and official websites of both sides have also been selected for this chapter, including those of the official PA and *Hamas* television stations, and the Israel Foreign Ministry website.

In order to achieve their political aims, both Palestinians and Israelis often use material that has already been published by the other side. In the past Israel followed closely the Palestinian media, including its caricatures. Their contents were reported in a special publication collected by the *Hatzav* unit in IDF's intelligence corps. This unit has for long time gleaned intelligential information from the Arab media, and not always by

⁹ Perry, *Yediot Aharonot*, 20 (Hebrew).

¹⁰ Associated Press, "Palestinian Journalist Dies of Wounds in London."

stealth. Since 1967 there has been a somewhat surrealistic exchange of newspapers every morning at the Israel-Jordan border, for the convenience of both intelligence organizations. With the rise of the internet and satellite services, one no longer needs a large technological infrastructure, such as satellite farms, to monitor enemy broadcasts, or covert operations to purchase enemy newspapers.

One very popular site, from which many caricatures have been selected, is the MEMRI website, which surveys the Arab media. It receives four million hits per month, about a quarter of which are from the Arab world. Another site is the Palestinian Media Watch, which surveys the Palestinian media and passes on the most virulent anti-Israeli messages to Knesset members and government offices. For the past few years the Foreign Ministry, which has traditionally remained dove-like, has been using some of that site's material.

6. The main motifs on the Palestinian side

Both sides strive to show the rival's failings, even though it is evident that the Israeli press (especially *Haaretz* newspaper) is very critical of the Israeli government – and any government – for not doing enough to appease the Palestinians. As far as we can see, the most common anti-Israel motifs on the Arab and Palestinian side during the period being studied, regarding both theme and style, are reminiscent of the notorious Nazi weekly, *Der Stürmer*.

The graphic language of Palestinian caricatures has developed with time. The use of colour has increased, words have become fewer and the visual expression more idiomatic. Peace is represented by a dove; when the dove is flying there is hope, and when it is wounded, slaughtered, or imprisoned, it symbolizes the sorry state of peace at the time. The Israeli character is typically portrayed as a soldier, but in times of appeasement he is dressed in a suit. The Palestinian is portrayed as a peasant. In order to guide the reader, in case the message is not sufficiently lucid, the Israeli bears a Star of David on his uniform, while a chequered scarf or *kaffiyeh* symbolizes the Palestinian. From the 1950s, Arafat worked hard to make the *kaffiyeh* the Palestinian logo. He continued this practice to his dying day, wearing it in the shape of Palestine, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea.¹¹

The Israeli may also be portrayed as an ultra-Orthodox Jew with the traditional beard and side-curls. To the secular Israelis' chagrin, Israel has

¹¹ Karsh, *Arafat's War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest*.

never managed to differentiate between the modern, liberal secular Israeli and the persistent myth, very popular in the Arab world, that all Israelis are Orthodox Jews.

Without exception, the most detested type of Israeli is the settler. The Israeli settler arouses fear and hatred among the Palestinians. There are several reasons for this. Settlers have made their homes in the heart of the West Bank, and until 2005 were occupying the sand dunes of the Gaza Strip as well. According to *Hamas*, they live on a land that is seen as being privately owned by Palestinians, or even a holy land, *Wakf*.

For the Palestinians, the image of settler thus represents an alternate and alien ideology regarding land ownership. For the settlers, these areas are the Judea and Samaria mentioned in the Bible, where their forefathers had lived thousands of years before the Arab conquest in the seventh century CE.

For the Palestinians the settlers are the primary enemy; the IDF and the Israeli government come in only second. Demonization is deemed the most effective technique against them. They are pictured not as people, but as monsters. The visual language of *Der Stürmer* is recruited for this battle. Settlers – and sometimes Israelis in general – are depicted as hunchbacked and bearded, sporting side-curls, with distorted features. The settler is always pictured as Orthodox, even though in reality most of them are ordinary Jews. The United States, the ally of Israel, is traditionally portrayed as Uncle Sam with a crumpled top hat and the stars and stripes of the American flag.

The Palestinian is usually depicted as the victim, looking smaller and weaker than the fearsome Israeli soldier standing above him. Yet he also looks more determined. This is usually communicated by the expression on his face. This is contrasted by the face of the Israeli, who portrayed as unrefined, to the point of being stupid-looking. In many cases the Israeli is depicted as a beast, particularly as one of animals that are considered unclean in Islam: a dog or a snake. When the snake is small, the Arab/Palestinian is smashing its head or severing it with a sword. When it is big, it is swallowing the helpless Arab. The Dove of Peace that carries an olive branch in its mouth – an image that is, interestingly enough, biblical in origin – and is a subject of longing for the Palestinian, is contrasted to the crow that is depicted as a lying, devious bird, only posing as something else.

As mentioned above, the image of an Arab is usually drawn with peasant-like characteristics. His helplessness is portrayed in the form of a child being pummelled by a fearsome Israeli – who looks like a stupid giant, a *Der Stürmer* Jew, or a combination of both. Frequently the Israeli

is shown acting under the auspices of Uncle Sam who generates power. The Yankee himself is sometimes made to look like a kindly old man, sometime a self-confident and devious one.

7. The main motifs on the Israeli side

As opposed to Arab and Palestinian caricatures, which trumpet their messages with virulence, Israeli caricatures usually carry more subtle messages. They are reminiscent of the British caricature tradition, which is typically guided by fine irony.

The most prominent theme in Israeli caricatures during the period being surveyed is the hope and the longing for peace. During the entire period, along with Palestinian attacks, there existed a clear-cut censure of the government. The most vociferous criticism was aimed at Binyamin Netanyahu during his first premiership (1996-9). The hawkish ideology of his Likud Party was blamed for the failure of the Oslo Accords. The next Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, a former chief of staff acting as the head of the Labour Party, was seen as a politician whose military background prevented him from pursuing peace, so the caricaturists assailed him as well. The critique was occasionally set aside when Arafat's manipulations were glaringly obvious, e.g. when the *Karin A* ammunition ship was apprehended on its way to Gaza, and Arafat denied any knowledge of it.

Netanyahu was always depicted in a negative way. *Haaretz's* left-leaning cartoonist Ze'ev drew him as a child in a suit, implying that he was not quite up to the job of prime minister. The caricature's pointed, enlarged nose and very small eyes gave him an aura of wickedness. One of the most sarcastic messages against Netanyahu consisted of a single verse from the book of Ecclesiastes (10:16): 'Woe to thee, O land, when thy king is a child.'

When Barak was prime minister and, later, a defence minister, his short height and protruding belly made it easy to depict him as a Napoleon-type: an irresponsible child with deadly weapons at his disposal. All visual criticism was absent when Netanyahu accepted a two-nation solution, Barak withdrew from Lebanon, and Sharon withdrew from the Gaza Strip. Yet when negotiations failed, in most cases the cartoonists visually blamed the Israeli leaders.

8. Israel as portrayed by the Palestinians

In general, the PA seeks to delegitimize Israel, in order to detach it from what the Palestinians see as its main sources of power – the United

States and Western Europe. At the same time it seeks to delegitimize Israel's existence, in order to maintain a level of hostility that will enable a continuing support of the conflict without getting overly involved in day-to-day issues. This situation has become even more extreme after *Hamas* came to power in Gaza in 2005, as it has since constantly questioned the legitimacy of PA. Nevertheless, *Hamas* and the PA share a historical outlook of the conflict – the demonization of Israel and the praise of violence.

The historical outlook is the most important factor for creating a basis for a separate Palestinian entity within the Arab world, in order to contest the Zionist claims about the Jewish People's rights to the Land of Israel. To achieve this, the Palestinians trace their historical existence back to the ancient Phoenicians, simultaneously minimizing the fact that an independent Jewish kingdom existed there already in the biblical times. Arafat has even pictured Jesus as the first Palestinian martyr, in order to build a bridge to the Christian world.¹²

The Palestinians also mention the Holocaust frequently. They feel that Israel uses the Holocaust as a tool to further its interests. It is a widespread Palestinian notion that Israel owes its very existence to the guilt feelings of the other nations.

The argument appears in several different aspects. First, the need to assuage the guilt feelings of the Europeans does not justify establishing a Jewish state at the Palestinians' expense. Second, the Israelis have changed from victims to aggressors and are doing to the Palestinians what the Nazis did to the Jews. Third, the Holocaust never happened. World War II did happen, but all those concerned suffered equally from it, and the Jews just invented a tearjerker scenario in order to steal Palestine from its rightful occupants.

As mentioned above, the history of propaganda is rich in examples of demonization, intended to make the attacked party an object of hate, in order to make it psychologically easier for the new recruits to exercise violence towards the enemy in the battlefield.¹³

The demonizing messages about Israel have run rampant in the Palestinian media following the Oslo Accords.¹⁴ Israel has been described as a cancerous growth in the heart of the Arab nation. The Israelis have been pictured as murderers of children and drinkers of Palestinian blood; they have been likened to snakes and scorpions. *Hamas*, which integrates a nationalist outlook with extreme Islamism, frequently quotes anti-Jewish

¹² Palestinian Media Watch, "Jesus Misrepresented as 'Muslim Palestinian'".

¹³ Stone & Shoshani "Dealing with the Demonization of the Other", 188.

¹⁴ Reuters, "The Arab Propaganda War Against History".

passages from the Muslim tradition, describing the Jews as descendants of apes and pigs – while completely disregarding those passages in the Koran that praise the Jews. When Hillary Clinton, the then first lady of the U.S., visited the PA in 1999, Suha Arafat stated in a demonstration in Gaza that Israel was spreading poison in order to cause cancer among women and children in Gaza.¹⁵

Demonizing the Jews also enables the recruiting suicide bombers for attacks against Israeli citizens. Such activity is justified, according to *Hamas*, for there is no reason to differentiate between soldiers and citizens: both are the enemies of Islam. One notable example of praising anti-Israeli violence is the children's program on *Hamas'* television station, featuring Farfur, the Palestinian version of Mickey Mouse. Farfur praises armed resistance against the Zionist enemy, and particularly the *Shaheeds* who engage in it.¹⁶

8.1. The leader's image

Much can be learned from how one side of a conflict portrays the leaders of the other side. An enemy leader is typically seen as the embodiment of all the evils that originally brought about the conflict. His distorted image combines a representation of his own personality with that of the entire enemy nation.

The visual and verbal portrayal of Ariel Sharon was particularly vicious. The Arabs remembered that it was he who failed to protect the two refugee camps, Sabra and Shatilla, during the First Lebanon War. Sharon was described in the most extreme, demonic *Der Stürmer* style: a monster, a drinker of children's blood, a sadist who enjoys the sufferings of Palestinians.

During the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip – the city of Gaza had been ceded decade earlier – Sharon's demonization ceased for a while, in order to enable him to force the withdrawal on Israel. During the negotiations his soon-to-be successor, Ehud Olmert, was at first described only as a devious rogue. When Operation Cast Lead began in December 2008 and Olmert became Sharon's successor, a torrent of vicious caricatures followed. Netanyahu was viewed as a puppet of the United States, a schemer and a subversive. When political negotiations reached a dead-end, Netanyahu was described as leading a cabinet of angels of death.¹⁷

¹⁵ BBC News, "Hillary Clinton Criticizes Mrs. Arafat".

¹⁶ MEMRI TV, "Farfour, Hamas' Mickey Mouse Character".

¹⁷ Palestinian Media Watch, "Demonization of Jews/Israelis".

9. The Palestinians as presented by Israel

By perusing cartoons of Arafat published in the Israeli press, one can learn about the Israeli psyche regarding the conflict in general. One gets the impression that the Israelis don't really understand the Palestinians. Arafat's colourful personality may have influenced the decision makers – but in the cartoons he is nevertheless seen as a ridiculous figure, not as a political leader.

The cartoonists, as supreme journalists whose work is akin to main newspaper articles, did not fully understand what Arafat had in mind, i.e. to deceive Israel into believing that he had given up hope for a Palestinian state. Even when the caricaturists criticized Israeli prime ministers, if Arafat was included in the picture, he was portrayed as passive, at best. At worst, he was presented as being irresponsible. The caricaturist in *Yediot Aharonot*, the most widely distributed centre/left newspaper in Israel, tended to depict both the prime ministers and Arafat as children.

When the Israeli caricaturists criticized Arafat, they depicted him as feigning ignorance: as a two-faced man, a child caught red-handed, or a person lighting a Molotov cocktail with his eyes closed. In an Israeli newspaper Arafat was never portrayed as a slaughterer of children with blood dripping from his teeth. Instead, the discrepancy between his peace-promoting statements and the terror attacks sanctioned by him was commented upon.

The liberal-leftist *Haaretz* mostly avoided condemning Arafat in its caricatures during the entire period of Oslo, from 1993 onwards. Even at the height of the suicide bombings, it attacked more the Moslem fundamentalists – along with the Jewish fundamentalists, who, according to the editors, provoked them – and less the mainstream PLO headed by Arafat. Only when information began leaking of Arafat's involvement in the terror attacks was any criticism levelled at him, and still without exploiting any laughable visual characteristics, such as his eternal two-day stubble and the shaking lower lip. That said, during the period of deepest disappointment, Ze'ev portrayed Arafat several times with glasses made of bombs. This of course had a double interpretation. It could have meant that Arafat sees the world from an active terrorist perspective, or that he had absorbed so many bombs that it influenced his world view. There was always a great restraint towards Arafat and the *Fatah*, as they symbolized the mainstream Palestinian society.

Two other sources convey how Israel views its enemy: the propaganda films of the Foreign Ministry and the IDF's psychological warfare messages. Over the past four decades, the Foreign Ministry's Information

Department has produced a small number of videos aimed for Western audiences. Most of them present the so-called 'beautiful side of Israel', i.e. Israel's contributions to the development of the third world and its agricultural, medical, and technological cooperation with other countries.

Some of the films deal with the relationship between Jews and Arabs, mainly in the visual context of Jerusalem, where Arab peasants are seen mingling with traditionally dressed Orthodox Jews. The constant message is as follows: 'yes, there are problems, but we hope for peace', complete with visual hints about Israel's contribution to the development of the West Bank, e.g. reducing infant mortality and raising the standard of living.

This romantic image of the East disintegrated during the suicide bombings of the Second Intifada (2000-5), as a reaction to the suicide terror, which had begun already in the mid-1990s – only three years after the signing of the Oslo Accords that produce a Palestinian state. Criticism of the Oslo Accords was restrained by a government campaign that among other things coined an Orwellian concept of 'victims of peace'. The First Intifada (1987-91) had been a campaign of fairly controlled violence, with almost no use of firearms. The second one, started by Arafat, was openly violent. Suicide bombers blew up buses in Jerusalem in what seemed almost like routine fashion.

At this point, the dove-like Foreign Ministry finally produced several films in which Palestinians are equated with terror. The effect is achieved by first showing Israeli children playing in a park. Then the image shifts suddenly. The children are seen through a sniper's sight, the aim passing from one child to another. The cumulative effect is that an anonymous Arab decides which child will live and which will not, making the Arab synonymous with terror and violence. At the end of these clips, which were disseminated on DVDs – a huge innovation for a ministry that, for budgetary reasons, was in the habit of asking embassies to return video cassettes sent to them, in order to erase and reuse them – the spectator sees the charred, blood-spattered buses, even though without any human remains.

In that aspect, there is a crucial difference between the Palestinian and Israeli approaches. Starting from the First Intifada, the Palestinians invited the media to report on their mourning. Since then it became common practice for the media to be present at funerals and in hospitals; photographers (both Palestinian and foreign) were encouraged to enter the hospitals to take pictures. Scenes involving the remains of a *Hamas* or *Fatah* activist after being hit by an Israeli missile were also made accessible for the media. To add to the effect the locals would even dip

their hands in the blood and wave various body organs. These pictures appeared in the Israeli press as well.

In contrast, in Israel photographers were banned from hospitals after terror attacks, in order to maintain the privacy of the wounded. This policy was changed after many of Israel's friends abroad claimed that Israel was losing the media war, and hence the world's support, as the media was showing only the Palestinian casualties, and none of the carnage they wreak on Israelis.

An especially demonic image was provided by a lynching that occurred in Ramallah in 2000. Two Israeli reservists mistakenly entered PA territory, and were arrested by the newly established Palestinian police force. A mob burst into the police station and beat the two soldiers to death. All footage of the event was confiscated by the Palestinian police, but one cassette remained, and was purchased by Israel. In it, one sees the bodies of the soldiers being thrown out a second-storey window; at the window stands a young man holding up his blood-stained hands in a gesture of triumph.

Israel publicized this picture in a roundabout – and therefore very effective – way, for once creating an image of the Palestinians as being bloodthirsty.

9.1. Flyers of the IDF's Psychological Warfare Unit

Flyers disseminated by the IDF's Psychological Warfare Unit show how, through visual means, the IDF thought to convince the Palestinians to stop suicide bombings. The most notable flyer shows a group of terrorists firing a missile towards Israel, with the missile swinging around and returning to the Gaza Strip. The message was that shooting missiles is eventually detrimental to the Palestinians themselves.

Another notable flyer showed the picture and told the story of a female suicide bomber who was caught before the act. The young woman, whose chances of getting married were impaired due to a burn scar on her face, was exploited by *Hamas* recruiters. Her story was made public on the flyer, which was distributed in the Gaza Strip.

The goal in these two cases was to blacken *Hamas'* image among the local population in Gaza.

10. Conclusion

In an attempt to bridge the gap in conventional military force between Israel and the Palestinians, the latter have wisely chosen the option of propaganda. In a campaign that has lasted four decades and has used the complementary strategies of terror and limited guerrilla warfare, they have managed to persuade Israeli decision makers and large parts of the Israeli public to create a *de facto* Palestinian state.

Israel, on the other hand, has counted on conventional force. Respectively, it has not been able, save for some feeble attempts, to counter the Palestinian propaganda challenge. Israel abhors propaganda on the grounds of being a Western liberal democracy, in addition to the horrendous experiences with Dr. Goebbels.

Such limitations, similar to all Western democracies, are nonexistent in the Arab world that perceives propaganda as a rightful tool of the ruler. As a result, the Palestinians have set up, admittedly through a trial-and-error process, large networks of smaller organizations to handle information. These organizations seem independent, but have been coordinated largely by powers above. Their activists on the field document events, make sure the media received access, and even sometimes stage scenes for the benefit of the media.

In contrast, Israel has had very few resources to deal with information and much energy has been spent on turf-level struggles. As a result, Israel has usually taken a defensive and apologetic stance. Over time, this has created the impression that Israel is always guilty, at least to some extent.

The propaganda know-how of the Palestinians comes from various sources. They have studied the revolutionary cases of Cuba, China, and Vietnam. They have translated works of Western academics and practitioners in the field, and have hired help from the top consultants of Madison Avenue.

The Palestinians were aided by the fact that Israeli society is split on its stand regarding the West Bank or Judea and Samaria, whereas the Palestinians are united in demanding an independent state; this makes their messages much clearer. In addition, while in Israel it is rare for a government to complete its four-year term, the Palestinians were ruled by Yasser Arafat for four decades. This enabled them to hammer in the basic theme of 'justice', and force the Israelis to understand that failure to fulfil the Palestinian demands will cost them dearly on the international arena.

Demonizing Israel has been an effective tool to reach that goal. It overshadows any rational counterargument, and when applied offensively,

the Israelis could only yield. Accusations of Israelis poisoning wells in Gaza came in quick succession with accusations of terror and massacre.

While the IDF was investigating a charge of misconduct, it had to deal with an accusation of 'gassing' (using tear gas, eventually). When that was settled, out came a campaign of slaughtering civilians or the targeted killings of terrorist leaders. This all caused a sense of tiredness and a will to disengage from the Palestinians, which resulted in withdrawal and the building of a separation fence, which was naturally turned into an 'Apartheid Wall'.

The discourse between the two sides is best described through visual means. The medium of dissemination chosen was the political cartoon. In the case of the Palestinians, where media control by the government was very strong, it was obvious that the messages reflected the government policy. In Israel, where the media enjoys more freedom, the newspapers, interestingly enough, were very critical of the government. Yet in many cases, for instance during the height of the suicide bombings, the editorial line was critical of the Palestinians.

The Palestinians were using anti-Semitic images to describe the Israelis in ways that were openly reminiscent of the Nazi visual language. The effect of demonization was achieved through portraying Israelis as predatory animals, bloodthirsty and distorted. Meanwhile, the Israelis were portraying Palestinians as scheming and cunning people who, while preaching peace, used violence unfairly.

Both sides were using each other's leaders to crystallize a message. The Israeli cartoonists had an easier job because Arafat was the Palestinians' leader for four decades, whereas the Palestinians had to deal with four prime ministers. The anti-Semitic visual vocabulary offered great help, yielding a century of visual symbolism at their disposal.

The Israelis were losing the visual battle – with a cumulative message that was defensive – whereas the Palestinian cumulative message was aimed at a primeval level of demonization. In addition, there is hardly any criticism expressed in the Palestinian media towards its own leaders.

Apparently, a liberal distaste for gross methods is not helpful in winning hearts and minds, during neither political nor military battles. The Palestinian suicide bombers, at the beginning of the Second Intifada, said in their videotaped testimonies that what convinced them to offer the utmost sacrifice was the image, prefabricated as it turned out, of the young Muhammad Al-Dura lying dead in his father's arms.

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THE ENEMY IN A POSTMODERN AGE: MILITARY ORGANISATION PERSPECTIVE

AKI-MAURI HUHTINEN

‘In the country of the blind the one-eyed man is king’
—Plato’s myth of the cave

In May 2011, US Special Forces captured and killed Osama bin Laden, who had tormented the world with terror-war for ten years. The war against terrorism culminated in this Al Qaida leader, who was the most wanted (dead or alive) man for the Western intelligence agencies.

The US government made the decision not to release photo material of dead Osama. Instead, they released a picture of an old, pathetic man, alone and wrapped in blankets, staring at images of himself on television. This picture symbolizes the information age enemy: pathetic, sick, even somewhat psychopathic old pervert staring at a television.

Just like Osama, Saddam Hussein was presented as a poor bum after his capture. This imagery can be seen as an analogy to the Hollywood-style cinematic serial killers and paedophiles. Outside these images the winners are young, beautiful, athletic and righteous. This concept of the enemy is manufactured according to a meticulous information operation script, where images function as evidence in the global media. These images are the measure of credibility. You are what you look like, and the enemy will decide of your success.

The US government has carefully assessed the aesthetic value systems of both the Western and the Islamic worlds before presenting the losers without dignity. The losers do not have to be respected and they do not have to be brought to justice, but instead they can be eliminated like parasites from among us bold and the beautiful. These procedures are widely accepted in the Western culture, as long as the winners do not celebrate their victory in public. The loser is gotten rid of like body fat at the gym. Is this something we can call conspiracy? That may well be so.

1. Introduction

In the art of war the enemy has been a necessary part of combat. As we now walk along the path of organized violence following the signs provided by Military Science, the talk of an enemy in political rhetoric becomes rarer and rarer. The more widely used concepts are those of opponent or competitor, or even the economically suitable concept of customer. We live in dangerous times: wars do no longer pop up in political speeches or rhetoric, and the enemy 'no longer exists', yet at the same time military battles are fought around the world, violations of human rights are commonplace and the arms industry is well off.

In this article I intend to shed some light on the way how an enemy turns from a visible to an invisible enemy. This change is a consequence of the global economy, supported by the information industry. In the western world speed is seen as a virtue. Speeding something up, or speed itself, makes things invisible. The human eye cannot see a missile flying in the sky, a virus advancing inside the human body or the information streams of a computer. Winning the struggles in our time is based on the ability to move faster than the opponent or adversary. If you are slow, you become visible, and at the same time vulnerable: a possible target of your opponent to strike. The slogan of our time, in politics, economy as well as warfare, is to be agile.

One way to get people to believe the different representations of the enemy are to infiltrate their imagination. We are moving from a rational world view into a postmodern reality of storytelling, where new information technology and visual culture lure people into stories. The basic plot always include the idea of 'good' vs. 'evil' or 'right' vs. 'wrong'. In every story there is a possibility to identify with the story, for creating an identity. This is how, without noticing it, we create ourselves and our opposites.

Human beings are storytellers. We are mythology makers. Myths, in the sense of communally shared grand narratives, are fundamental in understanding ourselves and our predicament as mortal, sexed beings. Myths show how we place ourselves against the framework of the cosmos and how we imagine our place within the vast stage of creation. Narrative reconstruction is an attempt to reconstitute and repair identity between the body, the self, and the world.¹

¹ Riessman, *Narrative methods for the human sciences*, 57; Armitage, "Militarized Bodies: An Introduction".

2. From Skopos to Diaspora

Killing is central to war. War, as premeditated violence, is therefore highly institutionalized as a social practice. War, revolution and genocide are closely related modes of organized political violence. Genocide has become an important part of the new wars, in which a key aim of state elites has been to destroy the power of certain groups, various urban as well as ethnic communities, and with this the lives of many of their own people.²

Our peace is not an automatic result of industrialism; it has been obtained through blood-letting in two world wars. Western peace has been based on massive war preparations, as well as on the scores of many smaller wars in the periphery of the Western world.³ Killing in war has to be intellectually prepared. Before men kill, they have to think that the killing they do will be accepted. The killers can be prepared to think of killing, but this activity has to be made acceptable also in the society at large.⁴ Since killing is no longer acceptable even in a combat situation in the western civilian society, the concept of enemy has become invisible.

A battlefield of today is a complex setting, with multiple and overlapping spaces of violence. Bombing a target is not just bombing the industry but also the morale. It aims to destroy not only the physical infrastructure of arms production of the enemy, but also their social, political and emotional basis. The direct, personal humiliation of the enemy is more important than the destruction of social power. Violation of the body, with maximum pain, has become a common method of violence. If the physical battlefield has become more specialized, the psychological battlefield remains broadly conceived.⁵

The mechanisms of memory are often directly politicized and propagandized. The propaganda mobilization of mass media is the basic model of the media role in conflict.⁶ For example, Wikileaks and social media, such as Facebook, are changing the nature of information in conflicts and crises. The rise of social media is creating a comeback of not only propaganda, but of conspiracy theories. Secret agents are not necessarily foreign agents hacking into your system or spies who have infiltrated the organization from within. They may be ordinary young men

² Shaw, *The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq*, 19-21, 49-50.

³ Ibid., 87.

⁴ Ibid., 100.

⁵ Ibid., 130-1, 137-8.

⁶ Ibid., 120-1.

or women, who exploit the complex nature of social networking. The status of social networks is undefined and in many cases unclear. Some organizations encourage the use of for example Facebook, as an effort to promote 'transparency'. At the same time, the use of social media is under constant control. Social media fuses work and personal life, and encourage a particular type of narcissistic social behaviour. People are eager to present their work information along with flattering photos to their social network and their contacts. Facebook profiles are reputation management and quickly replacing business cards. The problem arises when the 'strategic corporals' enter the network. A single soldier may make his organization extremely vulnerable (as was demonstrated by Wikileaks and Bradley Manning), and at the same time, a single person may exploit social networks like never before.

According to Sun Tzu the acme of the Art of War is a victory without fighting. Sun Tzu was an ancient Chinese military general, strategist and philosopher, who is traditionally believed to have authored *the Art of War*, an influential handbook book on military strategy. The ultimate art of war is winning without fight. Chess can be considered a game connected to the art or war such as winning without fight. It follows a clear and rational pattern, but the endless number of options makes it chaotic, creative, sudden and even tragic. In his classic piece the Iliad Homer describes in the spirit of Sun Tzu, through the warriors Hector and Achilles, the two central roles of warfare: warfare controlled by duty and warfare controlled by emotion.

These two characters have obvious differences in their approaches on how they fit the heroic matrix that they both try to conform into. However, despite their differences, and the fact that they belong to opposing armies and meet each other with hatred in battle, they also have numerous similar traits that logically allow a comparison between the two men. Both display a behaviour that could be described as heroism. Achilles, who fights for the Greeks, and Hector, who fights for the Trojans, act differently first when it comes to their approach war and the inevitable violence and death that accompany it.⁷

This duality can be seen throughout the history of the western art of war. Sometimes the rational and normative nature of warfare (Hector) is emphasised, sometimes the intuitive, subconscious and emotional nature of warfare (Achilles). Henri Jomini (1779-1869) developed geometric and mathematical models for warfare, whereas Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) saw that war cannot be controlled rationally and it is always affected by chance or friction.

⁷ <http://www.freeessays.cc/db/18/enq79.shtml>, 6.5.2011.

Today the advanced mobile technology, the Internet and the entertainment industry immensely exploit the experiences from wars and conflicts, for example as ideas for computer games. In return, the military industrial complex modifies its own language [for example in the concept of information operations] with the help of applications rising from the entertainment industry. The roles of Hector and Achilles, the teachings of Jomini and Clausewitz have an effect in the background of games and gaming.

Jomini divided military activity into three categories -- strategy, grand tactics, and logistics. He provided early definitions for modern concepts such as the 'theatre of operation'. Significantly, in contrast with Clausewitz, Jomini had little concern for political implications. To Clausewitz war was an extreme but natural extension of politics -- the ultimate tool of diplomacy. In his words, 'War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.' Both Jomini and Clausewitz agreed, that total victory could only be achieved through attack.⁸

The most important genres in gaming are 'strategy', 'adventure', 'shooter', 'sports', 'simulation', 'music', 'role playing' and 'puzzle'. All of these relate to warfare one way or another. Another interesting fact is that in the 1950's the first computer games were mathematic, strategy based games that had been developed in universities. According to Robert Kagan,⁹ American military hegemony has made it possible for Europeans to believe that power as such is no longer important. Europe is turning away from power. To put it differently, it is moving beyond the use of naked power, into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant's 'Perpetual Peace'. The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world, where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and defence and promotion of liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.

⁸ Osgood, "Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini and Military Strategy".

⁹ Kagan, "Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently".

Table 1: The classical dichotomy of warriors

Warriors	Philosophy	Military Strategy	Area
Hector	Immanuel Kant: duty & rationality, rules, control	Jomini	Europe
Achilles	Hegel, Hobbes & Nietzsche: emotion & chance, violence	Clausewitz	The United States

The question of enemy in the information age is always relative. Everyone can be, or become, an enemy. We are all potential enemies, or allies, while using Internet and social media, communicating and acting as different kinds of groups, even though we have no idea of their ultimate purposes. The whole global information culture is based on the idea of a so called ‘botnet’. A botnet is a collection of infected computers or bots that have been taken over by hackers (also known as bot herders) and are used to perform malicious tasks or functions. A computer becomes a bot when it downloads a file (e.g., an email attachment) that has a bot software embedded in it.¹⁰ This botnet evokes the Dostoyevsky-style idea that we are all guilty of everything.¹¹ The so called ‘diffused audience’¹² describes a situation in which everyone becomes an audience all the time. Thus there is no possibility to analyze beforehand who will be the target audience in the specific case. The decisions are made through automated surveillance of both online and offline behaviour. These surveillance technologies ‘screen out’ the normal, but bring into focus the unusual behaviour.¹³

The figure of the ‘unknown terrorist’ is ethically problematic: if a person’s behaviour fits the behavioural patterns of previous terrorists, does that make the person a terrorist-to-be, even if they do not know it? It is the case where the response before the event can never be a responsible response. This means that we have no still and initial pictures of war as a representation of heroes or villains because of linked, transmitted, reconceptualised, and fabricated images of warfare and combat. The authority of a source is no longer the representation of our memory. This

¹⁰ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botnet>, 29.5.2011.

¹¹ Williams, *Dostoevsky. Language, Faith, and Fiction*.

¹² Hoskins and O’Loughlin, *War and Media. The Emergence of Diffused War*, 14.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 15.

means that we have no access to battle space as an audience. Thus the mediation (thesis) interacts with our everyday lives (antithesis) to produce our understanding of the world (synthesis)¹⁴

Narratives can be seen as a chain of happenings that leads from a situation to another and typically contains eventfulness and certain unpredictability).¹⁵ These features, combined to certain gaps in the narration, are the foundation for all strategy. One of these strategies is conspiracy and conspiracy theories. Strategic communication and conspiracy theories have the same structures and patterns. The ultimate aim of them both is to deliver a reputation. In military discourse this process is known as the 'Battle of Narratives', an information operation that exploits emotions by attempting to win the 'hearts and minds'.

We are moving from the control model of 'Big Brother is Watching for You' to the model of 'Everyone is Watching Each Other'. The *skopos* of Antiquity was a watcher or watchman, someone stationed on the *skopia* the high ground as a lookout. The *skopos* hides out, and marks the game. In a military idiom he is spy or scout. Michel Foucault (1926-1984) speaks about a *panopticon*; the ultimate cost-benefit model of a human controller.

The social media as well as cyberspace in general allow the exploitation of the Trojan horse concept, which has become the model for human behavior in all aspects of social life. If we act in the Trojan spirit, we are living in a conspiracy where our beliefs and the facts no longer meet. Mika Mannerman refers to this polarization of social constructions with the concept 'ubiquitous society': everyone is present everywhere, all the time. The Big Brother is replaced by us, who are observing and controlling our physical and virtual environments. Conspiracy and paranoia are the foundation pillars of society. To some, this aquarium represents safety, and to some it appears as a source of angst. Our past is stored online and our virtual footprints construe an identity that we cannot entirely control. The free will of the individual is driven by the global (conspiratory) networks, which remain unseen. The safer the world becomes, the more we fear. The more we have information, the more we are driven by paranoia.¹⁶

At the same time, the *skopos* is also the object on which one fixes one's eye, the mark itself, the target. It functions as a kind of a hinge that joins and at the same time separates the marker from the mark. It is

¹⁴ Ibid., 15, 23, 63.

¹⁵ Schmidt, *Narratology*.

¹⁶ Mannerman, *Jokuveli: Elämä ja vaikuttaminen ubiikkiyhteiskunnassa* [Somebrother: Life and Influence in Ubiquitous Society].

attached both to the one who aims and to what is aimed at, simultaneously detaching them and then moving to another mark.¹⁷

The notions of *panopticon* or *skopos* are no longer valid enough to describe the control models for the Information Age. Stone walls, barbed wire, concrete and steel are visible signs of power. New threats and enemy representations move in information networks, crossing physical boundaries easily. The enemy should be seen more as a potential, demanding precautions to prevent that potential from realising. However, this leads us to ethical challenges: how can we prevent something that has not yet happened.

The so-called 'diffused audience' refers to the situation where it is not possible to analyze or profile the target audience in the specific situation. In cyberspace this means that decision-making is based on automated surveillance of both online and offline behaviour. These surveillance technologies 'screen out' the normal but bring into focus the unusual behaviour. The figure of the 'unknown terrorist' is ethically problematic: if a person's behaviour fits the pattern of previous behaviour characteristic terrorists in the recent past, does that make the person a terrorist-to-be? It is the case where the response before the event can never be a responsible response.¹⁸

The social media raises hopes that globalisation and the Information Age would eliminate hostility and discord among people. The *Facebook* is the new piazza where people exchange thoughts, the topics ranging from relationships to work related issues. But discord and enemy representations will not disappear so easily. Anxiety and dependency on the continual redefinition of the borders of a person's identity will create virtual tribes, consisting of different types of people. At the same time the new tribes will create their own virtual enemy representations with their new borders. Cyber strangers are a new type of potential enemy. On a state level cyberspace is still without rules: is it a normalising space, the home of economic activity and democracy, or is it perceived more as a threat and a target of hostility, to be internationally militarized and criminalized.

A *diaspora* (scattering, dispersion) denotes 'a movement, migration, or scattering of a people away from an established or ancestral homeland'. In academic context it has been defined as a people dispersed, by whatever cause, to more than one location. The traumas that gave birth to diaspora communities play an integral role in the identity formation for these communities. The delusion of alterity in the figure of the wanderer in

¹⁷ Bishop, *Modernist Avant-Garde Aesthetics and Contemporary Military Technology. Technicities of Perception*, 198.

¹⁸ Hoskins and O'Loughlin, *ibid.* 14-5.

diaspora finds an analogous form in the image of the individual that passes for the political subject. They are the necessary result of state sovereignty. The relative alterities give rise to the delusion of an absolute alterity.¹⁹

A grand narrative or a strategy is not something that groups, organizations, states, institutions or firms have. It is something that people do, don't do, could do or wish to do. We are moving from epistemological and technological understanding to a *phronesis* world understanding. This means more practical wisdom and tacit knowledge. Also we can speak about cunning intelligence, i.e. *metis*. This is one type of intelligence. *Metis* combines flair, wisdom, forethought, subtlety of mind, deception, resourcefulness, vigilance, opportunism, skills and experience acquired over the years. *Metis* and *pronesis* mean that someone is street-smart in their understanding of the world.²⁰ Resistance is the key narrative theme of a history of a power shift. For example, Hezbollah's main narrative is based on the grand story of all people sharing resistance against Israel.²¹

Street-smarts, *metis* or deception have for long been a military art – not a craft, much less a science. Deception has been transmitted from practitioner to practitioner by direct personal instruction or historical example. Still, deception is one of those odd strategic techniques of war, like psychological warfare.²² Emotions have always been prey to psychological operations: Perception management aims to reinforce and influence the sense or collective identity and the experience of 'us' vs. 'them'. However, users of the social media have the need to express individuality.

Slavoj Žizek (1949-) neatly sums up the content of this chapter. 'According to postmodern wisdom, there is no objective reality: reality consists of the multiple stories we tell ourselves about ourselves. In these terms then, was not the recent war in Georgia very postmodern? There were indeed several stories in play: the story of small heroic democratic state defending itself against the imperialist ambitions of post-Soviet Russia; of the US attempt to encircle Russia with military bases; of the struggle for the control of oil resources; and the list could go on. However, rather than get lost in this maze of competing stories, we might focus instead on that missing element whose lack triggers the ongoing profusion of political storytelling'.²³

¹⁹ Bishop, *ibid.* 175, 179, 181.

²⁰ Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl and Vaara, *Cambridge Handbook of Strategy as practice*, 37.

²¹ Cauton, Greenmyer, Groh and Waddell, *Information as power*.

²² Whaley, *Stratagem. deception and surprise in War*, 3.

²³ Žizek, *Living in the End Times*, 164-5.

The speed is a key element of the narratives. According to Wreden, ‘an elevator pitch gets its name from the 30-second opportunity to tell – and sell – your story during a three- or four-storey elevator ride. It’s one reason why the standard commercial or television ‘sound bite’ lasts 30 seconds.’²⁴ But you have to have your goals clear and also know the subject matter better than the other pitchers. You also have to find an audience, which would benefit from your information. You can start with introduction; next describe the clear of the problem; outline potential benefits; and last one you ask to permission to proceed next step. You have to make an immediate connection with the audience. Clarity is more powerful than jargon. Use analogues the audience can relate to. Emotional appeals are also powerful. A timely pause is an effective attention-getter. It gives you time to think and it gives your listener an opportunity to hear. Use video to evaluate your own performance.

3. Conspiracies as the *aesthesis* of violent actions

The idea of conspiracy keeps the demand for enemies alive. According to Airaksinen, conspiracies do exist. The first model of conspiracy is an anxiety reduction model. For example, authorities asking citizens to calm down in the critical situation without real purpose to take care of the citizens. The second refers to the disappointed hopes of paternalism, a situation in which a more powerful agent helps and protects the weaker one even against his or her own will. I do not trust my guardian but I do not see to my security situation either. A belief in security may change into the strongest type of disbelief, resulting in a conspiracy theory: ‘We have not been protected, we have been secretly attacked.’²⁵

Many revolutions started as conspiracies. A conspiracy theory is always irrational in the sense that its evidence base is faulted. The epistemic assent to it may be a paranoid expression of powerlessness in a situation where the facts and their logic become psychologically both incomprehensible and unbearable.

We can only speculate how large of a role did social media play in spreading the campaigns in the Arab countries in the spring of 2011, which led to the younger generations protesting against the older generations in power. Various kinds of mercenaries and criminal organizations infiltrated the freedom fighters; their intent was to incite violence for their own economic gain and not to advance true democracy.

²⁴ Wreden, “How to make your case in 30 seconds or less”.

²⁵ Airaksinen, “Conspiracy as a dirty secret: the case of 9/11”, 123-5.

The metamorphosis of an enemy shifts from form to form without the intervention of values. The acceptable picture of enemy for western societies can be constructed by Osama bin Laden model. Words refer to each other, creating a pure event. Ideas or concepts are all reversible. Good can always be turned into evil, truth into falsehood etc. Passivity and servility are a form of conspiracy too.²⁶ A good example of this is the phenomena surrounding the raid on Osama bin Laden, where the U.S. administration decided not to publish the photos showing the dead bin Laden. This way the administration attempted to minimize the elimination of the symbol of the War on Terror, and to maximize the domestic political benefit for the forthcoming U.S. presidential elections. The economic problems of the United States were, for a moment, covered with a 9/11 remembrance ritual that united the nation. As we know from the history of propaganda, a classic way to focus people's attention on a particular event is to cover the actual move under a larger move. The media does excellent tricks, feeding the existence of conspiracy theories.

The technology of visual culture relies on the power of speed. In order to represent it, it must be slowed down. Making and acting are different. The non-productive aspects of life lived under technological domination, which technology tends to ignore, contain or – when these are not possible – destroy the objects. Optoelectronic technology constantly creates new demands for separating the visible from the invisible because it consistently renders visible which had been invisible. There is the promise of absolute visibility despite the alternative sensations (hearing, smell, touch, muscular motion). Art does not only reproduce visible things, but also makes things visible. Today we reveal the reality behind visible things.²⁷

The images of Osama bin Laden's dead body, and the U.S. administration's decision not to publish them, is creating a new kind of image climate around the War on Terror. Coincident with the killing of Osama bin Laden are discussions on cutting the defence budget of the United States. Capturing bin Laden provides an opportunity to create a two-sided image: on the one hand economic resources can be transferred from security to social issues, on the other, the fight against terrorism is not over and still requires constant organisational transformation from the U.S. military. The military is connected more and more into the politically controlled military-industrial complex.²⁸

²⁶ Baudrillard, *The Conspiracy of Art*, 73-4.

²⁷ Bishop, *ibid.*, 7-8.

²⁸ Shaw, *ibid.*

I-You relations are the foundation of all discourse. To make you slow, blind and therefore visible, make the I fast, sighted and invisible. Success would thus be a matter of total destruction. To understand speed, it has to be slowed down. The questions of perception, deception and speed are tied together. The military helicopter as a 'subject' or 'identity' addresses its victims, who indeed may feel, for a moment – who would know? Technology promises more than it can provide in this sense, for time will not stand still even for a helicopter, but the intensification of the attempt to reduce the delay that temporality inevitably imposes has produced a forceful adversary.²⁹

The U.S. Navy SEALs³⁰ raid into Pakistan and the killing of Osama bin Laden epitomises the 'helicopter metaphor'. A high-technology supported Special Operations Forces team, with information superiority, stealthily descends on the located target and eliminates him without outsiders' knowledge of what is happening. The operation is completed in a short moment, like a surgery. In the morning the local ordinary Pakistanis have no idea that Special Operations Forces from a foreign country have been in their neighbourhood.

The advertising of the military helicopter AH-IZ employs the 'Goodbye' image: 'We made it beautiful, because it is the last thing some (enemy) people will ever see'. The dividing line between the instrumental and the aesthetic is blurred in the advertising discourse, as well as in the high-technological military systems. This discourse allows the soldier as a machine user the choice and agency to reveal the invisible object that will kill the victim (at the speed it takes to make it visible), and to make his last moment aesthetically pleasing and overwhelming.

A cyborg, like Arnold Schwarzenegger's famous cyborg character in the movie *The Terminator* by James Cameron (1986) has eyes without tradition, without morals, and without prejudice, but is nonetheless able to interpret itself as a part of the world.³¹ Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dalí described this discourse in a great way in the movie *Un chien Andalou*. We are used to needing supplement devices for our vision. Only the computers and other machines will be able to read the non-image image of

²⁹ Bishop, *ibid.*, 54, 68.

³⁰ In the war on terror SEALs have been primarily used for direct action and special reconnaissance operations, and to a lesser extent unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, hostage rescue, counter-terrorism and other missions. Without exception, all SEALs are male members of either the United States Navy or the United States Coast Guard.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Navy_SEALs, 29.5.2011.

³¹ Bishop, *ibid.*, 44.

the future of warfare. They can fight without CNN, but not without human beings. Man has extended his means of perception and action much further than his means of representation and summation.

My knowledge of the Other is dependent on the twin possibilities of my acting on the Other and the Other acting on me. For military technology, making the enemy slow and temporally removed from the targets they wish to strike is just as essential as making them visible, audible and traceable. The military metaphor of ‘invisibility’ regarding radar sight requires a type of technological synaesthesia, as the mechanised vision of the radar system depends on sound waves. Penetration technologies make aircraft ‘invisible’ to the radar.³²

An Auschwitz survivor, Jewish writer Primo Levi describes the struggle for survival in the concentration camp as more of a fight against an invisible enemy. This invisible enemy is inside every one, in the form of the risk of falling ill. Any wound or illness in the body that made one unable to work was a worse enemy than the *kapos* or Nazi guards of the camp. Analogous to this, in the fight on terror the fear remains a part of us although Osama bin Laden has been killed. We primarily fear an unseen threat that can transform itself from environmental pollution, illnesses and cyber-threats to shocking pictures and sounds. Clear-cut enemies exist no longer. The states of war and peace blend together and the difference between a friend and an enemy becomes relative in the networks: Friend today, enemy tomorrow.

One reason why Osama bin Laden never got in front of an international tribunal to recount his views was his past, when he had collaborated with the U.S. government. The more networked the world becomes, the more the unwanted developments pile up to form incredible risks. Ulrich Beck calls this transformation a risk society. We can also speak of mycelia of good and evil as well as of interdependencies.

The explicit goal of C3I – containment, control, communications, intelligence – in US and allied geo-political policy is a perfect, real-time visual control of the entire planet, to contain Communism.³³ The aesthetics of the ready-made allows us to access the logic of military technology.

4. Security and enemy

According to Airaksinen, one must separate combat/fighting, war and struggle from each other. A person struggles constantly, even against

³² Ibid., 85, 98, 100.

³³ Ibid., 150.

oneself, but taking up combat is an entirely different matter. No one can fight themselves. Another point worth noticing is that it is possible to fight without a war.³⁴

War is a special way of organising combat, or at least the threat of combat. Let us think about the Cold War, the model of a war without battles. War can exist without combat, and combat can exist without war. Military might may win numerous battles, or even all of them, like the USA in Vietnam, but still the state that the military represents loses the war. 'We won the battle but lost the war' is not a paradox. According to Airaksinen war and combat must be separated as accurately as possible.

A good example of combat, that has a mysterious relationship with the war, is the Afghanistan of 2011. There is a struggle going on there, the nature of which is very unclear.³⁵ Like Frank Furedi tries to prove in his book *Invitation to Terror*,³⁶ terrorism is such an unclear and difficult concept that the 'War on Terror' is transforming into a 'a Long War'. This semantic transition includes a long running message. The war in question is long, perhaps endless, and therefore something that can be seen not as an exception, but as a normal state. Terrorism is only a method, and one cannot wage war against a method. So the correct term would be war against terrorists. But who are they? An even better question, what war? This question concerns also the long war. Is there a war in Afghanistan? Are the peace-keeping countries at war? And if there is a war in Afghanistan, why are the Europeans there as peacekeepers?

As Airaksinen points out, president Obama is indeed waging war in Afghanistan.³⁷ Then again, the Taliban are terrorists and unlawful combatants, civilians who fire at US troops, and they are treated as such. Military personnel are an entirely different thing, particularly in the role of a prisoner of war. That is why there both is and isn't a war, consistent with the rhetoric nature of war today. President Obama wages a war when he wants, according to what is required, to get the benefit from the war rhetoric. He fights in any case, but wages war only on occasion. Airaksinen also says that a war in a developing country is a strange thing; it is plagued by a strangeness, which in turn is tied to rhetoric.³⁸ What else can you expect when the richest countries and strongest militaries in the world fight the poorest and most miserable countries of the world? Can

³⁴ Airaksinen, "Turvallisuudesta ja sodan etiikasta" [About the Security and the Ethics of War].

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Furedi, *Invitation to terror: the expanding empire of the unknown*.

³⁷ Airaksinen, *ibid*.

³⁸ Ibid.

there be a conflict any more dramatic than the one where the weakest faces the strongest in a fight to the death? Perhaps the question is misleading. The weakest is not weak, because the demonic forces of evil are behind him, and the curse of fanatical energy drives him on to meet democratic ethics and the good forces of science. From somewhere in the mountain caves a pack of *cynocephali* crawls out, wanting only to destroy and demolish things. They are not afraid to die. They are inhabitants of the developing countries, but they are not weak. Civilians are weak in their own primitive surroundings, but what is the difference between a civilian and a terrorist? Who is an innocent bystander? Does someone become a terrorist when they die? An affirmative answer helps us understand why modern war has so much civilian casualties and why the western countries accept such large numbers of civilian casualties. There is a conflict here also: in the western countries even one civilian casualty is a disaster, and two will cause a period of national mourning.

According to Airaksinen, people often say that they hope that things would change and the peace would return. Everyone wants peace. Everyone wants peace always. Peace in itself is a valuable state, which one would hope also to be the normal. People live in peace until there is a war. If there is no war, people live their normal lives. War breaks out; peace arrives. And with peace things become normal again.³⁹

But how is it really? Is the rhetoric once again different from the truth? Peace as the normal state may only be a mode of speaking and a phrase required by civilized discussion. Perhaps war is the normal state and peace is the exception to it.⁴⁰ How sensible does that make people's wish for peace? For example, the USA is strong enough to wage continuous war. Is the EU strong enough for that? The United States has a desire and willingness for continuous war. On the other hand it is possible and probably also necessary to speak of desire for peace.

The aboriginal people of Australia considered the war as the normal, but the fighting was not for destruction and they did not let the war to escalate into a total war. War was a ritualised combat whose purpose was to produce a victor with the minimum costs. It is a fine idea. Two sides face off and throw spears, spearing the opponents. Spears are thrown, deflected and evaded. When one of the combatants is badly hit, the combat stops. The war is over and the wounded are treated. Maybe compensation is paid for the dead. The battle has been fought and feuding is over, only to flare up again. A ritualised war like this can be normalised, and the community will live with it as a permanent part of their lives.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

5. A different kind of enemy

The so-called ‘diffused audience’ refers to the situation where it is not possible to analyze or profile the target audience in the specific situation. Diffused war is a name of a new paradigm of war in which the mediatization of war it makes possible to diffuse more causal relations between action and effect, creating greater uncertainty for policymakers in the conduct of war.⁴¹ Today both the sphere of policy and the sphere of business operate under the laws of marketing. Politicians cannot go without political advertising promoting them, and their policies resemble trademarks. In the case of war, propaganda campaigns are crucial to gain public support.⁴²

Because of nuclear weapons and cyber environment, warfare has become self-defeating and invalid as a means of policy. Warfare has to limit itself spatially and timewise. Young people are no longer socialized into the military. The mass consumer societies become post-military in the sense that most people’s lives are not directly affected by military institutions and wars anymore. People may easily support military preparations because they don’t seem to affect them.⁴³

In his Guidance of Counterinsurgency for ISAF soldiers and forces in Afghanistan general David H. Petraeus emphasised that western security assistance forces can no longer communicate to the fight. The local people decide which argument is the most attractive, most convincing, and has the greatest chance of success. The Taliban are not the only enemy of the local people. People are also threatened by inadequate governance, corruption, and abuse of political and economical power. The ‘enemy’ or adversary is the whole network, not just certain individuals or groups. The message is clear. First we have to develop the global plan to hold a country (and to build in it), before starting to clear or secure it. In the 21st century we have learnt nothing about how to fight without technology.

Can we trust the news in the media about distant suffering? Should the media prioritize sensation and urgency over objectivity and factuality, in order to make an audience care? Ethics mean that we have to ask ourselves how the pictures of suffering make us feel.

How are we supposed to feel? Do we always feel compassion for those we physically meet in normal life? Such representations urge us to analyze how much suffering the media should show, and what are the appropriate

⁴¹ Hoskins and O’Loughlin, *ibid.*, 3, 14.

⁴² Strazzanti, *Did the Media Sell War as a Product? The Case of Iraq War 2001-2003*.

⁴³ Shaw, *ibid.*, 5-7.

ways to present pain and misery? In relation to questions of power we must consider, who benefits if the distant suffering is low or absent from the news agenda.⁴⁴

War has degenerated during western history. Now we can understand war as genocide. The globalization of the Holocaust discourse templates the whole discussion of warfare. We have also Holocausts industrial processes like Hollywood's Steven Spielberg movies. The so called *testimony media* keeps alive the memorial culture based on the embodied process.⁴⁵ As with the war on terror it is ongoing and unfinished. The idea that an individual, group or society must remember, or rather must not forget, is entwined with the ethics of our time.

There is a great uncertainty about how and why people become radicalized, and about the role of media technologies in the process. Can people be radicalized just by looking at websites advocating violence? Or is it the other way round: that people only visit such websites once they are already radicalized, in which case the message of these websites simply confirms what they now believe?⁴⁶

6. How to create an enemy and lead him to defeat

When we construct our identity we also construct that which we are not. In a way the creation of the I is, at the same time, the creation of the You. The You always includes the possibility of becoming the enemy. Central to the creation of an enemy representation is understanding how we communicate and interact.

A *Johari window* is an interaction model that will help one to develop one's self-knowledge and relationships. It can also be used for improving team communications. Joseph Luft and Harry Ingham created the Johari window as a tool for cognitive psychology in the United States in 1955. The 'Johari' is derived from the first letters of the developers first names.

The window contains four areas that are constructed around two axes: openness and feedback. *Openness* shows how much information you share about yourself with others. *Feedback* shows how much you seek, receive and understand feedback from others. The two areas on the left side, Open and Hidden, describe how you see yourself. These areas contain the things you know about yourself. They can be simple facts or things you have done, but they can also be emotions, fears, beliefs or sources of

⁴⁴ Hoskins and O'Loughlin, *ibid.*, 39.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 107, 114-5.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 146.

motivation. The two top areas, *Open* and *Blind* describe how others see you. These areas contain the things that are familiar to those who are close to you. The *Unknown* area in the lower right corner includes things about you that neither you nor the others know about you as yet.

The Johari window appears different in different situations. This is because you most likely act differently at home and with friends than in a team or as a supervisor. The Johari window enables you to change and develop your interpersonal skills. When you enlarge the Open area, the comfort zone with you and others grows, and it will be easier to discuss things and emotions with others.

Table 3: A Johari table.

	I	Other
I	Hidden	Open
Other	Hidden	Open

Michel Foucault emphasizes that in the end it is not the job of the mind to bring things closer together, but to separate them in relation to priorities. The more distant things are, the more they need to fight for their identity (ontology and their epistemic). The end result is that because knowing is separating, history and science will be differentiated.⁴⁷ For example, when we browse through the profiles of our Facebook friends, we are inclined to think that others' lives are nicer and happier than our own. We also think that the bad aspects of our lives are worse than those of the others. We become 'Facebook jealous'. Those people whose Johari window is closed do not really open up about themselves in Facebook either. Reading our own profile will raise our self-esteem; we try to be better than we actually are.

Looking into the Facebook 'mirror' differs from looking into an ordinary mirror. Facebook does not make anyone a narcissist, but someone who is already narcissistic will use this platform far more eagerly than a non-narcissistic person. A narcissist spends more time in the social media than the others do. Those who have many friends in the social media spend much time there, and this time is away from the regular relationships. Updating your own profile creates anxiety, and not replying to your friends' messages creates guilt.

Most likely a social media addiction is like being addicted to alcohol, food or tobacco. A person's unhappiness with their own body and abilities

⁴⁷ Foucault, *Security, territory, population*, 70.

will increase the more they see pictures of ‘successful’ people. Facebook ridicules real relationships and turns them into objects. Sharing thoughts surpasses actual thinking: ‘I share, therefore I am.’

Continuous expectance of approval makes people feel guilty. In the social media people do not learn how to actually be alone. The fear of loneliness leads to angst and after that to hate, which in turn easily leads to different kinds of enemy perceptions.

Photos cannot capture either the existential or the metaphysical reality of the prisoners of war, in Nazi concentration camps or in Abu Ghraib. There are no personal verbal interpretations by prisoners. If suffering cannot be verbally represented, it cannot proceed to be politically represented. Pictures of damaged bodies are not enough to make suffering a public issue.⁴⁸

The question of identity is the question of enmity. This means the process how we define our onto-sociological limits of identity. The space we leave out of our ontological circle is unknown, and has a potential of becoming the enemy. *Seven Samurai* is a 1954 Japanese film co-written, edited and directed by Akira Kurosawa. A gang of marauding bandits approaches a mountain village. The bandit chief recognizes that they have ransacked the village before, and decides it is best that they spare it until the harvest, several months forward.

In film a villager happens to overhear the discussion. The news leaves the villagers divided about whether to surrender their harvest or to fight back against the bandits. They go to the village elder, who declares that they should fight, by hiring *samurai* to help to defend the village. Some of the villagers are troubled by this suggestion, thinking that the samurai are expensive to enlist and bound to lust after young farm women, but eventually realize that they have no choice. Since the villagers have nothing to offer to a prospective samurai except food, the village elder tells them to ‘find a hungry samurai.’

Seven Samurai describes the same situation as *The Prince* in Niccolo Machiavelli’s famous book or the *Iliad* Homer. Although the work advises princes how to tyrannize, Machiavelli is generally thought to have preferred some form of free republic. Some commentators justify his acceptance of immoral and criminal actions of the leaders by arguing that he lived in a time of continuous political conflict and instability in Italy. His influence is said to have increased the ‘pleasures, equality and freedom’ of many people, loosening the grip of the classical teleology of the medieval Catholicism, which ‘disregarded not only the needs of individuals and the wants of the common man, but stifled innovation,

⁴⁸ Hoskins and O’Loughlin, *ibid.*, 67.

enterprise, and enquiry into cause and effect relationships that now allow us to control nature’.

As they prepare for the siege in *Seven Samurai*, the villagers and their hired warriors slowly come to trust each other. However, when the samurai discover that the villagers have murdered and robbed fleeing samurai in the past, they are shocked and angry. Samurai Kyūzō even comments that he would like to kill everyone in the village. Samurai Kikuchiyo passionately castigates the others for ignoring the hardships that the farmers face in order to survive and make a living, despite the intimidation and harassment from the warrior class. This reveals his origins as a farmer's son to Kambei. ‘But who made them like this?’ he asks. ‘You did!’ The anger the samurai had felt turns to shame, and when the village elder, alerted by the clamour that this revelation instigates, asks if anything is the matter, Kambei humbly responds that there is not.

In film the preparations for the defence of the village continue apace, including the construction of fortifications and the training of the farmers for battle. Katsushirō, the youngest of the samurai, begins a relationship with Shino, the daughter of one of the villagers. Shino had been forced to masquerade as a boy by her father who hoped the deception would protect her from the supposedly lustful warriors. The three surviving samurai are left to observe the villagers happily planting the next crop. They reflect on the relationship between the warrior and farming classes: though they have won the battle for the farmers, they have lost their friends with little to show for it. ‘Again we are defeated,’ Kambei muses. ‘The farmers have won. Not us.’

The lessons of *Seven Samurai*, *The Prince*, the Iliad Homer or Sun Tzu are that a good and healthy identity of individuals and groups is based on the idea that in a good castle there is always a gate open to enemy. The ‘Know your enemy and you know yourself’ slogan is based on this. The enemy or adversary is always connecting to our own limits (of identity). The enemy is the mirror of our own identity.

7. Conclusion

The history of combat is primarily the history of radically changing fields of perception. In other words, war is not so much of about scoring territorial, economic or other material victories, but of appropriating the immateriality of perceptual field. The function of the eye has become the function of the weapons.⁴⁹ To understand the warfare of the information

⁴⁹ Virilio, *The aesthetics of disappearance*; Virilio, *Strategy of Deception*.

age we have to understand the concept of representation as a part of our violence process. Information warfare and information operations the physical target is not longer destroyed with kinetic systems, but through a process where non-kinetic systems, like information, scan the symbols-semiotics networks. For example, inside every Hector there is a bit of Achilles; personal weakness is signalled with aggression and revenge. Logic that is manifested on a state level transforms into individual behaviour. Leaders set the trends.

Documentaries and computer games also follow this logic. The entertainment industry, for its part, maintains the representations of justification and revenge. Sun Tzu and Michel Foucault arrived at the same result: security techniques differ from classical state power and the discipline of institutional organisations. They aim to control events and objects from the inside, by allowing them certain freedom and range. The aim is to control phenomena by creating a situation where the phenomena cancel themselves out.

A person may not by nature want to harm or kill another person, as Dave Grossman says.⁵⁰ The way which we grow into a culture through socialization also teaches us a relation to hate and violence and shows us how to direct it toward someone in an accepted way. Every culture that includes the concepts of fellow man and solidarity also carries with it the concepts of enemy and stranger.

When a person is taught respect towards others, be it through weapons or safety training, paradoxically the person at the same time learns how to hurt or kill another person. We should be very worried about how the social media and the Internet, as still ‘wild and free’ jungles, without common culture, effect our identity and the way how we see the enemy. We have no way of knowing the effects yet.

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CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Sarah Gendron is an Associate Professor of French at Marquette University, Milwaukee, USA. She has authored multiple articles and one book on literary theory, entitled *Repetition, Difference, and Knowledge*. She has also published several translations, including Simone de Beauvoir's 'Notes for a Novel.' Gendron's current research and most recent publications focus on visual and textual representations related to genocide in Europe, Cambodia, and Rwanda.

Professor Aki Huhtinen, LTC (G.S) is a Docent of Practical Philosophy in the University of Helsinki and Docent of Social Consequences of Media and Information Technology in the University of Lapland. The author is also a Docent of Information Security and Information Operations in the University of Technology in Tampere. Huhtinen works at the Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy at the Finnish National Defence University.

Dr. Tiina Lintunen is a research fellow at the Department of Political Science and Contemporary History, University of Turku, Finland. Her main research interests are war propaganda, particularly that of the Finnish Civil War of 1918, and the history of National Socialist Germany.

Dr. Ron Schleifer is a senior lecturer at the School of Communications at the Ariel University Center of Samaria. His research focuses on psychological warfare and the Middle East. His recent book *Perspectives of Psychological Operations* was published in 2011 by Sussex Academic Press.

Dr. Vesa Vares is Associate Professor of Political History in the University of Turku, and a Docent at the Universities of Tampere and Jyväskylä. His publications include books and articles about Finnish political history, especially on Finnish Conservatism, Liberalism and Populism. Vares' current research focuses on the German-Finnish relations from the late 19th century to 1944, the history of European political parties and the use of film in creating historical myths.

Dr. Marja Vuorinen (editor) is researcher at the Department of Political and Economic Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland. She has authored several articles and a book about historical enemy images and historical cases of hate speech, particularly as they appear in political propaganda. Her current research focuses on the interplay of self-images and enemy-images in identity construction, and on the complex role of aggressive rhetoric vis-à-vis political violence.